��ࡱ�>�� ����� � � � � � � � � ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������}� �R�0�bjbj�5�52��_�_�@ �������ZZ������������8�������4����������������������$2����`�� )�+��++������4��%�%�%�+�M������%�+��%�%�%������@������)l�.%�q���0��%�4��T4�%�4��%�L�Z@%�U4���������g�������++++��������������������������������������������������������������������4����������Zi: AUTHOR’S PREFACE A SHORT history of any subject should not simply be an abridgement of a larger one. It should be a picture complete in itself, rather than a mere inventory of names and “isms.’ To achieve this, the author should, as a Chinese expression says, “have the whole history in his mind. Only then can he give the reader an adequate and well-rounded account within his chosen limited scope. According to Chinese historiography, a good historian must have wide scholarship in order to master all his materials, sound judgment to make proper selection of them, and literary talent in order to tell his story in an interesting way. In writing a short history, intended for a general public, the author certainly has less chance to display his scholarship, but he needs more selective judgment and literary talent than he would for writing a longer and strictly scholarly work. In preparing this work, I have tried to use my best judgment in selecting what I consider important and relevant from materials which I have mastered. I was very fortunate, however, to have as editor Dr. Derk Bodde, who has used his literary talent to make the style of the book interesting, read-able, and comprehensible to the Western reader. He has also made suggestions regarding the selection and arrangement of the material. Being a short history, this book serves as no more than an introduction to the study of Chinese philosophy. If the reader wishes to know more about the subject, I would refer him to my larger work, A History of Chinese Philosophy. The first volume of this has been translated by Dr. Bodde, and he is now translating the second one; also to my more recent work, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, translated by Mr. E. R. Hughes of Oxford University. Both works are mentioned in the bibliography compiled by Dr. Bodde at the end of the present book. Acknowledgements are due to both Dr. Bodde and Mr. Hughes, from whose books I have borrowed some translations of the Chinese texts appearing herein. In publishing this book, I welcome the opportunity of expressing my thanks to the Rockefeller Foundation for the grant which made it possible for me to come from China to the University of Pennsylvania as Visiting Professor during the year 1946-47, and which resulted in the writing of this book. Also, I wish to thank my colleagues and students in the Department of Oriental Studies for their cooperation and encouragement, and especially Dr. Bodde, Associate Professor of Chinese. I am likewise grateful to Dr. A. W. Hummel, Chief of the Asiatic Division, Library of Congress, for his encouragement and help in making arrangements for the publication of the book. FUNC.YU-LAN June, 1947 University of Pennsylvania CHAPTER 1 THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY THE place which philosophy has occupied in Chinese civilization has been comparable to that of religion in other civilizations. In China, philosophy has been every educated person ‘s concern. In the old days, if a man were educated at all, the first education he received was in philosophy. When children went to school, the Four Books, which consist of the Confucian Analects, the Book of Mencius, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean, were the first ones they were taught to read. The Four Books were the most important texts of Neo-Confucianist philosophy. Sometimes when the children were just beginning to learn the characters, they were given a sort of textbook to read. This was known as the Three Characters Classic, and was so called because each sentence in the book consisted of three characters arranged so that when recited they produced a rhythmic effect, and thus helped the children to memorize them more easily. This book was in reality a primer, and the very first statement in it is that “the nature of man is originally good.” This is one of the fundamental ideas of Mencius’ philosophy. Place of Philosophy in Chinese Civilization To the Westerner, who sees that the life of the Chinese people is permeated with Confucianism, it appears that Confucianism is a religion. As a matter of fact, however, Confucianism is no more a religion than, say, Platonism or Aristotelianism. It is true that the Four Books have been the Bible of the Chinese people, but in the Four Books there is no story of creation, and no mention of a heaven or hell. Of course, the terms philosophy and religion are both ambiguous, Philosophy and religion may have entirely different meanings for different people. When men talk about philosophy or religion, they may have quite different ideas in their minds concerning them. For my part, what I call philosophy is systematic, reflective thinking on life. Every man, who has not yet died, is in life. But there are not many who think reflectively on life, and still fewer whose reflective thinking is systematic. A philosopher must philosophize; that is to say, he must think reflectively on life, and then express his thoughts systematically. This kind of thinking is called reflective because it takes life as its object. The theory of life, the theory of the universe, and the theory of knowledge all emerge from this type of thinking. The theory of the universe arises because the universe is the background of life�the stage on which the drama of life takes place. The theory of knowledge emerges because thinking is itself knowledge. According to some philosophers of the West, in order to think, we must first find out what we can think; that is to say, before we start to think about life, we must first think our thinking. Such theories are all the products of reflective thinking. The very concept of life, the very concept of the universe, and the very concept of knowledge are also the products of reflective thinking. No matter whether we think about life or whether we talk about it, we are all in the midst of it. And no matter whether we think or speak about the universe, we are all a part of it. Now, what the philosophers call the universe is not the same as what the physicists have in mind when they refer to it. What the philosophers call the universe is the totality of all that is. It is equivalent to what the ancient Chinese philosopher, Hui Shih, called “The Great One,” which is defined as that which has nothing beyond. So everyone and everything must be considered part of the universe. When one thinks about the universe, one is thinking reflectively. When we think about knowledge or speak about knowledge, this thinking and speaking are themselves knowledge. To use an expression of Aristotle, it is “thinking on thinking”; and this is reflective thinking. Here is the vicious circle which those philosophers follow who insist that before we think we must first think about our thinking; just as if we had another faculty with which we could think about thinking! As a matter of fact, the faculty with which we think about thinking is the very same faculty with which we think. If we are skeptical about the capacity of our thinking in regard to life and the universe, we have the same reason to be skeptical about the capacity of our thinking in regard to thinking. Religion also has something to do with life. In the heart of every great religion there is a philosophy. In fact, every great religion is a philosophy with a certain amount of superstructure, which consists of superstitions, dogmas, rituals, and institutions. This is what 1 call religion. If one understands the term religion in this sense, which does not really differ very much from common usage, one sees that Confucianism cannot be considered a religion. People have been accustomed to say that there were three religions in China: Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. But Confucianism, as we have seen, is not a religion. As to Taoism, there is a distinction between Taoism as a philosophy, which is called Too chia (the Taoist school), and the Taoist religion {Too chiao). Their teachings are not only dif- God is really the universe. Strictly speaking, the love of God in Christianity is not really super-moral. This is because God, in Christianity, is a personality, and consequently the love of God by man is comparable to the love of a father by his son, which is a moral value. Therefore, the love of God in Christianity is open to question as a super-moral value. It is a quasi super-moral value, while the love of God in the philosophy of Spinoza is a real super-moral value. To answer the above questions, I would say that the craving for something beyond the present actual world is one of the innate desires of mankind, and the Chinese people are no exception to this rule. They have not had much concern with religion because they have had so much concern with philosophy. They are not religious because they are philosophical. In philosophy they satisfy their craving for what is beyond the present actual world. In philosophy also they have the super-moral values expressed and appreciated, and in living according to philosophy these super-moral values are experienced. According to the tradition of Chinese philosophy, its function is not the increase of positive knowledge (by positive knowledge I mean information regarding matters of fact), but the elevation of the mind�a reaching out for what is beyond the present actual world, and for the values that are higher than the moral ones. It was said by the Lao-tzu: To work on learning is to increase day by day; to work on Tao (the Way, the Truth) is to decrease day by day.” (See ch. 48.) I am not concerned with the difference between in-creasing and decreasing, nor do I quite agree with this saying of Lao-tzu. I quote it only to show that in the tradition of Chinese philosophy there is a distinction between working on learning and working on Tao (the Way). The purpose of the former is what I call the increase of positive knowledge, that of the latter is the elevation of the mind. Philosophy belongs to the latter category. The view that the function of philosophy, especially metaphysics, is not the increase of positive knowledge, is expounded by the Viennese school in contemporary Western philosophy, though from a different angle and for a different purpose. I do not agree with this school that the function of philosophy is only the clarification of ideas, and that the nature of metaphysics is only a lyric of concepts. Nevertheless, in their arguments one can see quite clearly that philosophy, especially metaphysics, would become nonsense if it did attempt to give information regarding matters of fact. Religion does give information in regard to matters of fact. But the information given by religion is not in harmony with that given by science. So in the West there has been the conflict between religion and science. Where science advances, religion retreats; and the authority of religion recedes be-fore the advancement of science. The traditionalists regretted this fact and pitied the people who had become irreligious, considering them as having degenerated. They ought indeed to be pitied, if, besides religion, they had no other access to the higher values. When people get rid of religion and have no substitute, they also lose the higher values. They have to confine them-selves to mundane affairs and have nothing to do with the spiritual ones. Fortunately, however, besides religion there is philosophy, which provides man with an access to the higher values�an access which is more direct than that provided by religion, because in philosophy, in order to be acquainted with the higher values, man need not take the roundabout way pro-vided by prayers and rituals. The higher values with which man has become acquainted through philosophy are even purer than those acquired through religion, because they are not mixed with imagination and superstition. In the world of the future, man will have philosophy in the place of religion. This is consistent with Chinese tradition. It is not necessary that man should be religious, but it is necessary that he should be philosophical. When he is philosophical, he has the very best of the blessings of religion. Problem and Spirit of Chinese Philosophy The above is a general discussion of the nature and function of philosophy. In the following remarks I shall speak more specifically about Chinese philosophy. There is a main current in the history of Chinese philosophy, which may be called the spirit of Chinese philosophy. In order to understand this spirit, we must first make clear the problem that most Chinese philosophers have tried to solve. There are all kinds and conditions of men. With regard to any one of these kinds, there is the highest form of achievement of which any one kind of man is capable. For instance, there are the men engaged in practical politics. The highest form of achievement in that class of men is that of the great statesman. So also in the field of art, the highest form of achievement of which artists are capable is that of the great artist. Although there are these different classes of men, yet all of them are men. What is the highest form of achievement of which a man as a man is capable? According to the Chinese philosophers, it is nothing less than being a sage, and the highest achievement of a sage is the identification of the individual with the universe. The problem is, if men want to achieve this identification, do they necessarily have to abandon society or even to negate life? According to some philosophers, this is necessary. The Buddha said that life itself is the root and fountainhead of the misery of life. Likewise, Plato said that the body is the prison of the soul. And some of the Taoists said that life is an excrescence, a tumor, and death is to be taken as the breaking of the tumor. All these ideas represent a view which entails separation from what may be called the entangling net of the matter-corrupted world; and therefore, if the highest achievement of a sage is to be realized, the sage has to abandon society and even life itself. Only thus can the final liberation be attained. This kind of philosophy is what is generally known as “other-worldly philosophy.’ There is another kind of philosophy which emphasizes what is in society, such as human relations and human affairs. This kind of philosophy speaks only about moral values, and is unable to or does not wish to speak of the super-moral ones. This kind of philosophy is generally described as “this� worldly. From the point of view of a this�worldly philosophy, an other � world philosophy is too idealistic, is of no practical use and is negative. From the point of view of an other-worldly philosophy, a this-world philosophy is too realistic, too superficial. It may be positive, but it is like the quick walking of a man who has taken the wrong road: the more quickly he walks the further he goes astray. There are many people who say that Chinese philosophy is a this world philosophy. It is difficult to state that these people are entirely right or entirely wrong. Taking a merely superficial view, people who hold this opinion cannot be said to be wrong, because according to their view, Chinese philosophy, regardless of its different schools of thought, is directly or indirectly concerned with government and ethics. On the surface, therefore, it is concerned chiefly with society, and not with the universe; with the daily functions of human relations, not hell and heaven; with man’s present life, but not his life in a world to come. When he was once asked by a disciple about the meaning of death, Confucius replied:”Not yet understanding life, how can you understand death? (Analects, XI, II.) And Mencius said: The sage is the acme of human relations” (Mencius, IVa, 2.), which, taken literally, means that the sage is the morally perfect man in society. From a surface point of view, with the ideal man being of this world, it seems that what Chinese philosophy calls a sage is a person of a very different order from the Buddha of Buddhism and the saints of the Christian religion. Superficially, this would seem to be especially true of the Confucian sage. That is why, in ancient times, Confucius and the Confucianists were so greatly ridiculed by the Taoists. This, however, is only a surface view of the matter. Chinese philosophy cannot be understood by oversimplification of this kind. So far as the main tenet of its tradition is concerned, if we understand it aright, it cannot be said to be wholly this-worldly, just as, of course, it cannot be said to be wholly other-worldly. It is both of this world and of the other world. Speaking about the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung Dynasty, one philosopher de-scribed it this way: It is not divorced from daily ordinary activities, yet it goes straight to what antedated Heaven.” This is what Chinese philosophy has striven for. Having this kind of spirit, it is at one and the same time both extremely idealistic and extremely realistic, and very practical, though not in a superficial way. This-worldliness and other-worldliness stand in contrast to each other as do realism and idealism. The task of Chinese philosophy is to accomplish a synthesis out of these antitheses. That does not mean that they are to be abolished. They are still there, but they have been made into a synthetic whole. How can this be done? This is the problem which Chinese philosophy attempts to solve. According to Chinese philosophy, the man who accomplishes this synthesis, not only in theory but also in deed, is the sage. He is both this-worldly and other-worldly. The spiritual achievement of the Chinese sage corresponds to the saint s achievement in Buddhism, and in Western religion. But the Chinese sage is not one who does not concern himself with the business of the world. His character is described as one of sageliness within and kingliness without.’ That is to say, in his inner sageliness, he accomplishes spiritual cultivation; in his kingliness without, he functions in society. It is not necessary that the sage should be the actual head of the government in his society. From the standpoint of practical politics, for the most part, the sage certainly has no chance of being the head of the state. The saying “sageliness within and kingliness without” means only that he who has the noblest spirit should, theoretically, be king. As to whether he actually has or has not the chance of being king, that is immaterial. Since the character of the sage is, according to Chinese tradition, one of sageliness within and kingliness without, the task of philosophy is to enable man to develop this kind of character. Therefore, what philosophy discusses is what the Chinese philosophers describe as the Tao (Way, or basic principles) of sageliness within and kingliness without. This sounds like the Platonic theory of the philosopher-king. According to Plato, in an ideal state, the philosopher should be the king or the king should be a philosopher; and in order to become a philosopher, a man must undergo a long period of philosophical training before his mind can be converted from the world of changing things to the world of eternal ideas. Thus according to Plato, as according to the Chinese philosophers, the task of philosophy is to enable man to have the character of sageliness within and kingliness without. But according to Plato, when a philosopher becomes a king, he does so against his will�in other words, it is something forced on him, and entails a great sacrifice on his part. This is what was also held by the ancient Taoists. There is the story of a sage who, being asked by the people of a certain state to become their king, escaped and hid himself in a mountain cave. But the people found the cave, smoked him out and compelled him to assume the difficult task. (Lii shih Ch’un-ch’iu, I, l.) This is one similarity between Plato and the ancient Taoists, and it also shows the character of other-worldliness in Taoist philosophy. Following the main tradition of Chinese philosophy, the Neo�Taoist, Kuo Hsiang of the third century A.D., revised this point. According to Confucianism, the daily task of dealing with social affairs in human relations is not something alien to the sage. Carrying on this task is the very essence of the development of the perfection of his personality. He performs it not only as a citizen of society, but also as a citizen of the universe, t ien min, as Mencius called it. He must be conscious of his being a citizen of the universe, otherwise his deeds would not have super�moral value. If he had the chance to become a king he would gladly serve the people, thus performing his duty both as a citizen of society, and as a citizen of the universe. Since what is discussed in philosophy is the Tao (Way) of sageliness with-in and kingliness without, it follows that philosophy must be inseparable from political thought. Regardless of the differences between the schools of Chinese philosophy, the philosophy of every school represents, at the same time, its political thought. This does not mean that in the various schools of philosophy there are no metaphysics, no ethics, no logic. It means only that all these factors are connected with political thought in one way or another, just as Plato s Republic represents his whole philosophy and at the same time is his political thought. For instance, the School of Names was known to indulge in such arguments as a white horse is not a horse, which seems to have very little connection with politics. Yet the leader of this school, Kung -sun Lung, wished to extend this kind of argument to rectify the relationship between names and facts in order to transform the world. We have seen in our world today how every statesman says his country wants only peace, but in fact, when he is talking about peace, he is often preparing for war. Here, then, there is a wrong relationship between names and facts. According to Kung-sun Lung, this kind of wrong relationship should be rectified. This is really the first step towards the transformation of the world. Since the subject matter of philosophy is the Tao of sageliness within and kingliness without, the study of philosophy is not simply an attempt to ac-quire this kind of knowledge, but is also an attempt to develop this kind of character. Philosophy is not simply something to be known, but is also some-thing to be experienced. It is not simply a sort of intellectual game, but something far more serious. As my colleague, Professor Y. L. Chin, has pointed out in an unpublished manuscript: “Chinese philosophers were all of them different grades of Socrates. This was so because ethics, politics, reflective thinking, and knowledge were unified in the philosopher; in him, knowledge and virtue were one and inseparable. His philosophy required that he live it; he was himself its vehicle. To live in accordance with his philosophical convictions was part of his philosophy. It was his business to school him-self continually and persistently to that pure experience in which selfishness and egocentricity were transcended, so that he would be one with the universe. Obviously this process of schooling could not be stopped, for stopping it would mean the emergence of his ego and the loss of his universe. Hence cognitively he was eternally groping, and conatively he was eternally behaving or trying to behave. Since these could not be separated, in him there was the synthesis of the philosopher in the original sense of that term. Like Socrates, he did not keep office hours with his philosophy. Neither was he a dusty, musty philosopher, closeted in his study, sitting in a chair on the periphery of life. With him, philosophy was hardly ever merely a pattern of ideas exhibited for human understanding, but was a system of precepts internal to the conduct of the philosopher; and in extreme cases his philosophy might even be said to be his biography.” The Way in which Chinese Philosophers Expressed Themselves A Western student beginning the study of Chinese philosophy is instantly confronted with two obstacles. One, of course, is the language barrier; the other is the peculiar way in which the Chinese philosophers have expressed themselves. I will speak about the latter first. When one begins to read Chinese philosophical works, the first impression one gets is perhaps the briefness and disconnectedness of the sayings and writings of their authors. Open the Confucian Analects and you will see that each paragraph consists of only a few words, and there is hardly any connection between one paragraph and the next. Open a book containing the philosophy of Lao Tzu, and you will find that the whole book consists of about five thousand words�no longer than a magazine article; yet in it one will find the whole of his philosophy. A student accustomed to elaborate reasoning and detailed argument would be at a loss to understand what these Chinese philosophers were saying. He would be inclined to think that there was disconnectedness in the thought itself. If this were so, there would be no Chinese philosophy. For disconnected thought is hardly worthy of the name of philosophy. It may be said that the apparent disconnectedness of the sayings and writings of the Chinese philosophers is due to the fact that these sayings and writings are not formal philosophical works. According to Chinese tradition, the study of philosophy is not a profession. Everyone should study philosophy just as in the West every one should go to church. The purpose of the study of philosophy is to enable a man, as a man, to be a man, not some particular kind of man. Other studies�not the study of philosophy�enable a man to be some special kind of man. So there were no professional philosophers; and non-professional philosophers did not have to produce formal philosophical writings. In China, there were far more philosophers who produced no formal philosophical writings than those who did. If one wishes to study the philosophy of these men, one has to go to the records of their sayings or the letters they wrote to disciples and friends. These letters did not belong to just one period in the life of the person who wrote them, nor were the records written only by a single person. Disconnectedness or even inconsistency between them is, therefore, to be expected. The foregoing may explain why the writings and saying of some philosophers are disconnected; but it does not explain why they are brief. In some philosophic writings, such as those of Mencius and Hstin Tzu, one does find systematic reasoning and arguments. But in comparison with the philosophic writings of the West, they are still not articulate enough. The fact is that Chinese philosophers were accustomed to express themselves in the form of aphorisms, apothegms, or allusions, and illustrations. The whole book of Lao-tzu consists of aphorisms, and most of the chapters of the Chuang-tzu are full of allusions and illustrations. This is very obvious. But even in writings such as those of Mencius and Hsiin Tzu, mentioned above, when com-pared with the philosophical writings of the West, there are still too many aphorisms, allusions, and illustrations. Aphorisms must be very brief; allusions and illustrations must be disconnected. Aphorisms, allusions, and illustrations are thus not articulate enough. Their insufficiency in articulateness is compensated for, however, by their suggestiveness. Articulateness and suggestiveness are, of course, incompatible. The more an expression is articulate, the less it is suggestive�just as the more an expression is prosaic, the less it is poetic. The sayings and writings of the Chinese philosophers are so inarticulate that their suggestiveness is almost boundless. Suggestiveness, not articulateness, is the ideal of all Chinese art, whether it be poetry, painting, or anything else. In poetry, what the poet intends to communicate is often not what is directly said in the poetry, but what is not said in it. According to Chinese literary tradition, in good poetry the number of words is limited, but the ideas it suggests are limitless. So an intelligent reader of poetry reads what is outside the poem; and a good reader of books reads what is between the lines. Such is the ideal of Chinese art, and this ideal is reflected in the way in which Chinese philosophers have expressed themselves. The ideal of Chinese art is not without its philosophical background. In the twenty-sixth chapter of the Chuang-tzu it is said: “A basket-trap is for catching fish, but when one has got the fish, one need think no more about the basket. A foot�trap is for catching hares; but when one has got the hare, one need think no more about the trap. Words are for holding ideas, but when one has got the idea, one need no longer think about the words. If only I could find someone who had stopped thinking about words and could have him with me to talk to! ” To talk with someone who has stopped thinking about words is not to talk with words. In the Chuang-tzu the statement is made that two sages met without speaking a single word, because “when their eyes met, the Too was there. According to Taoism, the Too (the Way) cannot be told, but only suggested. So when words are used, it is the suggestiveness of the words, and not their fixed denotations or connotations, that reveals the Too. Words are something that should be forgotten when they have achieved their purpose. Why should we trouble ourselves with them any more than is necessary? This is true of the words and rhymes in poetry, and the lines and colors in painting. During the third and fourth centuries A.D., the most influential philosophy was the Neo �Taoist School, which was known in Chinese history as the hsiian hstteh (the dark or mystic learning). At that time there was a book en-titled Shih-shuo Hsin-yil, which is a record of the clever sayings and romantic activities of the famous men of the age. Most of the sayings are very brief, some consisting of only a few words. It is stated in that book (ch. 4) that a very high official once asked a philosopher (the high official was him-self a philosopher), what was the difference and similarity between Lao-Chuang (i.e., Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu) and Confucius. The philosopher answered: “Are they not the same?” The high official was very much pleased with this answer, and instantly appointed the philosopher as his secretary. Since the answer consists of only three words in the Chinese language, this philosopher has been known as the three-word secretary. He could not say that Lao-Chuang and Confucius had nothing in common, nor could he say that they had everything in common. So he put his answer in the form of a question, which was really a good answer. The brief sayings in the Confucian Analects and in the philosophy of the Lao-tzu are not simply conclusions from certain premises which have been lost. They are aphorisms full of suggestiveness. It is the suggestiveness that is attractive. One may gather together all the ideas one finds in the Lao-tzu and write them out in a new book consisting of fifty thousand or even five hundred thousand words. No matter how well this is done, however, it is just a new book. It may be read side by side with the original Lao-tzu, and may help people a great deal to understand the original, but it can never be a substitute for the original. Kuo Hsiang, to whom I have already referred, was one of the great commentators on Chuang Tzu. His commentary was itself a classic of Taoist literature. He turned the allusions and metaphors of Chuang Tzu into a form of reasoning and argument, and translated his poems into prose of his own. His writing is much more articulate than that of Chuang Tzu. But between the suggestiveness of Chuang Tzu’s original and the articulateness of Kuo Hsiang s commentary, people may still ask: Which is better? A monk of the Buddhist Ch an or Zen school of a later period once said: Everyone says that it was Kuo Hsiang who wrote a commentary on Chuang Tzu; I would say it was Chuang Tzu who wrote a commentary on Kuo Hsiang. The Language Barrier It is true of all philosophical writings that it is difficult for one to have a complete understanding and full appreciation of them if one cannot read them in the original. This is due to the language barrier. Because of the suggestive character of Chinese philosophical writings, the language barrier be-comes even more formidable. The suggestiveness of the sayings and writings of the Chinese philosophers is something that can hardly be translated. When one reads them in translation, one misses the suggestiveness; and this means that one misses a great deal. A translation, after all, is only an interpretation. When one translates a sentence from, say, the Lao-tzu, one gives one’s own interpretation of its meaning. But the translation may convey only one idea, while as a matter of fact, the original may contain many other ideas besides the one given by the translator. The original is suggestive, but the translation is not, and cannot be. So it loses much of the richness inherent in the original. There have been many translations of the Lao -tzu and the Confucian Analects. Each translator has considered the translations of others unsatisfactory. But no matter how well a translation is done, it is bound to be poorer than the original. It needs a combination of all the translations already-made and many others not yet made, to reveal the richness of the Lao-tzu and the Confucian Analects in their original form. Kumarajiva, of the fifth century A.D., one of the greatest translators of the Buddhist texts into Chinese, said that the work of translation is just like chewing food that is to be fed to others. If one cannot chew the food oneself, one has to be given food that has already been chewed. After such an operation, however, the food is bound to be poorer in taste and flavor than the original. CHAPTER 2 THE BACKGROUND OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY In the last chapter I said that philosophy is systematic reflective thinking on life. In thinking, the thinker is usually conditioned by the surroundings in which he lives. Being in certain surroundings, he feels life in a certain way, and there are therefore in his philosophy certain emphases or omissions, which constitute the characteristics of that philosophy. This is true of an individual, as it is also true of a people. In this chapter I shall try to say something about the geographic and economic background of the Chinese people in order to show how and why Chinese civilization in general, and Chinese philosophy in particular, are what they are. Geographic Background of the Chinese People In the Confucian Analects Confucius said: The wise man delights in water; the good man delights in mountains. The wise move; the good stay still. The wise are happy; the good endure.” (VI, 2.1.) In reading this saying, I feel there is in it something which suggests a difference between the people of ancient China and those of ancient Greece. China is a continental country. To the ancient Chinese their land was the world. There are two expressions in the Chinese language which can both be translated as the world. One is all beneath the sky and the other is all within the four seas. To the people of a maritime country such as the Greeks, it would be inconceivable that expressions such as these could be synonymous. But that is what happens in the Chinese language, and it is not without reason. From the time of Confucius until the end of the last century, no Chinese thinkers had the experience of venturing out upon the high seas. Confucius and Mencius lived not far from the sea, if we think in modern terms of distance, yet in the Analects, Confucius mentions the sea only once. He is recorded as saying: If my way is not to prevail, 1 shall get upon a raft and float out to the sea. He who will go with me will be [Chung] Yu.” (V, 6.) Chung Yu was a disciple of Confucius known for his courage and bravery. It is said in the same work that when Chung Yu heard this statement, he was much pleased. Confucius, however, was not so pleased by Chung Yu� s overenthusiasm, and remarked: Yu is more brave than myself. I do not know what to do with him.” (Ibid.) Mencius�s reference to the sea is likewise brief. He who has seen the sea,” he says, “finds it difficult to think anything about other waters; and he who has wandered to the gate of the sage, finds it difficult to think anything about the words of others. (Vila, 24-) Mencius is no better than Confucius, who thought only of “floating out to sea. How different were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who lived in a maritime country and wandered from island to island! Economic Background of the Chinese People The ancient Chinese and Greek philosophers not only lived under different geographic conditions, but different economic ones as well. Since China is a continental country, the Chinese people have to make their living by agriculture. Even today the portion of the Chinese population engaged in farming is estimated at 75 to 80 percent. In an agrarian country, land is the primary basis of wealth. Hence, throughout Chinese history, social and economic thinking and policy have centered around the utilization and distribution of land. Agriculture in such an economy is equally important not only in peacetime but in wartime as well. During the period of the Warring States (48O-2.2.O B. C), a period in many ways similar to our own, in which China was divided into many feudal kingdoms, every state devoted its greater attention to what were then called the arts of agriculture and war. Finally the state of Chin, one of the seven leading states of the time, gained supremacy both in agriculture and war, and as a result succeeded in conquering the other states and thus bringing a unification to China for the first time in her history. In the social and economic thinking of Chinese philosophers, there is a distinction between what they call “the root and “the branch. “The root” refers to agriculture and the branch to commerce. The reason for this is that agriculture is concerned with production, while commerce is merely concerned with exchange. One must have production before one can have exchange. In an agrarian country, agriculture is the major form of production, and therefore throughout Chinese history, social and economic theories and policies have all attempted to emphasize the root and slight the branch. The people who deal with the branch, that is, the merchants, were therefore looked down upon. They were the last and lowest of the four traditional classes of society, the other three being scholars, farmers, and artisans. The scholars were usually landlords, and the farmers were the peasants who actually cultivated the land. These were the two honorable professions in China. A family having “a tradition of studying and farming was something of which to be proud. Although the scholars did not actually cultivate the land themselves, yet since they were usually landlords, their fortunes were tied up with agriculture. A good or bad harvest meant their good or bad fortune, and therefore their reaction to the universe and their outlook on life were essentially those of the farmer. In addition their education gave them the power to express what an actual farmer felt but was incapable of expressing himself. This expression took the form of Chinese philosophy, literature, and art. Value of Agriculture In the Lil -shih Ch’ un -ch’ iu 0Tl%f�y0, a compendium of various schools of philosophy written in the third century B.C., there is a chapter titled “The Value of Agriculture. 0 N�Q0” In this chapter a contrast is made between the mode of life of people who are engaged in the root occupation the farmers, and that of those who are engaged in the “branch” occupation the merchants. The farmers are primitive and simple and therefore always ready to accept commands. They are childlike and innocent and therefore unselfish. Their material properties are complex and difficult to move, and therefore they do not abandon their country when it is in danger. Merchants, on the other hand, are corrupt and therefore not obedient. They are treacherous and therefore selfish. They have simple properties which are easy to transport, and therefore they usually abandon their country when it is in danger. Hence this chapter asserts that not only is agriculture economically more important than commerce, but the mode of life of the farmers is also superior to that of the merchants. Herein lies the value of agriculture. (XXVI, 3-) The author of this chapter found that the mode of life of people is conditioned by their economic background, and his evaluation of agriculture again shows that he was himself conditioned by the economic background of his time. In this observation of the Lil-shih Ch’ un-ch’iu, we find the root and source of the two main trends of Chinese thought, Taoism and Confucianism. They are poles apart from one another, yet they are also the two poles of one and the same axis. They both express, in one way or another, the aspirations and inspirations of the farmer. Reversal, Is the Movement of Tao�S�S�KN�R Before considering the difference between these two schools, let us first take up a theory which both of them maintained. This is that both in the sphere of nature and in that of man, when the development of anything brings it to one extreme, a reversal to the other extreme takes place; that is, to borrow an expression from Hegel, everything involves its own negation. This is one of the main theses of Lao Tzu’ s philosophy and also that of the Book of Changesf�~ as interpreted by the Confucianists. It was no doubt inspired by the movements of the sun and moon and the succession of the four seasons, to which farmers must pay particular heed in order to carry on their own work. In the Appendices of the Book of Changesf O, it is said: When the cold goes, the warmth comes, and when the warmth comes, the cold goes. (Appendix III.) �[�_R�feg��f�_R�[eg0 ( 0�|�� O0N) And again: “When the sun has reached its meridian, it declines, and when the moon has become full, it wanes.”�e�vR�N�g�vRߘ0( 00NfS���0) (Appendix I.) Such movements are referred to in the Appendices as “returning Y. Thus Appendix I says: In returning we see the mind of Heaven and Earth. Y�vQ�)Y0WKN�_NN Similarly in the Lao-tzu we find the words: Reversal is the movement of the Too.” (Ch. 40.) This theory has had a great effect upon the Chinese people and has contributed much to their success in overcoming the many difficulties which they have encountered in their long history. Convinced of this theory, they remain cautious even in time of prosperity, and hopeful even in time of extreme danger. In the late war, the concept provided the Chinese people with a sort of psychological weapon, so that even in its darkest period, most people lived on the hope which was expressed in the phrase: “The dawn will soon come.” It was this “will to believe” that helped the Chinese people to go through the war. This theory has also provided the principal argument for the doctrine of the golden mean, favored by Confucianist and Taoist alike. “Never too much has been the maxim of both. For according to it, it is better for one to be wrong by having too little, than to be wrong by having too much, and to be wrong by leaving things undone, than to be wrong by overdoing them. For by having too much and overdoing, one runs the risk of getting the opposite of what one wants. Idealization of Nature Taoism and Confucianism differ because they are the rationalization or theoretical expression of different aspects of the life of the farmers. The farmers are simple in their living and innocent in their thought. Seeing things from their point of view, the Taoists idealized the simplicity of primitive society and condemned civilization. They also idealized the innocence of children and despised knowledge. In the Lao-tzu it is said: Let us have a small country with few inhabitants….Let the people return to the use of knotted cords [for keeping records]. �V�[l�& & O�N Y�~�~�(uKN�uvQߘ��vQ g��[vQE PNvQ�O0���V�vg�!��rKN�X�v��l��{k N�v�_egLet them obtain their food sweet, their clothing beautiful, their homes comfortable, their rustic tasks pleasurable. The neighbouring state might be so near at hand that one could hear the cocks crowing in it and dogs barking. But the people would grow old and die without ever having been there.” (Ch. 80.) Is this not an idyllic picture of a farmer’s country? The farmers are always in contact with nature, so they admire and love nature. This admiration and love were developed by the Taoists to the fullest extent. They made a sharp distinction between what is of nature and what is of man, the natural and the artificial. According to them, what is of nature is the source of human happiness and what is of man is the root of all human suffering. They were, as the Confucianist Hstin Tzu@�P[ puts it, “blinded by nature and had no knowledge of man.” =��N)Y� N�w�N ( 0@�P[��=�0)(Hsiin-tzu, ch. 21.) As the final development of this trend of thinking, the Taoists maintained that the highest achievement in the spiritual cultivation of a sage lies in the identification of himself with the whole of nature, i.e., the universe. Family System The farmers have to live on their land, which is immovable, and the same is true of the scholar landlords. Unless one has special talent, or is especially lucky, one has to live where one� s father or grandfather lived, and where one’s children will continue to live. That is to say, the family in the wider sense must live together for economic reasons. Thus there developed the Chinese family system, which was no doubt one of the most complex and well�organized in the world. A great deal of Confucianism is the rational justification or theoretical expression of this social system. The family system was the social system of China. Out of the five traditional social relationships, which are those between sovereign and subject, father and son, elder and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend, three are family relationships. The remaining two, though not family relationships, can be conceived of in terms of the family. Thus the relationship between sovereign and subject can be conceived of in terms of that between father and son, and that between friend and friend in terms of the one between elder and younger brother. So, indeed, was the way in which they were usually conceived. But these are only the major family relationships, and there were many more. In the Erh Ya,Ŗ which is the oldest dictionary of the Chinese language, dating from before the Christian era, there are more than one hundred terms for various family relationships, most of which have no equivalent in the English language. For the same reason ancestor worship developed. In a family living in a particular place, the ancestor worshiped was usually the first of the family who had established himself and his descendants there on the land. He thus became the symbol of the unity of the family, and such a symbol was indispensable for a large and complex organization. A great part of Confucianism is the rational justification of this social system, or its theoretical expression. Economic conditions prepared its basis, and Confucianism expressed its ethical significance. Since this social system was the outgrowth of certain economic conditions, and these conditions were again the product of their geographical surroundings, to the Chinese people, both the system and its theoretical expression were very natural. Because of this, Confucianism naturally became the orthodox philosophy and remained so until the invasion of industrialization from modern Europe and America changed the economic basis of Chinese life. This-worldliness and Other-worldliness eQNN�QN Confucianism is the philosophy of social organization, and is also the philosophy of daily life. Confucianism emphasizes the social responsibilities of man, while Taoism emphasizes what is natural and spontaneous in him. In the Chuang-tzu, 0�^P[0 it is said that the Confucianists roam within the bounds of society, while the Taoists roam beyond it. In the third and fourth centuries A.D., when Taoism again became influential, people used to say that Confucius valued ming chiao TYe(the teaching of names denoting the social relationships), while Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu valued tzu jan �6q(spontaneity or naturalness). These two trends of Chinese philosophy correspond roughly to the traditions of classicism and romanticism in Western thought. Read the poems of Tu Fu and Li Fo, and one sees in them the difference between Confucianism and Taoism. These two great poets lived during the same period (eighth century A.D.), and concurrently expressed in their poems the two main traditions of Chinese thought. Because it roams within the bounds of society, Confucianism appears more this�worldly than Taoism, and because it roams beyond the bound of society, Taoism appears more other�worldly than Confucianism. These two trends of thought rivaled each other, but also complemented each other. They exercised a sort of balance of power. This gave the Chinese people a better sense of balance in regard to this-worldlincss and other-worldliness. There were Taoists in the third and fourth centuries who attempted to make Taoism closer to Confucianism, and there were also Confucianists in the eleventh and twelfth centuries who attempted to make Confucianism closer to Taoism. We call these Taoists the Neo -Taoists and these Confucianists the Neo -Confucianists. It was these movements that made Chinese philosophy both of this world and of the other world, as I pointed out in the last chapter. Chinese Art and Poetry The Confucianists took art as an instrument for moral education. The Taoists had no formal treatises on art, but their admiration of the free movement of the spirit and their idealization of nature gave profound inspiration to the great artists of China. This being the case, it is no wonder that most of the great artists of China took nature as their subject. Most of the masterpieces of Chinese painting are paintings of landscapes, animals and flowers, trees and bamboos. In a landscape painting, at the foot of a mountain or the bank of a stream, one always finds a man sitting, appreciating the beauty of nature and contemplating the Too or Way that transcends both nature and man. Likewise in Chinese poetry we find such poems as that by T’ao Ch ien (A.D. 372.-42-7): I built my hut in a zone of human habitation, Yet near me there sounds no noise of horse or coach, Would you know how that is possible? A heart that is distant creates a wilderness round it. I pluck chrysanthemums under the eastern hedge, Then gaze long at the distant summer hills. The mountain air is fresh at the dusk of day; The flying birds two by two return. In these things there lies a deep meaning; Yet when we would express it, words suddenly fail us.* Here we have Taoism at its best. The Methodology of Chinese Philosophy In Chinese philosophy, the farmer’s outlook not only conditioned its content, such as that reversal is the movement of the Tao, but, what is more important, it also conditioned its methodology. Professor Northrop has said that there are two major types of concepts, that achieved by intuition and that by postulation. “A concept by intuition,” he says, “is one which denotes, and the complete meaning of which is given by, something which is immediately apprehended. ‘Blue’ in the sense of the sensed color is a concept by intuition….A concept by postulation is one the complete meaning of which is designated by the postulates of the deductive theory in which it occurs…. ‘Blue’ in the sense of the number of a wave-length in electro-magnetic theory is a concept by postulation.’ ** Northrop also says that there are three possible types of concepts by intuition: “The concept of the differentiated aesthetic continuum. The concept of the indefinite or undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. The concept of the differentiation.” �]:SR�v�[�ޏ�~SO�v�i�_, N�[�vb*g:SR�v�[�ޏ�~SO�v�i�_,:SR�v�i�_(Ibid., p. 187.) According to him, * Translated by Arthur Waley. **Filmer S. C. Northrop, “The Complemeiiliiry Emphases of Eastern Intuition Philosophy and Western Scientific Philosophy,” in Philosophy, East and West, C. A. Moore, ed., p. 187, Princeton University Press, 1946. “Confucianism may be defined as the state of mind in which the concept of the indeterminate intuited manifold moves into the background of thought and the concrete differentiations in their relativistic, humanistic, transitory comings and goings form the content of philosophy. Q�[f[��S�N�[IN:NN�y�_up�r`�(WvQ-N� N�[�v�vɉ0R�vY�eb��v�i�_�y�N`�`̀of�N0�wQSO:SRvQ�v�[�v0�NS��v0�w�f�v egeg�_�_ R�gb�N(Ibid., p. 2.05.) But in Taoism, it is the concept of the indefinite or undifferentiated aesthetic continuum that forms the content of philosophy. (Ibid.) I do not quite agree with all Northrop has said in this essay, but I think he has here grasped the fundamental difference between Chinese and Western philosophy. When a student of Chinese philosophy begins to study Western philosophy, he is glad to see that the Greek philosophers also made the distinction between Being and Non�being, the limited and the unlimited. But he feels rather surprised to find that the Greek philosophers held that Non -being and the unlimited are inferior to Being and the limited. In Chinese philosophy the case is just the reverse. The reason for this difference is that Being and the limited are the distinct, while Non-being and the unlimited are the indistinct. Those philosophers who start with concepts by postulation have a liking for the distinct, while those who start with intuition value the indistinct. If we link what Northrop has pointed out here with what I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, we see that the concept of the differentiated aesthetic continuum, from which come both the concept of the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum and that of differentiation (Ibid., p. 187), is basically the concept of the farmers. What the farmers have to deal with, such as the farm and crops, are all things which they immediately apprehend. And in their primitivity and innocence, they value what they thus immediately appre -hend. It is no wonder then, that their philosophers likewise take the immediate apprehension of things as the starting point of their philosophy. This also explains why epistemology has never developed in Chinese philosophy. Whether the table that I see before me is real or illusory, and whether it is only an idea in my mind or is occupying objective space, was never seriously considered by Chinese philosophers. No such epistemological problems are to be found in Chinese philosophy (save in Buddhism, which came from India), since epistemological problems arise only when demarcation between the subject and the object is emphasized. And in the aesthetic continuum, there is no such demarcation. In it the knower and the known is one whole. This also explains why the language used by Chinese philosophy is suggestive but not articulate. It is not articulate, because it does not represent concepts in any deductive reasoning. The philosopher only tells us what he sees. And because of this, what he tells is rich in content, though terse in words. This is the reason why his words are suggestive rather than precise. Marine Countries and Continental Countries The Greeks lived in a marine country and maintained their prosperity through commerce. They were primarily merchants. And what merchants have to deal with first are the abstract numbers used in their commercial accounts, and only then with concrete things that may be immediately apprehended through these numbers. Such numbers are what Northrop called concepts by postulation. Hence Greek philosophers likewise took the concept by postulation as their starting point. They developed mathematics and mathematical reasoning. That is why they had epistemological problems and why their language was so articulate. But merchants are also townsmen. Their activities demand that they live together in towns. Hence they have a form of social organization not based on the common interest of the family so much as on that of the town. This is the reason why the Greeks organized their society around the city state, in contrast with the Chinese social system, which may be called that of the family state, because under it the state is conceived of in terms of the family. In a city state the social organization is not autocratic, because among the same class of townsmen, there is no moral reason why one should be more important than, or superior to, another. But in a family state the social organization is autocratic and hierarchic, because in a family the authority of the father is naturally superior to that of the son. The fact that the Chinese were farmers also explains why China failed to have an industrial revolution, which is instrumental for the introduction of the modern world. In the Lieh�tzu there is a story which says that the Prince of the State of Sung once asked a clever artisan to carve a piece of jade into the leaf of a tree. After three years the artisan completed it, and when the artificial leaf was put upon the tree, it was made so wonderfully that no one could distinguish it from the real leaves. Thereupon the Prince was much pleased. But when Lieh Tzu heard it, he said: “if nature took three years to produce one leaf, there would be few trees with leaves on them! (Lieh�tzu, ch. 8.) This is the view of one who admires the natural and condemns the artificial. The way of life of the farmers is to follow nature. They admire nature and condemn the artificial, and in their primitivity and innocence, they are easily made contcnt. They desire no change, nor can they conceive of any change. In China there have been not a few notable inventions or discoveries, but we often find that these were discouraged rather than encouraged. With the merchants of a maritime country conditions are otherwise. They have greater opportunity to see different people with different customs and different languages; they are accustomed to change and are not afraid of novelty. Nay, in order to have a good sale for their goods, they have to encourage novelty in the manufacture of what they are going to sell. It is no accident that in the West, the industrial revolution was first started in England, which is also a marine country maintaining her prosperity through commerce. What was quoted earlier in this chapter from the Lu�shih Ch un�ch iu about merchants can also be said of the people of marine countries, provided that, instead of saying that they are corrupt and treacherous, we say that they are refined and intelligent. We can also paraphrase Confucius by saying that the people of marine countries are the wise, while those of continental countries are the good. And so we repeat what Confucius said: The wise delight in water; the good delight in mountains. The wise move; the good stay still. The wise are happy; the good endure. ” It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enumerate evidences to prove the relationship between the geographic and economic conditions of Greece and England on the one hand, and the development of Western scientific thought and democratic institutions on the other. But the fact that the geographic and economic conditions of Greece and England are quite different from those of China suffices to constitute a negative proof for my thesis in regard to Chinese history as mentioned in this chapter. The Permanent and the Changeable in Chinese Philosophy The advancement of science has conquered geography, and China is no longer isolated within the four seas. She is having her industrialization too, and though much later than the Western world, it is better late than never. It is not correct to say that the East has been invaded by the West. Rather it is a case in which the medieval has been invaded by the modern. In order to live in a modern world, China has to be modern. One question remains to be asked: If Chinese philosophy has been so linked with the economic conditions of the Chinese people, does what has been expressed in Chinese philosophy possess validity only for people living under those conditions? The answer is yes and no. In the philosophy of any people or any time, there is always a part that possesses value only in relation to the economic conditions of that people or of that time, but there is always another part that is more than this. That which is not relative has lasting value. I hesitate to say that it is absolute truth, because to determine what is absolute truth is too great a task for any human being, and is reserved for God alone, if there be one. Let us take an instance in Greek philosophy. The rational justification of the slave system by Aristotle must be considered as a theory that is relative to the economic conditions of Greek life. But to say this is not to say that there is nothing that is not relative in the social philosophy of Aristotle. The same holds true for Chinese thought. When China is industrialized, the old family system must go, and with it will go its Confucianistic rational justification. But to say this is not to say that there is nothing that is not relative in the social philosophy of Confucianism. The reason for this is that the society of ancient Greece and ancient China, though different, both belong to the general category which we call society. Theories which are the theoretical expression of Greek or Chinese society, are thus also in part expressions of society in general. Though there is in them something that pertains only to Greek or Chinese societies per se, there must also be something more universal that pertains to society in general. It is this latter something that is not relative and possesses lasting value. The same is true of Taoism. The Taoist theory is certainly wrong which says that the Utopia of mankind is the primitivity of a bygone age. With the idea of progress, we moderns think that the ideal state of human existence is something to be created in the future, not something that was lost in the past. But what some moderns think of as the ideal state of human existence, such as anarchism, is not wholly dissimilar from that thought of by the Taoists. Philosophy also gives us an ideal of life. A part of that ideal, as given by the philosophy of a certain people or a certain time, must pertain only to the kind of life resulting from the social conditions of that people or that time. But there must also be a part that pertains to life in general, and so is not relative but has lasting value. This seems to be illustrated in the case of the Confucianist theory of an ideal life. According to this theory, the ideal life is one which, though having a very high understanding of the universe, yet remains within the bounds of the five basic human relationships. The nature of these human relationships may change according to circumstances. But the ideal itself does not change. One is wrong, then, when one insists that since some of the five human relationships have to go, therefore the Confucianist ideal of life must go as well. And one is also wrong when one insists that since this ideal of life is desirable, therefore all the five human relationships must likewise be retained. One must make a logical analysis in order to distinguish between what is permanent and what is changeable in the history of philosophy. Every philosophy has that which is permanent, and all philosophies have something in common. This is why philosophies, though different, can yet be compared with one another and translated one in terms of the other. Will the methodology of Chinese philosophy change? That is to say, will the new Chinese philosophy cease to confine itself to concept by intuition? Certainly it will, and there is no reason why it should not. In fact, it is already changing. In regard to this change, I shall have more to say in the last chapter of this book. CHAPTER 3 THE ORIGIN OF THE SCHOOLS In the last chapter I said that Confucianism and Taoism are the two main streams of Chinese thought. They became so only after a long evolution, however, and from the fifth through the third centuries B.C. they were only two among many other rival schools of thought. During that period the num-ber of schools was so great that the Chinese referred to them as the “hun-dred schools. Ssu-ma T’an�Sl�� and the Six Schools Later historians have attempted to make a classification of these”hundred schools.” The first to do so was Ssu-ma T’an (died HO B.C.), father of Ssu-ma Ch’ien�Sl�� (145~ca. 86 B.C.), and the author with him of China’s first great dynastic history, the Shih Chi or Historical Records�S��. In the last chapter of this work Ssu-ma Ch’ien quotes an essay by his father, titled “On the Es-sential Ideas of the Six Schools.��mQ�[���e” In this essay Ssu-ma T’an classifies the philosophers of the preceding several centuries into six major schools, as fol-lows: The first is the Yin-Yang chia or Yin-Yang school4�3��[, which is one of cos-mologists. It derives its name from the Yin and Yang principles, which in Chinese thought are regarded as the two major principles of Chinese cos-mology, Yin being the female principle, and Yang the male principle, the combination and interaction of which is believed by the Chinese to result in all universal phenomena. The second school is the Ju chia or School of LiteratiQ�[. This school is known in Western literature as the Confucianist school, but the word ju lit-erally means literatus or scholar. Thus the Western title is somewhat mis-leading, because it misses the implication that the followers of this school were scholars as well as thinkers; they, above all others, were the teachers of the ancient classics and thus the inheritors of the ancient cultural legacy. Confucius, to be sure, is the leading figure of this school and may rightly be considered as its founder. Nevertheless the term Ju not only denotes Confu-cian” or “Confucianist, but has a wider implication as well. The third school is that of the Mo chia or Mohist school�X�[. This school had a close-knit organization and strict discipline under the leadership of Mo Tzu. Its followers actually called themselves the Mohists. Thus the title of this school is not an invention of Ssu-ma T’an, as were some of the other schools. The fourth school is the Ming chia or School of Names T�[. The followers of this school were interested in the distinction between, and relation of, what they called “names” and “actualities. TN�[ The fifth school is the Fa chia or Legalist school�l�[. The Chinese word fa means pattern or law. The school derived from a group of statesmen who maintained that good government must be one based on a fixed code of law instead of on the moral institutions which the literati stressed for government. The sixth school is the Tao-Te chia or School of the Way and its PowerS��[. The followers of this school centered their metaphysics and social philosophy around the concept of Non-being, which is the Too or Way, and its concen-tration in the individual as the natural virtue of man, which is Te, translated as “virtue but better rendered as the “power” that inheres in any individual thing. This group, called by Ssu-ma T’an the Tao-Te school, was later known simply as the Too chia, and is referred to in Western literature as the Taoist school.As pointed out in the first chapter, it should be kept carefully distinct from the Taoist religion. Liu Hsin RFkand His Theory of the Beginning of the Schools The second historian who attempted to classify the hundred schools was Liu Hsin (ca. 46 B.C.-A.D. 2.3). He was one of the greatest scholars of his day, and, with his father Liu HsiangRT, made a collation of the books in the Imperial Library. The resulting descriptive catalogue of the Imperial Library, known as the “Seven Summaries,Neu” was taken by Pan Ku �s�V(A.D. 32.-92-) as the basis for the chapter, Yi Wen Chih or Treatise on LiteratureIlfN z��e�_, contained in his dynastic history, the History of the Former Han Dynasty. In this “Trea-tise” we see that Liu Hsin classifies the “hundred schools into ten main groups. Out of these, six are the same as those listed by Ssu-ma T’an. The other four are the Tsung Heng chia or School of Diplomatists�~*j�[, Tsa chia or School of EclecticsBg�[, Nung chia or School of Agrarians�Q�[, and Hsiao-shuo chia or School of Story Tellers�[. In conclusion, Liu Hsin writes: “The various philosophers consist of ten schools, but there are only nine that need be no-ticed.” By this statement he means to say that the School of Story Tellers lacks the importance of the other schools. In this classification itself, Liu Hsin did not go very much further than Ssu-ma T’an had done. What was new, however, was his attempt for the first time in Chinese history to trace systematically the historical origins of the different schools. Liu Hsin’s theory has been greatly elaborated by later scholars, especially by Chang Hsileh -ch’ eng�zf[ڋ (1738-1801) and the late Chang Ping lin�z�p��. In essence, it maintains that in the early Chou dynasty (llli?-256 B.C.), before the social institutions of that age disintegrated, there was “no separation be-tween officers and teachers.’ In other words the officers of a certain depart-ment of the government were at the same time the transmitters of the branch of learning pertaining to that department. These officers, like the feudal lords of the day, held their posts on a hereditary basis. Hence there was then only “official learning but no private teaching. That is to say, nobody taught any branch of learning as a private individual. Any such teaching was car-ried on only by officers in their capacity as members of one or another de-partment of the government. According to this theory, however, when the Chou ruling house lost its power during the later centuries of the Chou dynasty, the officers of the gov-ernmental departments lost their former positions and scattered throughout the country. They then turned to the teaching of their special branches of knowledge in a private capacity. Thus they were then no longer officers, but only private teachers. And it was out of this separation between teach-ers and officers that the different schools arose. Liu Hsin’s whole analysis reads as follows: ‘The members of the Ju school had their origin in the Ministry of Education….This school delighted in the study of the Liu Yi [the Six Classics or six liberal artsmQz�] and paid at-tention to matters concerning human-heartedness and righteousness. They regarded Yao and Shun [two ancient sage emperors supposed to have lived in the twenty-fourth and twenty-third centuries B.C.] as the ancestors of their school, and King WenhT�e�s [II2.O?-IIO8? B.C. of the Chou dynasty] and King WuhTfk�s [son of King Wen] as brilliant exemplars. To give authority to their teaching, they honored Chung ni LConfucius] as an exalted teacher. Their teaching is the highest truth. ‘That which is admired must be tested. The glory of Yao and Shun, the prosperity of the dynasties of Yin and Chou, and the achievements of Chung-ni are the results discovered by testing their teaching. “Those of the Taoist school had their origin in the official historians. By studying the historical examples of success and failure, preservation and de-struction, and calamity and prosperity, from ancient to recent times, they learned how to hold what is essential and to grasp the fundamental. They guarded themselves with purity and emptinessnZ�, and with humbleness and meekness maintained themselves….Herein lies the strong point of this school. Those of the Yin-Yang school had their origin in the official astronomers. They respectfully followed luminous heaven, and the successive symbols of the sun and moon, the stars and constellations, and the divisions of times and seasons. Herein lies the strong point of this school. ‘Those of the Legalist school had their origin in the Ministry of Justice. They emphasized strictness in rewarding and punishing, in order to support a system of correct conduct. Herein lies the strong point of this school. “Those of the School of Names had their origin in the Ministry of Cere-monies. For the ancients, where titles and positions differed, the ceremonies accorded to them were also different. Confucius has said: ‘ If names be in-correct, speech will not follow its natural sequence. If speech does not follow its natural sequence, nothing can be established.’ Herein lies the strong point of this school. “Those of the Mohist school had their origin in the Guardians of the Tem-ple. The temple was built with plain wooden rafters and thatched roofs; hence their teaching emphasized frugality. The temple was the place where the Three Elders and Five Experienced Men were honored; hence their teaching emphasized universal love. The ceremony of selecting civil officials and that of military exercises were also held in the temple; hence their teaching emphasized the preferment of virtue and ability. The temple was the place for sacrifice to ancestors and reverence to fathers; hence their teaching was to honor the spirits. They accepted the traditional teaching of following the four seasons in one s conduct; hence their teaching was against fatalism. They accepted the traditional teaching of exhibiting filial piety throughout the world; hence they taught the doctrine of ‘agreeing with the superior.’ Herein lies the strong point of this school. “Those of the Diplomatist school had their origin in the Ministry of Em-bassies…. [They taught the art of] following general orders [in diplomacy], instead of following literal instructions. Herein lies the strength of their teaching. “Those of the Eclectic school had their origin in the Councillors. They drew both from the Confucianists and the Mohists, and harmonized the School of Names and the Legalists. They knew that the nation had need of each of these, and saw that kingly government should not fail to unite all. Herein lies the strong point of this school. “Those of the Agricultural school had their origin in the Ministry of Soil and Grain. They taught the art of sowing the various kinds of grain and urged people to plow and to cultivate the mulberry so that the clothing and food of the people would be sufficient….Herein lies the strong point of this school. “Those of the School of Story Tellers had their origin in the Petty Offices. This school was created by those who picked up the talk of streets and alleys and repeated what they heard wherever they went….Even if in their teaching but a single word can be chosen, still there is some contribution.” (“Treatise on Literature” in the History of the Former Han Dynasty.) � Q�[�Am��v�Q�N�S�_KN�[0& & 8n�e�NmQ�~KN-N�Yua�N�NINKNE��Vy�’���[�z�efk��[^�N<��N͑vQ���NS�g:Nؚ0T[P[�f� �Y g@b���vQ g@bՋ0 U^�KN����khTKN�v��N��w The learning which Confucius here refers to is not what we now would call learning. In the Analects, Confucius said: “Set your heart on the Too.”�_�NS� (VII, 6.) And again: “To hear the Too in the morning and then die at night, that would be all right.”g�S��Y{k�S�w (IV, 9.) Here Too means the Way or Truth. It was this Too which Confucius at fifteen set his heart upon learning. What we now call learning means the increase of our knowledge, but the Too is that whereby we can elevate our mind. Confucius also said: “Take your stand in the li [rituals, ceremonies, proper conduct].” �z�NT��:N>T�SKN���:N>T���:N>T�SKN�N�:N>T�N As a result, such a man does not do very much for his friends. But the man who holds to the principle of all embracingness says, on the contrary: I must care for my friends as much as I do for myself, and for their parents as I would my own. �_:NvQ�SKN���:NvQ���:NvQ�SKN�N�:NvQ�N As a result, he does everything he can for his friends. Having made this distinction, Mo Tzu then asks the question: Which of these two principles is the right one? Mo Tzu thereupon uses his “tests of judgment” to determine the right and wrong of these principles. According to him, every principle must be exam- ined by three tests, namely: Its basis, its verifiability, and its applicability. A sound and right principle should be based on the Will of Heaven and of the spirits and on the deeds of the ancient sage-kings.” g,gKN�� g�SKN�� g(uKN�0�NvQ,gKN_N��KN)Y<��KN�_0#W�sKN�N Then "it is to be ver-ified by the senses of hearing and sight of the common people." And finally, "it is to be applied by adopting it in government and observing whether it is beneficial to the country and the people." �NUO�SKN�N�S�[~v�Y3��vKN�[0�NUO(uKN��S�N:NR?e�vQ-N�V�[~v�Y�NlKN)R0 (Mo-tzu, ch. 35.) Of these three tests, the last is the most important. Being beneficial to the country and the people is the standard by which Mo Tzu determines all values. This same standard is the chief one used by Mo Tzu to prove the desir-ability of all-embracing love. In the third of three chapters, all of which are titled "All-embracing Love, he argues: "The task of the human-hearted man is to procure benefits for the world and to eliminate its calamities. Now among all the current calamities of the world, which are the greatest? I say that attacks on small states by large ones, disturbances of small houses by large ones, oppression of the weak by the strong, misuse of the few by the many, deception of the simple by the cunning, and disdain toward the humble by the honored: these are the mis-fortunes of the world....When we come to think about the causes of all these calamities, how have they arisen? Have they arisen out of love of others and benefiting others? We must reply that it is not so. Rather we should say that they have arisen out of hate of others and injuring others. If we classify those in the world who hate others and injure others, shall we call them 'discrimi-nating' or 'all-embracing'? We must say that they are 'discriminating.' So, then, is not mutual discrimination the cause of the major calamities of the world? Therefore the principle of discrimination is wrong. "Whoever criticizes others must have something to substitute for what he criticizes. Therefore I say: Substitute all�embracingness for discrimination. What is the reason why all-embracingness can be substituted for discrimi-nation? The answer is that when everyone regards the states of others as he regards his own, who will attack these other states? Others will be regarded like the self. When everyone regards the cities of others as he regards his own, who will seize these other cities? Others will be regarded like the self. When everyone regards the houses of others as he regards his own, who will disturb these other houses? Others will be regarded like the self. "Now, when states and cities do not attack and seize one another, and when clans and individuals do not disturb and harm one another, is this a calamity or a benefit to the world? We must say it is a benefit. When we come to consider the origin of the various benefits, how have they arisen? Have they arisen out of hate of others and injuring others? We must say not so. We should say that they have arisen out of love of others and benefiting others. If we classify those in the world who love others and benefit others, shall we call them 'discriminating or 'all-embracing ? We must say that they are 'all-embracing.' Then is it not the case that 'mutual all-embrae-ingness is the cause of the major benefit of the world? Therefore I say that the principle of all embracingness is right. (Mo tzu, ch. 16.) �N�NKN�N���_�RBltQ)YNKN)R�d�)YNKN�[06qS_�NKN�e�)YNKN�[p[:N'Y��f�'Y�VKN;e�V_N�'Y�[KNqN�[_N�:_KN�R1_�OKN�f�[�ȋKN�a�5�KN�P1��dk)YNKN�[_N0& & �Y,g�S�O�[KN@b�u�dk��u�dk�1r�N0)R�NuN�sS�_�f�^�6q_N0�_�f��Nv`�N0<���Nu0R TNN)YNv`�N�<���N��|QN�+RN�sS�_�f�+R_N06qsSKN�N+R���gu)YNKN'Y�[�N�/fEe+R^�_N0 ^��N��_ g�NfKN0& & /fEeP[�XP[�f�|Q�Nf+R06qsS|QKN�S�Nf+RKNEeUO_N��f�Ʌ:N�NKN�V��:NvQ�V�+Y��r>NvQ�V�N;e�NKN�V��T�:N|_��r:N�]_N0:N�NKN���:NvQ��+Y��r>NvQ��NO�NKN���T�:N|_�r:N�]_N0:N�NKN�[��:NvQ�[�+Y��rf[vQ�[�NqN�NKN�[��T�:N|_�r:N�]_N0 6qsS�V� N�v;eO��N�[ N�vqN<���dk)YNKN�[N�)YNKN)RN�sS�_�f�)YNKN)R_N0�Y,g�S�O)RKN@b�u0dk��u�dk�v`�N0<���NuN�sS�_�f�^�6q_N0�_�f��N1r�N0)R�Nu0R TNN)YN1r�N�)R�N��+RN�|QN�sS�_�f�|Q_N06qsSKN�N|Q���gu)YNKN'Y)R�N�/fEeP[�XP[�f�|Q/f_N0 Thus, using a utilitarianistic argument, Mo Tzu proves the principle of all-embracing love to be absolutely right. The human-hearted man whose task it is to procure benefits for ihe world and eliminate its calamities, must estab-lish all-embracing love as the standard of action both for himself and for all others in the world. When everyone in the world acts according to this stan-dard, then attentive ears and keen eyes will respond to serve one another, limbs will be strengthened to work for one another, and those who know the proper principle will untiringly instruct others. Thus the aged and widowers will have support and nourishment with which to round out their old age, and the young and weak and orphans will have a place of support in which to grow up. When all-embracing love is adopted as the standard, such are the consequent benefits." �N|Q:Nck�/f�Nj�3�f�v��vNƉ,TNN�/f�N�����k:_��v:N�R�[NN0� gS����vYe��/f�N���e�YP[�� g@b�O{Q�N�~vQ�[�|^1_d[�zKN�e6r�k�� g@b>e�O�N�vQ��0�N/U�k�N|Q:Nck�sS�vQ)R_N0 {Ibid.) This, then, is Mo Tzu’s ideal world, which can be created only through the practice of all-embracing love. The Will of God and Existence of Spirits There remains, however, a basic question: How to persuade people thus to love one another? One may tell them, as was said above, that the practice of all�embracing love is the only way to benefit the world and that every hu-man-hearted man is one who practices all-embracing love. Yet people may still ask: Why should I personally act to benefit the world and why should 1 be a human�hearted man? One may then argue further that if the world as a whole is benefited, this means benefit for every individual in the world as well. Or as Mo Tzu says: “He who loves others, must also be loved by others. He who benefits others, must also be benefited by others. He who hates oth-ers, must also be hated by others. He who injures others, must also be in-jured by others.” +Y1r�N���N�_�N�1rKN�)R�N���N�_�N�)RKN�v`�N���N�_�N�v`KN��[�N���N�_�N��[KN (Mo-tzu, ch. 17.) Thus, then, the love of others is a sort of personal insurance or investment, which pays, as Americans would say. Most people, however, are too shortsighted to see the value of a long term investment of this sort, and there are a few instances in which such an in-vestment does, indeed, fail to pay. In order, therefore, to induce people to practice the principle of all-em-bracing love, Mo Tzu, in addition to the foregoing arguments, introduces a number of religious and political sanctions. Thus in the Mo-tzu there are chapters on “The Will of Heaven,” and also ones titled Proof of the Existence of Spirits.” In these we read that Cod exists; that He loves mankind; and that His Will is that all men should love one another. He constantly supervises the activities of men, especially those of the rulers of men. He punishes with calamities persons who disobey His Will, and rewards with good fortune those who obey. Besides God, there are also numerous lesser spirits who likewise reward men who practice all�embracing love, and punish those who practice “discrimination.” In this connection there is an interesting story about Mo Tzu: When Mo Tzu was once ill, Tieh Pi came to him and inquired: Sir, you hold that the spirits are intelligent and control calamities and blessings. They reward the good and punish the evil. Now you are a sage. How then can you be ill? Is it that your teaching is not entirely correct or that the spirits are after all not intelligent? Mo Tzu replied: Though I am ill, why should the spirits be un-intelligent? There are many ways by which a man can contract diseases. Some are contracted from cold or heat, some from fatigue. If there are a hundred doors and only one be closed, will there not be ways by which rob-bers can enter? “‘ P[�XP[ g�u0̍;�ۏ���f�HQu�N<��^y:Nf��:Nxy�y�:N�U�O�KN�:N N�U�ZKN0�NHQu#W�N_N�UOEe g�u�a�HQuKN� g N�UNN�<��^y Nf�wNN�P[�XP[�f�}�Ob g�u�<��^yUO}� Nf��NKN@b�_�N�u�Y�e� g�_KN�[�f� g�_KN�R�0~v���N� q0R�vUO}��e�N�N (Mo-tzu, ch. 48-) In modern logical terminology, Mo Tzu would say that punishment by the spirits is a sufficient cause for the disease of a man, but not its necessary cause. A Seeming Inconsistency Here it is timely to point out that both the Mohists and the Comfucianists seem to be inconsistent in their attitude toward the existence of spirits and the performance of rituals connected with the spirits. Certainly it seems in-consistent for the Mohists to have believed in the existence of the spirits, yet at the same time to have opposed the elaborate rituals that were conducted on the occasion of funerals and of the making of sacrifices to the ancestors. Likewise, it seems inconsistent that the Confucianists stressed those funeral and sacrificial rituals, yet did not believe in the existence of the spirits. The Mohists, for their part, were quite ready to point out this seeming inconsis-tency as regards the Confucianists. Thus we read in the Mo�tzu: Kung � meng Tzu [a Confucianist] said: 'There are no spirits.' lQ_[P[�f �e<��^y Again he said: 'The superior man should learn the rituals of sacrifice. Mo Tzu said: 'To hold that there are no spirits, and yet to learn sacrificial ceremonies, is like learn-ing the ceremonies of hospitality when there are no guests, or throwing fish nets when there are no fish. (Ch. 48.) gb�e<���f[my<��^yKN�^���V�0�zck�_N�^�ؚvQ5r0�SvQ�y0 �[5�ZO��KN_N��N:NNltQ)R0d��[0�[+�0O�[0�[qS0�lqN_N (Ch. I2.)According to this statement, therefore, the state and its ruler were established through the Will of God. No matter what was the way in which the ruler gained his power, once he was established, he, according to Mo Tzu, issued a mandate to the people of the world, saying: "Upon hearing good or evil, one shall report it to one's superior. What the superior thinks to be right, all shall think to be right. What the superior thinks to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong." �S?e�N)YNKN~v�Y���f��U� N�U��v�NJTvQ N� NKN@b/f��_�v/fKN� NKN@b^���_�v^�KN (Ch. II.) This leads Mo Tzu to the following dictum: "Always agree with the superior; never follow the inferior. (Ibid.) NT� NN�k Thus, Mo Tzu argues, the state must be totalitarian and the authority of its ruler absolute. This is an inevitable conclusion to his theory of the origin of the state. For the state was created precisely in order to end the disorder which had existed owing to the confused standards of right and wrong. The state's primary function, therefore, is, quoting Mo Tzu, "to unify the stan-dards. Within the state only one standard can exist, and it must be one which is fixed by the state itself. No other standards can be tolerated, be-cause if there were such, people would speedily return to 'the state of na-ture " in which there could be nothing but disorder and chaos. In this politi-cal theory we may see Mo Tzu's development of the professional ethics of the hswh, with its emphasis upon group obedience and discipline. No doubt it also reflects the troubled political conditions of Mo Tzu's day, which caused many people to look with favor on a centralized authority, even if it were to be an autocratic one. So, then, there can be only one standard of right and wrong. Right, for Mo Tzu, is the practice of mutual all�embracingness, and wrong is the prac-tice of "mutual discrimination." Through appeal to this political sanction, together with his religious one, Mo Tzu hoped to bring all people of the world to practice his principle of all-embracing love. Such was Mo Tzu's teaching, and it is the unanimous report of all sources of his time that in his own activities he was a true example of it. CHAPTER 6 THE FIRST PHASE OF TAOISM: YANG CHU In the Confucian Analects, we are told that Confucius, while traveling from state to state, met many men whom he called yin che, ''those who obscure themselves," and described as persons who had "escaped from the world." (XIV, 39-) These recluses ridiculed Confucius for what they regarded as his vain efforts to save the world. By one of them he was described as the one who knows he cannot succeed, yet keeps on trying to do so." (XTV, 41.) To these attacks, Tzu Lu, P[� a disciple of Confucius, once replied: It is unrigh-teous to refuse to serve in office. If the regulations between old and young in family life are not to be set aside, how is it then that you set aside the duty that exists between sovereign and subject? In your desire to maintain your personal purity, you subvert the great relationship of society Lthc relation-ship between sovereign and subject]." (Ibid., XVI11, 7.) N�N�eIN0�|^KN��� N�S�^_N0T�KNIN��YKNUOvQ�^KN�2kmvQ��0�qN'Y&O�TP[KN�N_N�L�vQIN_N0S�KN NL���]�wKN�w0 ( 0�_P[0) The Early Taoists and the Recluses The recluses were thus individualists who "desired to maintain their per-sonal purity. 2kmvQ��They were also, in a sense, defeatists who thought that the world was so bad that nothing could be done for it. One of them is reported in the Analects to have said: "The world is a swelling torrent, and is there anyone to change it? �n�n�)YN�v/f_N����NfKN�( 0��틷�_P[0 (XVIII, 6.) It was from men of this sort, most of them living far away from other men in the world of nature, that the Taoists were probably originally drawn. The Taoists, however, were not ordinary recluses who escaped the world, desiring to "maintain their personal purity, ' and who, once in re-tirement, made no attempt ideologically to justify their conduct. On the con-trary, they were men who, having gone into seclusion, attempted to work out a system of thought that would give meaning to their action. Among them, Yang Chu hg1gseems to have been the earliest prominent exponent. Yang Chu s dales are not clear, but he must have lived between the time of Mo Tzu (c. 479-c. 381 B.C.) and Mencius (c. 371-c. 189 B.C.). This is indicated by the fact that though unmentioned by Mo Tzu, he, by the time of Mencius, had become as influential as were the Mohists. To quote Mencius himself: "The words of Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the world." hg1g0�X�KN��v)YN (Mencius, Illb, 9.) In the Taoist work known as the Lieh-tzu, RP[there is one chapter entitled "Yang Chu," which, according to the traditional view, represents Yang Chu's philosophy. But the authenticity of the Lieh-tzu has been much questioned by modern scholarship, and the view expressed in most of the "Yang Chu chapter is not consistent with Yang Chu's ideas as reported in other early reliable sources. Its tenets are those of extreme hedonism (hence Forke s title, Yang Chu's Garden of Pleasure"), whereas in no other early writings do we find Yang Chu being accused as a hedonist. Yang Chu s actual ideas, unfortunately, are nowhere described very consecutively, but must be deduced from scattered references in a number of works by other writers. Yang Chu s Fundamental Ideas The Mencius says: "The principle of Yang Chu is: 'Each one for himself.' Though he might have profited the whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it.' hgP[�S:Nb��bN�k�)R)YN� N:N_N (Vila, 26.) The Lii -shih Ch un -ch iu (third century B.C.) says: "Yang Sheng valued self." hgu5��] (XVII, 7.) The Han-fei-tzu �^�P[(also third century) says: There is a man whose policy it is not to enter a city which is in danger, nor to remain in the army. Even for the great profit of the whole world, he would not exchange one hair of his shank....He is one who despises things and values life." �N g�N�Ndk�IN NeQqS�W� NY�Q�e� N�N)YN'Y)RfvQ�N�k�& & {�ir͑uKN�X_N (Ch. 50.) And the Huai-nan-tzu (sec-ond century B.C.) says: Preserving life and maintaining what is genuine in it, not allowing things to entangle one's person: this is what Yang Chu estab-lished." (Ch. 13.) hQ'`�Ow� N�Nir/}b_�hgP[KN@b�z_N0 ( 0l����0) In the above quotations, the Yang Sheng of the Lii shih Ch un-ch iu has been proved by recent scholars to be Yang Chu, while the man who "for the great profit of the whole world, would not exchange one hair of his shank" must also be Yang Chu or one of his followers, because no other man of that time is known to have held such a principle. Putting these sources together, we can deduce that Yang Chu's two fundamental ideas were: "Each one for himself, and the despising of things and valuing of life. :Nb {�ir͑uSuch ideas are precisely the opposite of those of Mo Tzu, who held the principle of an all-embracing love. The statement of Han Fei Tzu that Yang Chu would not give up a hair from his shank even to gain the entire world, differs somewhat from what Mencius says, which is that Yang Chu would not sacrifice a single hair even in order to profit the whole world. Both statements, however, are consistent with Yang Chu s fundamental ideas. The latter harmonizes with his doctrine * See Anton Forke, Yang Chit's Garden of Pleasure, and James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol II, Prolegomena, pp. 91-9- of "each one for himself ; the former with that of "despising things and valu-ing life." Both may be said to be but two aspects of a single theory. Illustrations of Yang Chu s Ideas In Taoist literature, illustrations may be found for both the above men-tioned aspects of Yang Chu's ideology. In the first chapter of the Chuang-tzu, there is a story about a meeting between the legendary sage�ruler Yao and a hermit named Hsu Yu. Yao was anxious to hand over his rule of the world to Hsu Yu, but the latter rejected it, saying: You govern the world and it is already at peace. Suppose I were to take your place, would I do it for the name? Name is but the shadow of real gain. Would I do it for real gain? The tit, building its nest in the mighty forest, occupies but a single twig. The tapir, slaking its thirst from the river, drinks only enough to fill its belly. You return and be quiet. I have no need of the world." '��)YN�N��1u0& & ��1u�f�P[�l)YN�)YN�e�]�l_N��b�r�NP[�>T:N TNN� T���[KN�[_N0>T:N�[NN�j�i��]�N�m�g� NǏN�g�CP �n��l� NǏ�ny�0R_ONNT�P[�e@b(u)YN:N Here was a hermit who would not take the world, even were it given to him for nothing. Certainly, then, he would not exchange it for even a single hair from his shank. This illustrates Han Fei Tzu’ s account of Yang Chu. In the above mentioned chapter titled “Yang Chu” in the Lieh-tzu, there is another story which reads: Ch in Tzu asked Yang Chu: If by plucking out a single hair of your body you could save the whole world, would you do it? Yang Chu answered: The whole world is surely not to be saved by a single hair. Ch in Tzu said: But supposing it possible, would you do it? Yang Chu made no answer. Ch in Tzu then went out and told Meng-sun Yang. The latter replied: ‘ You do not understand the mind of the Master. I will explain it for you. Supposing by tearing off a piece of your skin, you were to get ten thousand pieces of gold, would you do it?’ Ch’ in Tzu said: I would. Meng�sun Yang continued: Supposing by cutting off one of your limbs, you were to get a whole kingdom, would you do it? For a while Ch in Tzu was silent. Then Meng-sun Yang said: ‘ A hair is unimportant com-pared with the skin. A piece of skin is unimportant compared with a limb. But many hairs put together are as important as a piece of skin. Many pieces of skin put together are as important as a limb. A single hair is one of the ten thousand parts of the body. How can you disregard it?’ “�yP[�hg1g�f��SP[SOKNN�k��NNmNN�]l:NKNNN�hgP[��N�V^�N�kKN@bNm0�yP[�f�GPNm�:NKNNN�hgP[_�^0�yP[�Q�_[Y[3�0_[Y[3��f�P[ N��+YP[KN�_�>T��KN� g�O傌�����Nё���:NKNNN��f�:NKN0_[Y[3��f� g�e�N���_N�V�P[:NKNNN��yP[؞6q g�0_[Y[3��f�N�k�_�N����������_�NN���w�w06qR�yN�k�Nb������y�����NbN��0N�k�VNSONR-NKNNir�HYUO{�KNNN� This is an illustration of the other aspect of Yang Chu s theory. In the same chapter of the Lieh-tzu, Yang Chu is reported to have said: “The men of antiquity, if by injuring a single hair they could have profited the world, would not have done it. Had the world been offered to them as their exclusive possession, they would not have taken it. If everybody would refuse to pluck out even a single hair, and everybody would refuse to take the world as a gain, then the world would be in perfect order. �SKN�N_cN�k)R)YN� NN_N��`)YNIYN��� N�S_N0�N�N N_cN�k��N�N N)R)YN�)YN�l�w We cannot be sure that this is really a saying of Yang Chu, but it sums up very well the two aspects of his theory, and the political philosophy of the early Taoists. Yang Chu s Ideas as Expressed in the Lao-tzu and Chuang�tzu Reflections of Yang Chu’s main ideas can be found in portions of the Lao-tzu and some chapters of the Chuang�lzu and the Lil�shih Ch un�ch i� u. In the latter work there is a chapter titled “The Importance of Self,” in which it is said: Our life is our own possession, and its benefit to us is very great. Regarding its dignity, even the honor of being Emperor could not compare with it. Regarding its importance, even the wealth of possessing the world would not be exchanged for it. Regarding its safety, were we to lose it for one morning, we could never again bring it back. These three are points on which those who have understanding are careful.” �N>TuKN:Nb g��)Rb�N’Y�w0��vQ5�1��5r:N)YP[ N���N�k q0��vQ{�͑��[ g)YN N�S�NfKN0��vQ�[qS�N�f1YKN��~�� N Y�_0dk N�� gS��KN@bNa_N0 ( 0_[%f�~�͑�]0) (I, 3.) This passage ex-plains why one should despise things and value life. Even an empire, once lost, may some day be regained, but once dead, one can never live again. The Lao-tzu contains passages expressing the same idea. For example: He who in his conduct values his body more than he does the world, may be given the world. He who in his conduct loves himself more than he does the world, may be entrusted with the world.” 5��N��:N)YN���S�[)YN�1r�N��:N)YN���SXb)YN(Ch. 13.) Or: “Name or person, which is more dear? Person or fortune, which is more important? TN���p[�N���N’��p[Y (Ch. 44-) Here again appears the idea of despising things and valuing life. In the third chapter of the Chuang-tzu, titled “Fundamentals for the Cul-tivation of Life, we read: When you do something good, beware of reputa-tion; when you do something evil, beware of punishment. Follow the middle way and take this to be your constant principle. Then you can guard your person, nourish your parents, and complete your natural term of years.” :N�U�eя T�:Nv`�eяR�cw�N:N�~��S�N�O����S�NhQu��S�N{Q�N��S�N=t^0 This again follows Yang Chu s line of thought, and, according to the earlier Taoists, is the best way to preserve one’s life against the harms that come from the human world. If a man s conduct is so bad that society punishes him, this is obviously not the way to preserve his life. But if a man is so good in his conduct that he obtains a fine reputation, this too is not the way to preserve his life. Another chapter of the Chuang-tzu tells us: “Mountain trees are their own enemies, and the leaping fire is the cause of its own quenching. Cinnamon is edible, therefore the cinnamon tree is cut down. Ch’i oil is useful, therefore the ch’i tree is gashed.” q(g��[_N0��kp�Nq_N0Bh�Sߘ�EeOKN0o�S(u�EerRKN (Ch. 4.) A man having a reputation of ability and usefulness will suffer a fate just like that of the cinnamon and ch’i Irees. Thus in the Chuang-tzu we find passages that admire the usefulness of the useless. In the chapter just quoted, there is the description of a sacred oak, which, because its wood was good for nothing, had been spared the ax, and which said to someone in a dream: “For a long time I have been learning to be useless. There were several occasions on which I was nearly destroyed, but now I have succeeded in being useless, which is of the greatest use to me. If I were useful, could I have become so great? �NBl�e@b�S(uEN�w0�Q{k�CN�N�_KN�:N�N’Y(u0O�N_N� g(u�N�_ gdk’Y_N�� Again it is said that “the world knows only the usefulness of the useful, but does not know the usefulness of the useless.” �N�v�w g(uKN(u�����w�e(uKN(u_N (Ch. 4.) To be useless is the way to preserve one’s life. The man who is skillful in preserving life must not do much evil, but neither must he do much good. He must live midway between good and evil. He tries to be useless, which in the end proves of greatest usefulness to him. Development of Taoism In this chapter we have been seeing the first phase in the development of early Taoist philosophy. Altogether there have been three main phases. The ideas attributed to Yang Chu represent the first. Those expressed in the greater part of the Lao-tzu represent the second. And those expressed in the greater part of the Chuang�lzu represent the third and last phase. I say the greater part of the Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, because in the Lao-tzu there are also to be found ideas representing the first and third phases and in the Chuang-tzu ideas of the first and second phases. These two books, like many others of ancient China, are really collections of Taoist writings and sayings, made by differing persons in different times, rather than the single work of any one person. The starting point of Taoist philosophy is the preservation of life and avoiding of injury. Yang Chu s method for so doing is to escape. This is the method of the ordinary recluse who flees from society and hides himself in the mountains and forests. By doing this he thinks he can avoid the evils of the human world. Things in the human world, however, are so complicated that no matter how well one hides oneself, there are always evils that cannot be avoided. There are times, therefore, when the method of “escaping’ does not work. The ideas expressed in the greater part of the Lao-tzu represent an at-tempt to reveal the laws underlying the changes of things in the universe. Things change, but the laws underlying the changes remain unchanging. If one understands these laws and regulates one’s actions in conformity with them, one can then turn everything to one s advantage. This is the second phase in the development of Taoism. Even so, however, there is no absolute guarantee. In the changes of things, both in the world of nature and of man, there are always unseen elements. So despite every care, the possibility remains that one will suffer injury. This is why the Lao-tzu says with still deeper insight: “The reason that I have great disaster is that I have a body. If there were no body, what disaster could there be? ” >T@b�N g’Y�`��:N>T g����S>T�e���>T gUO�` (Ch. 13.) These words of greater understanding are developed in much of the Chuang-tzu, in which occur the concepts of the equalization of life with death, and the identity of self with others. This means to see life and death, self and others, from a higher point of view. By seeing things from this higher point of view, one can transcend the existing world. This is also a form of escape ; not one, however, from society to mountains and forests, but rather from this world to another world. Here is the third and last phase of development in the Taoism of ancient times. All these developments are illustrated by a story which we find in the twentieth chapter of the Chuang-tzu, titled “The Mountain Tree.” The story runs: “Chuang Tzu was traveling through the mountains, when he saw a great tree well covered with foliage. A tree�cutter was standing beside it, but he did not out it down. Chuang Tzu asked him the reason and he replied: ‘It is of no use.’ Chuang Tzu then said: ‘By virtue of having no exceptional quali-ties, this tree succeeds in completing its natural span. “When the Master (Chuang Tzu) left the mountains, he stopped at the home of a friend. The friend was glad and ordered the servant to kill a goose and cook it. The servant asked: ‘One of the geese can cackle. The other cannot. Which shall I kill?’ The Master said: ‘Kill the one that cannot cackle.’ Next day, a disciple asked Chuang Tzu the question: ‘Yesterday the tree in the mountains, because it had no exceptional quality, succeeded in completing its natural span. But now the goose of our host, because it had no exceptional quality, had to die. What will be your position? “Chuang Tzu laughed and said: My position will lie between having ex-ceptional qualities and not having them. Yet this position only seems to be right, but really is not so. Therefore those who practice this method are not able to be completely free from troubles. If one wanders about with Too and Te (the Way and its spiritual power), it will be otherwise.”‘ Then Chuang Tzu went on to say that he who links himself with Too and Te is with the ancestor of things, using things as things, but not being used by things as things. When that is so, what is there that can trouble him? ” �^P[L��Nq-N��’Y(g�g�S�v��O(g�bkvQ�e� N�S_N��vQEe0�f��e@b�S(u0�^P[�f�dk(g�N NPg�_�~vQ)Yt^0 +YP[�Q�Nq� ��NEe�NKN�[0Ee�N�U�}T�zP[@g���pKN0�zP[��f�vQN�#��vQN N�#���ZY@g�;N�N�f�@g N�#��0f�e�_P[N�^P[�f�(f�eq-NKN(g��N NPg�_�~vQ)Yt^��N;N�NKN���N NPg{k�HQuUOY� �^P[{�f�hTYNNPgN NPgKN�0PgN NPgKN��e*gMQNN/}0�+YXNS��_�nm8nR N6q0�e���e>��N��Ndž�N�e�OS���e��N:N�N NNN��N�T:Nϑ�nm8nNNNirKNVy�irir� Nir �Nir�R��S�_�/}��� In this story, the first part illustrates the theory of preserving life as practiced by Yang Chu, while the second part gives that of Chuang Tzu. “Having exceptional quality’ corresponds to the doing of good things, mentioned in the earlier quotation from the third chapter of the Chuang�Iza. “Having no exceptional quality” corresponds to the doing of bad things in that same quotation. And a position between these two extremes corresponds to the middle way indicated in that quotation. Yet if a man cannot see things from a higher point of view, none of these methods can absolutely guarantee him from danger and harm. To see things from a higher point of view, however, means to abolish the self. We may say that the early Taoists were selfish. Yet in their later development this selfishness became reversed and destroyed itself. CHAPTER 7 THE IDEALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: MENCIUS ACCORDING to the Historical Records (ch. 74), Mencius (371-289? B.C.) was a native of the state of Tsou, in the present southern part of Shantung province in East China. He was linked with Confucius through his study under a disciple of Tzu-ssu, who in turn was Confucius’ grandson. At that time, the Kings of Chi,P��V a larger state also in present Shantung, were great admirers of learning. Near the west gate of their capital, a gate known as Chi, they had established a center of learning which they called Chi hsia, 7zN that is, below Chi. All the scholars living there were ranked as great officers and were honored and courted by having large houses built for them on the main road. This was to show to all the pensioned guests of the feudal lords that it was the state of Ch i that could attract the most eminent scholars in the world.” ([bid.) �v}T�fR’Y+Y�:N_,{�^�^KNb��ؚ�’YK� �[KN0ȉ)YN�O�[�[��P���)YN$��X_N0 ( 0�S���_[P[@�SR O0) Mencius for a while was one of these eminent scholars, but he also trav-eled to other states, vainly trying to get a hearing for his ideas among their rulers. Finally, so the Historical Records tell us, he retired and with his dis-ciples composed the Mencius in seven books. This work records the conver-sations between Mencius and the feudal lords of his time, and between him and his disciples, and in later times it was honored by being made one of the famous “Four Books,” which for the past one thousand years have formed the basis of Confucian education. Meneius represents the idealistic wing of Confucianism, and the somewhat later Hstin Tzu the realistic wing. The meaning of this will become clear as we go on. The Goodness of Human Nature We have seen that Confucius spoke very much about jen (humanhearted-ness), and made a sharp distinction between yi (righteousness) and li (profit). Every man should, without thought of personal advantage, unconditionally do what he ought to do, and be what he ought to be. In other words, he should extend himself so as to include others, which, in essence, is the practice of jen. But though Confucius held these doctrines, he failed to explain why it is that a man should act in this way. Mencius, however, attempted to give an answer to this question, and in so doing developed the theory for which he is most famed: that of the original goodness of human nature. Whether human nature is good or bad-that is, what, precisely, is the na-ture of human nature�has been one of the most controversial problems in Chinese philosophy. According to Mencius, there were, in his time, three other theories besides his own on this subject. The first was that human na-ture is neither good nor bad. The second was that human nature can be ei-ther good or bad (which seems to mean that in the nature of man there are both good and bad elements), and the third was that the nature of some men is good, and that of others is bad. (Mencius, Via, 3-6.) The first of these the-ories was held by Kao Tzu,JTP[ a philosopher who was contemporary with Men-cius. We know more about it than the other theories through the long dis-cussions between him and Mencius which are preserved for us in the Men-cms. When Mencius holds that human nature is good, he does not mean that every man is born a Confucius, that is, a sage. His theory has some similari-ty with one side of the second theory mentioned above, that is, that in the nature of man there are good elements. He admits, to be sure, that there are also other elements, which are neither good nor bad in themselves, but which, if not duly controlled, can lead to evil. According to Meneius, howev-er, these are elements which man shares in common with other living crea-tures. They represent the animal aspect of man s life, and therefore, strictly speaking, should not be considered as part of the human nature. To support his theory, Mencius presents numerous arguments, among them the following: “All men have a mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others …. If now men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress….From this case we may perceive that he who lacks the feeling of commiseration is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; that he who lacks a feeling of modesty and yielding is not a man; and that he who lacks a sense of right and wrong is not a man. The feeling of commiseration is the beginning of human-heartedness. The feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and yielding is the beginning of propriety. The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. Man has these four beginnings, just as he has four limbs….Since all men have these four beginnings in themselves, let them know how to give them full development and completion. The result will be like fire that be-gins to burn, or a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to protect all within the four seas. If they are denied that development, they will not suffice even to serve one’s parents.” (Mencius, TIa, 6.) �N�v g N�_�NKN�_0& & �N�NMN�z[P[eQ�N�N��v g�l�`�O��KN�_0& & 1u/fKN��e�O��KN�_�^��N_N��e�v`KN�_�^��N_N��e����KN�_�^��N_N��e/f^�KN�_�^��N_N0�O��KN�_��NKN�z_N��v`KN�_�INKN�z_N�����KN�_�T�N0 ( 0�XP[���g0) Wu-ma Tzu was a Confucianist, and the representation of him as saying, “I love myself better than I love my parents, comes from a Mohist source and is probably an exaggeration. Certainly it is not consistent with the Con-fucianist emphasis on filial piety. With this exception, however, Wu -ma Tzu s statement is in general agreement with the Confucianist spirit. For ac-cording to the Confucianists, there should be degrees in love. Speaking about these degrees, Mencius says:’ The superior man, in his re-lation to things, loves them but has no feeling of human-heartedness. In his relation to people, he has human-heartedness, but no deep feeling of family affection. One should have feelings of family affection for the members of one’ s family, but human -heartedness for people; human -heartedness for people, but love for things.” TP[KN�Nir_N�1rKN�_�N��Nl_N��NKN�_�N0�N�N��Nl��Nl�1rir (Mencius, Vila, 45.) In a discussion with a Mo-hist by the name of Yi Chih, Mencius asked him whether he really believed that men love their neighbors children in the same way as they love their brothers children; the love for a brother s child is naturally greater. (Men-cius, Ilia, 50 This, according to Mencius, is quite proper; what should be done is to extend such love until it includes the more distant members of so-ciety. “Treat the aged in your family as they should be treated, and extend this treatment to the aged of other people’s families. Treat the young in your family as they should be treated, and extend this treatment to the young of other people s families. �>T���N�S�NKN��|^>T|^��N�S�NKN|^ (Mencius, la, 7-) Such is what Mencius calls ex-tending one’s scope of activity to include others.” (Ibid.) It is an extension based on the principle of graded love. To extend the love for one s family so as to include persons outside it as well, is to practice that “principle of chung [conscientiousness to others] and shu [altruism]” advocated by Confucius, which in turn is equivalent to the practice of human-heartedness. There is nothing forced in any of these practices, because the original natures of all men have in them a feeling of commiseration, which makes it impossible for them to bear to see the suffer-ing of others. The development of this “beginning” of goodness causes men naturally to love others, but it is equally natural that they should love their parents to a greater degree than they love men in general. Such is the Confucianist point of view. The Mohists, on the contrary, insist that the love for others should be on a par with the love for parents. Regard-less of whether this means that one should love one s parents less, or love others more, the fact remains that the Confucianisl type of graded love should be avoided at all costs. It is with this in mind that Mencius attacks the Mohist principle of all-embracing love as meaning that a man treats his father as of no account. The above difference between the Confucianist and the Mohist theory of love has been pointed out very clearly by Mencius and by many others after him. Besides this, however, there is another difference of a more fundamen-tal nature. This is, that the Confucianists considered human�heartedness as a quality that develops naturally from within the human nature, whereas the Mohists considered all-embracing love as something artificially added to man from without. Mo Tzu may also be said to have answered a question that did not occur to Confucius, namely: Why should man practice human-heartedness and righteousness? His answer, however, is based on utilitarianism, and his em-phasis on supernatural and political sanctions to compel and induce people to practice all�embracing love is not consistent with the Confucianist princi-ple that virtue should be done for its own sake. If we compare the Mo�tzu s chapter on “All-Embracing Love, as quoted above in the fifth chapter, with the quotations here from the Mencius on the four moral beginnings in man’s nature, we see very clearly the fundamental difference between the two schools. Political Philosophy We have seen earlier that the Mohist theory of the origin of state is like-wise a utilitarianistic one. Here again the Confucianist theory differs. Men-cius says: If men have satisfied their hunger, have clothes to wear, and live at ease but lack good teaching, they are close to the birds and beasts. The sage �Shun, a legendary sage-ruler � was distressed about this and appointed Hsieh as an official instructor to teach men the basic relationships of life. Father and son should love each other. Ruler and subject should be just to each other. Husband and wife should distinguish their respective spheres. Elder and younger brothers should have a sense of mutual precedence. And between friends there should be good faith. �NKN gS�_N�q�ߘ�fc��8�E��eYe�Rя�N�y}Q0#W�N g�_KN�OQY:N�S�_�Ye�N�N&O�6rP[ g�N�T� gIN�+Y�Y g+R��|^ g�^�g�S g�O0 ( 0_[P[��Z�elQ N0) (Mencius, Ilia, 4.) The existence of the human relationships and the moral principles based on them is what differentiates man from birds and beasts. The state and society have their origin in the existence of these human relationships. Therefore, according to the Mohists, the state exists because it is useful. But according to the Confucianists, it exists because it ought to exist. Men have their full realization and development only in human relation-ships. Like Aristotle, Mencius maintains that man is a political animal and can fully develop these relationships only within state and society. The state is a moral institution and the head of the state should be a moral leader. Therefore in Confucianist political philosophy only a sage can be a real king. Mencius pictures this ideal as having existed in an idealized past. According to him, there was a time when the sage Yao (supposed to have lived in the twenty-fourth century B.C.) was Emperor. When he was old, he selected a younger sage, Shun, whom he had taught how to be a ruler, so that at Yao s death, Shun became Emperor. Similarly, when Shun was old, he again selected a younger sage, Yii, to be his successor. Thus the throne was hand-ed from sage to sage, which, according to Mencius, is as it ought to be. If a ruler lacks the ethical qualities that make a good leader, the people have the moral right of revolution. In that case, even the killing of the ruler is no longer a crime of regicide. This is because, according to Meneius, if a sovereign does not act as he ideally ought to do, he morally ceases to be a sovereign and, following Confucius theory of the rectification of names, is a “mere fellow,” as Mencius says. (Mencius, lib, 8.) Mencius also says: “The people are the most important element in a state; the spirits of the land and the grain are secondary; and the sovereign is the least. l:N5��>y7z!kKN�T:N{�0 ( 0_[P[�=�_N0) (Merwius, Vllb, I4-) These ideas of Mencius have exercised a tremendous influence in Chinese history, even as late as the revolution of 1911, which led to the establishment of the Chinese Republic. It is true that modern democratic ideas from the West played their role too in this event, but the ancient native concept of the right of revolution had a greater influence on the mass of the people. If a sage becomes king, his government is called one of kingly govern-ment. According to Mencius and later Confucianists, there are two kinds of government. One is that of the wang or (sage) king; the other is that of the pa or military lord. These are completely different in kind. The government of a sage�king is carried on through moral instruction and education; that of a military lord is conducted through force and compulsion. The power of the wang government is moral, that of the pa government, physical. Mencius says in this connection: “He who uses force in the place of virtue is a pa. He who is virtuous and practices human�heartedness is a wang. When one subdues men by force, they do not submit to him in their hearts but only outwardly, because they have insufficient strength to resist. But when one gains follow-ers by virtue, they are pleased in their hearts and will submit of themselves as did the seventy disciples to Confucius. (Mencius, Ha, 3.) �N�RGP�N�8�& & �N�_L��N��s& & �N�R g�N��^��_ g_N��R Na�_N0�N�_ g�N��-N�_�`�ڋ g_N��YNASP[KN gT[P[_N0 ( 0_[P[�lQY[N N0) This distinction between wang and pa has always been maintained by laler Chinese political philosophers. In terms of contemporary politics, we may say that a democratic government is a wang government, because it represents a free association of people, while a Fascist government is that of a pa, be-cause it reigns through terror and physical force. The sage-king in his kingly government does all he can for the welfare and benefit of the people, which means that his state must be built on a sound economic basis. Since China has always been overwhelmingly agrarian, it is natural that, according to Mencius, the most important economic basis of kingly government lies in the equal distribution of land. His ideal land system is what has been known as the “well-field system. �N0uAccording to this system, each square li (about one third of a mile) of land is to be divided in-to nine squares, each consisting of one hundred Chinese acres. The central square is known as the “public field, while the eight surrounding squares are the private land of eight farmers with their families, each family having one square. These farmers cultivate the public field collectively and their own fields individually. The produce of the public field goes to the govern-ment, while each family keeps for itself what it raises from its own field. The arrangement of the nine squares resembles in form the Chinese character for “well” , which is why it is called the “well�field system. (Mencius Ilia) Describing this system further, Meneius states that each family should plant mulberry trees around its five�acre homestead in its own field so that its aged members may be clothed with silk. Each family should also raise fowls and pigs, so that its aged members may be nourished with meal. If this is done, everyone under the kingly government can “nourish the living and bury the dead without the least dissatisfaction, which marks the beginning of ihe kingly way.�Mencius, Ta, 3-) {Qu�{k�e�a��sS�KN�Y_N ( 0_[P[��h�`�s N0) It marks, however, only the beginning, because it is an exclusively eco-nomic basis for the higher culture of the people. Only when everyone has re-ceived some education and come to an understanding of the human relation-ships, does the kingly way become complete. The practice of this kingly way is not something alien to human nature, but is rather the direct outcome of the development by the sage-king of his own feeling of commiseration. As Mencius says: All men have a mind which cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others. The early kings, having this unbearing mind, thereby had likewise an unbearing government.” �N�v g N�_�NKN�_0HQ�s g N�_�NKN�_��e g N�_�NKN?e�w (Men-cius, I la, 6.) The unbearing mind and feeling of commiseration are one in Mencius thought. As we have seen, the virtue of human heartedness, ac-cording to the Confucianists, is nothing but the development of this feeling of commiseration; this feeling in its turn cannot be developed save through the practice of love; and the practice of love is nothing more than the “extension of one s scope of activity to include others, which is the way of cluing and sliu. �_U`The kingly way or kingly government is nothing but the result of the king’s practice of love, and his practice of chung and slm. According to Mencius, there is nothing esoteric or difficult in the kingly way. The Mencius (1b, 9) records that on one occasion, when an ox was being led to sacrifice, King Hsuan of Ch i saw it and could not endure its fright-ened appearance, as if it were an innocent person going to the place of death. He therefore ordered that it be replaced by a sheep. Mencius then told the King that this was an example of his “unbearing mind,” and if he could only extend it to include human affairs, he could then govern in the kingly way. The King replied that he could not do this because he had the defect of loving wealth and feminine beauty. Whereupon Mencius told the King that these are things loved by all men. If the King, by understanding his own desires, would also come to understand the desires of all his people, and would take measures whereby the people might satisfy these desires, this would result in the kingly way and nothing else. What Mencius told King Hsiian is nothing more than the extension of one’s own scope of activity to include others, which is precisely the prac-tice of chung and shu. Here we see how Mencius developed the ideas of Confucius. In his exposition of this principle, Confucius had limited himself to its application to the self-cultivation of the individual, while by Mencius its application was extended to government and politics. For Confucius, it was a principle only for sageliness within,�Q#W but by Mencius it was expanded to become also a principle for “kingliness without.Y�s Even in the former sense of “sageliness within,” Mencius expresses his concept of this principle more clearly than did Confucius. He says: He who has completely developed his mind, knows his nature. He who knows his na-ture, knows Heaven.” =vQ�_���wvQ’`_N0�wvQ’`�R�w)Y�w0 ( 0_[P[�=�_ N0) (Mencius, Vila, I.) The mind here referred to is the unbearing mind or the feeling of commiseration. It is the essence of our nature. Hence when we fully develop this mind, we know our nature. And according to Mencius, our nature is ‘what Heaven has given to us.’ (Men-cius, Via, I5-) Therefore, when we know our nature, we also know Heaven. Mysticism According to Mencius and his school of Confucianism, the universe is es-sentially a moral universe. The moral principles of man are also metaphysi-cal principles of the universe, and the nature of man is an exemplification of these principles. It is this moral universe that Mencius and his school mean when they speak of Heaven, and an understanding of this moral universe is what Mencius calls knowing Heaven. If a man knows Heaven, he is not only a citizen of society, but also a “citizen of Heaven,” then min )Yl, as Men-cius says. (Mencius, Vila, 19.) Mencius further makes a distinction between human honors and heavenly honors. He says: There are heavenly hon-ors and human honors. Human -hcartedness, righteousness, loyalty, good faith, and the untiring practice of the good: these are the honors of Heaven. Princes, ministers, and officials: these are the honors of man. g)Y5r�� g�N5r�0�NIN�_�O�PN�U N&P�dk)Y5r_N0lQS’Y+Y�dk�N5r_N0 ( 0_[P[�JTP[ N0) (Mencius, VI a, 16.) In other words, heavenly honors are those to which a man can attain in the world of values, while human honors are purely material concepts in the human world. The citizen of Heaven, just because he is the citizen of Heaven, cares only for the honors of Heaven, but not those of man. Mencius also remarks: “All things are complete within us. There is no greater delight than to realize this through self-cultivation. And there is no better way to human� heartedness than the practice of the principle of shu. Nir�vY�Nb�w0�S���ڋ�PN��’Y q0:_(`�L��Bl�N��я q0( 0_[P[�=�_ N0) (Mencius, Vila, I.) In other words, through the full development of his na-ture, a man can not only know Heaven, but can also become one with Heaven. Also when a man fully develops his unbearing mind, he has within him the virtue of human-heartedness, and the best way to human-hearted-ness is the practice of chung and shu. Through this practice, one s egoism and selfishness are gradually reduced. And when they are reduced, one comes to feel that there is no longer a distinction between oneself and others, and so of distinction between the individual and the universe. That is to say, one becomes identified with the universe as a whole. This leads to a re-alization that “all things are complete within us.” In this phrase we see the mystical element of Mencius philosophy. We will understand this mysticism better, if we turn to Mencius discus-sion on what he calls the Hao Jan Chih Ch’i,im6qKNl a term which translate as the Great Morale. In this discussion Meneius describes the development of his own spiritual cultivation. The Meneius (Ha, 2.) tells us that a disciple asked Meneius of what he was a specialist. Meneius replied: “I know the right and wrong in speech, and am proficient in cultivating my Hao Jan Chih Ch’i.” b�w��b�U{Q>Tim6qKNl The questioner then asked what this was, and Meneius replied: It is the Ch i, supremely great, supremely strong. If it be directly cultivated without handicap, then it per-vades all between Heaven and Earth. It is the Ch’ i which is achieved by the combination of righteousness and Too [the way, the truth], and without these it will be weakened. vQ:Nl_N��’Y�R��N�v{Q��e�[�R^X�N)Y0WKN�0vQ:Nl_N�M�INNS���e/f���_N Hao Jan Chih Ch’i is a special term of Meneius. In later times, under his increasing influence, it came to be used not infrequently, but in ancient times it appears only in this one chapter. As to what it signifies, even Men-eius admits that “it is hard to say.” (Ibid.) The context of this discussion, however, includes a preliminary discussion about two warriors and their method of cultivating their valor. From this I infer that Meneius Ch i (a word which literally means vapor, gas, spiritual force) is the same ch i as oc-curs in such terms as yung ch’ i (courage, valor) and shih ch i (morale of an army). That is why I translate Hao Jan Chih Ch’i as the “Great Morale.” It is of the same nature as the morale of the warriors. The difference between the two, however, is that this Ch’ i is further described as hao jan, which means “great to a supreme degree.” The morale which warriors cultivate is a matter concerning man and man, and so is a moral value only. But the Great Morale is a matter concerning man and the universe, and therefore is a su-per-moral value. It is the morale of the man who identifies himself with the universe, so that Meneius says of it that it pervades all between Heaven and Earth.” The method of cultivating the Great Morale has two aspects. One may be called the “understanding of Too”; that is, of the way or principle that leads to the elevation of the mind. The other aspect is what Meneius calls the ac-cumulation of righteousness ; that is, the constant doing of what one ought to do in the universe as a “citizen of the universe.” The combination of these two aspects is called by Meneius the combination of righteousness and Too. After one has reached an understanding of Too and the long accumulation of righteousness, the Great Morale will appear naturally of itself. The least bit of forcing will lead to failure. As Meneius says: We should not be like the man of Sung. There was a man of Sung who was grieved that his grain did not grow fast enough. So he pulled it up. Then he returned to his home with great innocence, and said to his people: I am tired today, for I have been helping the grain to grow. His son ran out to look at it, and found all the grain withered.” (Ibid.) �e傋[�N6q0�[�N g�vQׂKN N��CPKN�0����6qR_��vQ�N�f��N�e�u�w��N�Rׂ��w0vQP[����_ƉKN�ׂR�i�w When one grows something, one must on the one hand do something for it, but on the other never “help it to grow. The cultivation of the Great Morale is just like the growing of the grain. One must do something, which is the practice of virtue. Though Mencius here speaks of righteousness rather than human-heartedness, there is no practical difference, since human-hearted -ness is the inner content, of which righteousness is the outer expression. If one constantly practices righteousness, the Great Morale will naturally emerge from the very center of one s being. Although this Hao Jan Chih Chi sounds rather mysterious, it can nevertheless, according to Mencius, be achieved by every man. This is because it is nothing more than the fullest development of the nature of man, and every man has fundamentally the same nature. His nature is the same, just as every man s bodily form is the same. As an example, Mencius remarks that when a shoemaker makes shoes, even though he does not know the exact length of the feet of his customers, he always makes shoes, but not baskets. (Mencius, Via, 7.) This is so because the similarity between the feet of all men is much greater than their difference. And likewise the sage, in his original nature, is similar to everyone else. Hence every man can become a sage, if only he gives full development to his original nature. As Mencius affirms: “All men can become Yao or Shun [the two legendary sage-rulers previously mentioned]. �N�v�S�N:N’� ( 0_[P[�JTP[N0)�Mencius, VIb, 2..) Here is Mencius theory of education, which has been held by all Confucianists. CHAPTER 8 THE SCHOOL OF NAMES THE term Ming chia has sometimes been translate d as “sophists,” and sometimes as “logicians” or “dialecticians.” It is true that there is some similarity between the Ming chia and the sophists, logicians, and dialecti-cians, but it.is also true that they are not quite the same. To avoid confusion, it is better to translate Ming chia literally as the School of Names. This translation also helps to bring to the attention of Westerners one of the im-portant problems discussed by Chinese philosophy, namely that of the rela-tion between ming (the name) and shih (the actuality). The School of Names and the Debaters logically speaking, the contrast between ming and shih in ancient Chi-nese philosophy is something like that between subject and predicate in the West. For instance, when we say: “This is a table, or “Socrates is a man, ‘ “this” and “Socrates” are shih or actualities, while “table” and “man” are ming or names. This is obvious enough. Let us, however, try to analyze more exactly just what the shih or ming are, and what their relationship is. We are then apt to be led into some rather paradoxical problems, the solution of which brings us to the very heart of philosophy. The members of the School of Names were known in ancient times as pien che��� (debaters, disputcrs, arguers). In the chapter of the Chuang-tzu titled “The Autumn Flood,” Kung-sun Lung, one of the leaders of the School of Names, is represented as saying: 1 have unified similarity and difference, and separated hardness and whiteness. I have proved the impossible as pos-sible and affirmed what others deny. I have controverted the knowledge of all the philosophers, and refuted all the arguments brought against me. TT_��yZW}v�6q N6q��S N�S0�V~v�[KN�w�wzO�SKN��(Chuang-tzu, eh. TJ.) These words are really applicable to the School of Names as a whole. Its members were known as persons who made paradoxi-cal statements, who were ready to dispute with others, and who purposely affirmed what others denied and denied what others affirmed. Ssu-ma Tan (died 110 B.C.), for example, in his essay, “On the Essential Ideas of the Six Schools,” wrote: “The School of Names conducted minute examinations of trifling points in complicated and elaborate statements, which made it impos-sible for others to refute their ideas.” T�[ۂ�[4�~�O�N N�_�SvQa(Historical Records, ch. I2O.) Hsiin Tzu,@�P[ a Confucianist of the third century B.C., describes Teng Hsi ���g(died 501 B.C.) and Hui Shih as philosophers who “liked to deal with strange theories and indulge in curious propositions.” }Y�l*`���s&t��(Hsiin-tzu, ch. 6.) Likewise, the Lii�shih Ch un�ch iu mentions Teng Hsi and Kung�sun Lung as among those known for their paradoxical arguments. (XVIII, 4 and 5.) And the chap-ter titled “The World” in the Chuang-tzu, after listing the paradoxical argu-ments famous at that time, mentions the names of Hui Shih, Huan T uan, and Kung�sun Lung. These men, therefore, would seem to have been the most important leaders of this school. About Huan T’uan we know nothing further, but about Teng Hsi, we know that he was a famous lawyer of his time; his writings, however, no longer are preserved, and the book today bearing the title of Teng�hsi�tzu is not gen-uine. The Lii-shih Ch’un-ch’iu says that when Tzu-ch’an, a famous statesman, was minister of the state of Cheng, Teng Hsi, who was a native of that state, was his major opponent. He used to help the people in their law-suits, for which services he would demand a coat as a fee for a major case, and a pair of trousers for a minor one. So skilful was he that he was patron-ized by numerous people; as their lawyer, he succeeded in changing right into wrong and wrong into right, until no standards of right and wrong re-mained, so that what was regarded as possible and impossible fluctuated from day to day. (XVIII, 4.) Another story in the same work describes how, during a flood of the Wei River, a certain rich man of the state of Cheng was drowned. His body was picked up by a boatman, but when the family of the rich man went to ask for the body, the man who had found it demanded a huge reward. Thereupon the members of the family went to Teng Hsi for advice. He told them: “Merely wait. There is nobody else besides yourselves who wants the body.” The fam-ily took his advice and waited, until the man who had found the body be-came much troubled and also went to Teng Hsi. To him Teng Hsi said: “Merely wait. There is nobody else but you from whom they can get the body.” (Ibid.) We are not told what was the final end of this episode! It would thus seem that Teng Hsi’ s trick was to interpret the formal letter of the law in such a way as to give varying interpretations in different cases at will. This was how he was able to “conduct minute examinations of trifling points in complicated and elaborate statements, which made it impossible for others to refute his ideas.” He thus devoted himself to interpreting and ana-lyzing the letter of the law, while disregarding its spirit and its connection with actuality. In other words, his attention was directed to names,” instead of to “actualities.” Such was the spirit of the School of Names. From this we may see that the pien che were originally lawyers, among whom Teng Hsi was evidently one of the first. He was, however, only a be-ginner in the analysis of names, and made no real contribution to philosophy as such. Hence the real founders of the School of Names were the later Hui Shih and Kung�sun Lung. Concerning these two men the Lu-shih Ch’un-ch iu tells us: “Hui Tzu [Hui Shih] prepared the law for King Hui of Wei (370-319). When it was completed and was made known to the people, the people considered it to be good. (XVIII, 5-) And again: The states of Chao and Ch in entered into an agreement which said: ‘From this time onward, in whatever Chin desires to do, she is to be assisted by Chao, and in whatever Chao desires to do, she is to be assisted by Ch in. But soon afterward Ch in attacked the state of Wei, and Chao made ready to go to Wei’s assistance. The King of Ch in protested to Chao that this was an infringement of the pact, and the King of Chao reported this to the Lord of P ing�yuan, who again told it to Kung�sun Lung. Kung-sun Lung said: ‘We too can send an envoy to protest to the King of Ch’in, saying: “According to the pact, each side guarantees to help the other in whatever either desires to do. Now it is our desire to save Wei, and if you do not help us to do so, we shall charge you with infringement of the pact.”‘” (Ibid.) �yu��vN�~��~�f���N�Neg��yKN@b2k:N�u��RKN�u�KN@b2k:N��y�RKN0E�e�QUO0�ytQuQ;eO��u�2kQeKN��y�s N��O�N��u��s�f��~�f��yKN@b2k:N�u��RKN�u�KN@b2k:N��y�RKN0�N�y2k;eO���u��V2kQeKN�dk^��~_N0u��s�NJTs^�ST0s^�ST�NJTlQY[��0lQY[���f��N�S�N�SO����y�s�f�u�2kQeKN0�N�y�s�r N�Ru��dk^��~_N Again we are told in the Han fei tzu: When discussions on hardness and whiteness and having no thickness’ appear, the governmental laws lose their effect.” (Ch. 41-) We shall see below that the doctrine of “hardness and whiteness” is one of Kung-sun Lung, while that of “having no thick-ness” is one of Hui Shih. From these stories we may see that Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung were, to some extent, connected with the legal activities of their time. Indeed, Kung� sun Lung s interpretation of the pact between Chao and Ch in is truly in the spirit of Teng Hsi. Han Fei Tzu considered the effect of the “speeches” of these two gentlemen on law to be as bad as that of the practice of Teng Hsi. It may seem strange that Han Fei Tzu, himself a Legalist, should oppose, as destructive to law, the discussions of a school which had originated with lawyers. But, as we shall see in chapter 14, Han Fei Tzu and the other Le-galists were really politicians, not jurists. Hui Shih and Kung�sun Lung represented two tendencies in the School of Names, the one emphasizing the relativity of actual things, and the other the absoluteness of names. This distinction becomes evident when one comes to analyze names in their relationship to actualities. Let us take the simple statement, “This is a table.” Here the word “this refers to the concrete ac-tuality, which is impermanent and may come and go. The word table, how-ever, refers to an abstract category or name which is unchanging and always remains as it is. The “name” is absolute, but the “actuality ‘ is relative. Thus “beauty” is the name of what is absolutely beautiful, but “a beautiful thing” can only be relatively so. Hui Shih emphasized the fact that actual things are changeable and relative, while Kung-sun Lung emphasized the fact that names are permanent and absolute. Hui Shih’s Theory of Relativity Hui Shih (fl. 350-260) was a native of the state of Sung, in the present province of Honan. We know that he once became premier of King Hui of Wei (370-319)? and that he was known for his greal learning. His writings, unfortunately, are lost, and what we know of his ideas may be deduced only from a series of “ten points” preserved in the chapter titled “The World” in the Chuang�tzu. The first of these points is: “The greatest has nothing beyond itself, and is called the Great One. The smallest has nothing within itself, and is called the Small One.” �’Y�eY��KN’YN���e�Q��KNNThese two statements constitute what are called analytical propositions. They make no assertions in regard to the actual, for they say nothing about what, in the actual world, is the greatest thing and the smallest thing. They only touch upon the abstract concepts or names: “greatest” and smallest. In order to understand these two propositions fully, we should compare them with a story in the chapter titled “The Autumn Flood in the Chuang-tzu. From this it will become apparent that in one respect Hui Shih and Chuang Tzu had very much in common. This story describes how in autumn, when the Yellow River was in flood, the Spirit of the River, who was very proud of his greatness, moved down the river to the sea. There he met the Spirit of the Sea, and realized for the first time that his river, great as it was, was small indeed in comparison with the sea. Yet when, full of admiration, he talked with the Spirit of the Sea, the latter replied that he himself, in his relationship to Heaven and Earth, was nothing more than a single grain lying within a great warehouse. Hence he could only be said to be small, but not to be great. At this the River Spirit asked the Sea Spirit: “Are we right then in saying that Heaven and Earth are supremely great and the tip of a hair is supremely small? The Sea Spirit answered: What men know is less than what they do not know. The time when they are alive is less than the time when they are not alive….How can we know that the tip of a hair is the extreme of smallness, and Heaven and Earth are the extreme of greatness? And he then went on to define the smallest as that which has no form, and the greatest as that which cannot be enclosed (by anything else). This definition of the supremely great and supremely small is similar to that given by Hui Shih. {Chuang-tzu, eh. 17.) 6qR>T’Y)Y0W��k+g��SNN� Swm��� &T0& & ���NKN@b�w� N�vQ@b N�w�vQuKN�e� N�*guKN�e0�NvQ��BlwzvQ�’YKN�W�/fEe�qN� N�ꁗ__N01udkKN��SUO�N�w�k+gKN���N�[��~KN*P��SUO�N�w)Y0WKN���Nwz�’YKN�W� To say that Heaven and Earth are the greatest of things and that the tip of a hair is the smallest is to make assertions about the actual, the shih. It makes no analysis of the names of the actualities, the ming. These two proposi tions are what are called synthetic propositions and both may be false. They have their basis in experience; therefore their truth is only con-tingent, but not necessary. In experience, things that are great and things that are small are all relatively so. To quote the Chuang-tzu again: “If we call a thing great, because it is greater than something else, then there is nothing in the world that is not great. If we call a thing small because it is smaller than something else, then there is nothing in the world that is not small. �V�@b’Y�’YKN0RNir�� N’Y��VvQ@b�KN0RNir�� N We cannot through actual experience decide what is the greatest and what is the smallest of actual things. But we can say independently of experience that that which has nothing beyond itself is the greatest, and that which has nothing within itself is the smallest. Greatest and “smallest, defined in this way, are absolute and unchanging concepts. Thus by analyzing the names, “Great One” and “Small One,” Hui Shih reached the concept of what is absolute and unchanging. From the point of view of this concept, he realized that the qualities and differences of actual concrete things are all relative and liable to change. Once we understand this position of Hui Shih, we can see that his series of “points,” as reported by the Chuang-tzu, though usually regarded as paradoxes, are really not paradoxical at all. With the exception of the first, they are all illustrations of the relativity of things, and expressions of whal may be called a theory of relativity. Let us study them one by one. “That which has no thickness cannot be increased [in thickness], yet it is so great that it may cover one thousand miles. �e�S N�S�y_N�vQ’YCS̑ This states that the great and the small are so only relatively. It is impossible for that which has no thickness to be thick. In this sense it may be called small. Nevertheless, the ideal plane of geometry, though without thickness, may at the same time be very long and wide. In this sense it may be called great. “The heavens are as low as the earth; mountains are on the same level as marshes.” )YN0WQS�qN�ls^This, too, states that the high and the low are so only relatively. The sun at noon is the sun declining; the creature born is the creature dy-ing. �e�e-N�ehw�ir�eu�e{kThis states that everything in the actual world is changeable and changing. “Great similarity differs from little similarity. This is called little-similari-ty and difference. All things are in one way all similar, in another way all different. This is called great-similarity-and-difference.” ‘YT�NT_�dkKN�T_0Nir�kT�k_�dkKN�’YT_When we say that all men are animals, we thereby recognize that all human beings are similar in the fact that they are human beings, and are also similar in the fact that they are animals. Their similarity in being human beings, however, is greater than that in being animals, because being a human being implies being an animal, but being an animal does not necessarily imply being a human be-ing. For there are other kinds of animals as well, which are different from human beings. It is this kind of similarity and difference, therefore, that Hui Shih calls little-similarity-and-difference. However, if we take “beings’as a universal class, we thereby recognize that all things are similar in the fact that they are beings. But if we take each thing as an individual, we thereby recognize that each individual has its own individuality and so is different from other things. This kind of similarity and difference is what Hui Shih calls great�similarity�and�difference. Thus since we can say that all things are similar to each other, and yet can also say that all things are different from each other, this shows that their similarity and difference are both rela-tive. This argument of the School of Names was a famous one in ancient China, and was known as the argument for the unity of similarity and differ-ence.” TT_KN�� “The South has no limit and yet has a limit. WS�e�ewz� gwz “The South has no limit’ was a common saying of the day. At that time, the South was a little known land very much like the West of America two hundred years ago. For the early Chinese, the South was not limited by sea as was the East, nor by bar-ren desert as were the North and West. Hence it was popularly regarded as having no limit. Hui Shih s statement may thus perhaps be merely an ex-pression of his superior geographical knowledge, that the South is, eventual-ly, also limited by the sea. Most probably, however, it means to say that the limited and the unlimited are both only relatively so. “I go to the state of Ytich today and arrived there yesterday. ” �N�e���fegThis states that “today” and “yesterday” are relative terms. The yesterday of today was the today of yesterday, and the today of today will be the yesterday of to-morrow. Herein lies the relativity of the present and the past. “Connected rings can be separated.” ޏ�s�S�_NConnected rings cannot be separated unless they are destroyed. But destruction may, from another point of view, be construction. If one makes a wooden table, from the, point of view of the wood, it is destruction, but from the point of view of the table, it is construc-tion. Since destruction and construction are relative, therefore connected rings can be separated ‘ without destroying them. I know the center of the world. It is north of Yen and south of Yiieh. b�w)YNKN-N.Y��qKNS0��KNWS/f_NAmong the states of the time, Yen was in the extreme north and Yiieh in the extreme south. The Chinese regarded China as being the world. Hence it was a matter of common sense that the center of the world should be south of Yen and north of Yiieh. HuiShih s contrary assertion here is well interpreted by a commentator of the third century A.U., Ssu-ma Piao, who says: “The world has no limit, and therefore anywhere is the center, just as in drawing a circle, any point on the line can be the starting point. )YN�e�e�Ee@b(W:N-N��_�s�e�z�Ee@b(W:N�Y_N “Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one body.” �b1rNir0)Y0WNSO_NIn the preced-ing propositions, Hui Shih argues that all things are relative and in a state of flux. There is no absolute difference, or absolute separation among them. Ev-erything is constantly changing into something else. It is a logical conclu-sion, therefore, that all things are one, and hence that we should love all things equally without discrimination. In the Chuang-tzu it is also said: “If we see things from the point of view of their difference, even my liver and gall are as far from each other as are the states of Ch’ u and Yiieh. If we see things from the point of view of their similarity, all things are one. (Ch. 5.) �vQ_�ƉKN���ƀZi��_N��vQT�ƉKN�Nir�vN_N Kung sun Lung s Theory of Universals The other main leader of the School of Names was Kung-sun Lung (fl. 284-259), who was widely known in his day for his sophistic arguments. It is said that once when he was passing a frontier, the frontier guards said: “Horses are not allowed to pass.” Kung-sun Lung replied: “My horse is white, and a white horse is not a horse.”And so saying, he passed with his horse. Instead of emphasizing, as did Hui Shih, that actual things are relative and changeable, Kung-sun Lung emphasized that names are absolute and permanent. In this way he arrived at the same concept of Platonic- ideas or universals that has been so conspicuous in Western philosophy. In his work titled the Kung�sun Lung�tzu, there is a chapter called Dis-course on the White Horse.” Its main proposition is the assertion that “a white horse is not a horse. This proposition Kung�sun Lung tries to prove through three arguments. The first is: The word horse denotes a shape; the word ‘white denotes a color. That which denotes color is not that which denotes shape. Therefore I say that a white horse is not a horse. l��0@b�N}Tb__N�}v��@b�N}Tr�_N0}Tr��^�}Tb__N0Ee�f�}vl�^�l�0In terms of Western logic, we may say that this argument emphasizes the difference in the intension of the terms “horse,” “white,” and “white horse.” The inten-sion of the first term is one kind of animal, that of the second is one kind of color, and that of the third is one kind of animal plus one kind of color. Since the intension of each of the three terms is different, therefore a white horse is not a horse. The second argument is: “When a horse is required, a yellow horse or a black one may be brought forward, but when one requires a white horse, a yellow or a black horse cannot be brought forward….Therefore a yellow horse and a black horse are both horses. They can only respond to a call for a horse but cannot respond to a call for a white horse. It is clear that a white horse is not a horse. And again: The term horse neither excludes nor in-cludes any color; therefore yellow and black ones may respond to it. But the term white horse both excludes and includes color. Yellow and black horses are all excluded because of their color. Therefore only a white horse can fit the requirements. That which is not excluded is not the same as that which is excluded. Therefore I say that a white horse is not a horse.” Bll��Ğўl��v�S�0Bl}vl��Ğўl� N�S�0& & EeĞўl�N_N���S�N�^ gl��� N�S�N�^ g}vl��/f}vl�KN^�l��[�w 0 l����e�S�S�Nr��EeĞў�v@b�N�^0}vl�� g�S�S�Nr��Ğўl��v@b�Nr��S�Ee�`}vl��r�S�N�^3�0�e�S��^� g�S_N0Ee�f�}vl�^�l�0In terms of Western logic, we may say that this argument emphasizes the differ-ence in the extension of the terms “horse” and “white horse.” The extension of the term “horse” includes all horses, with no discrimination as to their color. The extension of the term ‘ white horse, however, includes only white horses, with a corresponding discrimination of color. Since the extension of the term “horse” and “white horse” is different, therefore a white horse is not a horse. The third argument is: “Horses certainly have color. Therefore there are white horses. Suppose there is a horse without color, then there is only the horse as such. But how then, do we get a white horse? Therefore a white horse is not a horse. A white horse is ‘horse’ together with ‘white.’ ‘Horse with ‘white’ is not horse. l��V gr��Ee g}vl�0Ol��er�� gl��Y�]3�0�[�S}vl��Ee}v��^�l�_N0}vl���l�N}v_N�}vNl�_N0Ee�f�}vl�^�l�_N0In this argument, Kung-sun Lung seems to emphasize the distinction between the universal, “horseness,” and the universal, while�horseness. The universal, horseness, is the essential at-tribute of all horses. It implies no color and is just “horse as such. Such “horseness” is distinct from “white-horseness. ” That is to say, the horse as such is distinct from the white horse as such. Therefore a white horse is not a horse. Besides horse as such, there is also white as such, that is, whiteness. In the same chapter it is said: “White as such does not specify what is white. But ‘white horse specifies what is white specified white is not white.” }v� N�[@b}v��_KN��S_N0}vl���}v0�[@b}v_N0�[@b}v��^�}v_N0Specified white is the concrete white color which is seen in this or that par-ticular white object. The word here translated as specified is ting, which also has the meaning of “determined.” The white color which is seen in this or that white object is determined by this or that object. The universal, whiteness, however, is not determined by any one particular white object. It is the whiteness unspecified. The Kung-sun Lung-tzu contains another chapter entitled “Discourse on Hardness and Whiteness. The main proposition in this chapter is that “hardness and whiteness are separate.” Kung-sun Lung tries to prove this in two ways. The first is expressed in the following dialogue: “[Supposing there is a hard and white stone , is it possible to say hard, white, and stone are three? No. Can they be two? Yes. How? When without hardness one finds what is white, this gives two. When without whiteness one finds what is hard, this gives two. Seeing does not give us what is hard but only what is white, and there is nothing hard in this. Touching does not give us what is white but only what is hard, and there is nothing white in this.” ZW0}v0�w� N��SNN��f� N�S0�f��N��SNN��f��S0�f�UO�T��f��eZW�_}v�vQ>N_N�N��e}v�_ZW�vQ>N_N�N 0 Ɖ N�_vQ@bZW��_vQ@b}v���eZW_N0�b N�_vQ@b}v��_vQ@bZW��_vQZW_N��e}v_NThis dialogue uses epistemological proof to show that hardness and whiteness arc separated from each other. Here we have a hard and white stone. If we use our eyes to see it, we only get what is white, i.e., a white stone. But if we use our hands to touch it, we only get what is hard, i.e., a hard stone. While we are sensing that the stone is white, we cannot sense that it is hard, and while we are sensing that it is hard, we cannot sense that it is white. Epistemologically speaking, therefore, there is only a white stone or a hard stone here, but not a hard and white stone. This is the meaning of the saying: “When without hardness one finds what is white, this gives two. When without whiteness one finds what is hard, this gives two. Kung-sun Limjr s second argument is a metaphysical one. Its general idea is that both hardness and whiteness, as universals, are unspecified in regard to what particular object it is that is hard or that is white. They can be mani-fested in any or all white or hard objects. Indeed, even if in the physical world there were no hard or white objects at all, none the less, the universal, hardness, would of necessity remain hardness, and the universal, whiteness, would remain whiteness. Such hardness and whiteness are quite independent of the existence of physical stories or other objects that are hard and white. The fact that they are independent universals is shown by the fact that in the physical world there are some objects that are hard but not white, and other objects that are white but not hard. Thus it is evident that hardness and whiteness are separate from each other. With these epistemological and metaphysical arguments Kung-sun Lung established his proposition that hardness and whiteness are separate. This was a famous proposition in ancient China, and was known as the argument for “the separateness of hardness and whiteness.” In the Kung-sun Lung-tzu there is yet another chapter entitled “Dis-course on Chih and Wu.”cir�� By wu Kung-sun Lung means concrete particular things, while by chih he means abstract universals. The literal meaning of chih is, as a noun, “finger or “pointer,” or, as a verb, “to indicate.” Two explanations may be given as to why Kung sun Lung uses the word chih to denote universals. A common term, that is, a name, to use the terminology of the School of Names, denotes a class of particular things and connotes the common attributes of that class. An abstract term, on the contrary, denotes the attribute or universal. Since the Chinese language has no inflection, there is no distinction in form between a common term and an abstract one. Thus, in Chinese, what Westerners would call a common term may also de-note a universal. Likewise, the Chinese language has no articles. Hence, in Chinese, such terms as horse, the horse, and a horse are all designat-ed by the one word ma or “horse.” It would seem, therefore, that fundamen-tally the word ma denotes the universal concept, horse, while the other terms, “a horse,” “the horse, ‘ etc., are simply particularized applications of this universal concept. From this it may be said that, in the Chinese lan-guage, a universal is what a name points out, i.e., denotes. This is why Kung�sun Lung refers to universals as chih or pointers. Another explanation of why Kung-sun Lung uses chih to denote the universal, is that chih (finger, pointer, etc.) is a close equivalent of another word, also pronounced chih and written almost the same, which means idea or “concept.” According to this explanation, then, when Kung-sun Lung speaks of chih (pointer), he really means by it “idea” or “concept.” As can be seen from his arguments above, however, this “idea” is for him not the subjec-tive idea spoken of in the philosophy of Berkeley and Hume, but rather the objective idea as found in the philosophy of Plato. It is the universal. In the final chapter of the Chuang-lzu we find a series of twenty�one argu-ments attributed without specification to the followers of the School of Names. Among them, however, it is evident that some are based upon the ideas of Hui Shih, and others upon those of Kung-sun Lung, and they can be explained accordingly. They used to be considered as paradoxes, but they cease to be such once we understand the fundamental ideas of their authors. Significance of the Theories of Hui Shih and Kung�sun Lung Thus by analyzing names, and their relation with, or their distinction from, actualities, the philosophers of the School of Names discovered what in Chi-nese philosophy is called “that which lies beyond shapes and features.” In Chinese philosophy a distinction is made between “being that lies within shapes and features, and ‘ being that lies beyond shapes and features.” “Be-ing that lies within shapes and features’ is the actual, the shih. For instance, the big and the small, the square and the round, the long and the short, the white and the black, are each one class of shapes and features. Anything that is the object or possible object of experience has shape and feature, and lies within the actual world. Conversely, any object in the actual world that has shape and feature is the object or possible object of experience. When Hui Shih enunciated the first and last of his series of “points,” he was talking about what lies beyond shapes and features. The greatest, he said, has nothing beyond itself. This is called the Creat One. This defines in what manner the greatest is as it is. “Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one.” This defines of what the greatest consists. This last statement conveys the idea that all is one and one is all. Since all is one, there can be nothing beyond the all. The all is itself the greatest one, and since there can be nothing beyond the all, the all cannot be the object of experience. This is because an object of experience always stands in opposition to the one who experiences. Hence if we say that the all can be an object of experience, we must also say that there is something that stands in opposition to the all and is its experiencer. In other words, we must say that that which has nothing beyond itself at the same time has something beyond itself, which is a mani-fest contradiction. King-sun Lung, too, discovered what lies beyond shapes and features, be-cause the universals he discussed can likewise not be objects of experience. One can see a white something, but one cannot see the universal whiteness as such. All universals that are indicated by names lie in a world beyond shapes and features, though not all universals in that world have names to indicate them. In that world, hardness is hardness and whiteness is white-ness, or as Kung-sun Lung said: “Each is alone and true.” �r�ck(Kung-sun Lung-tzu, ch. 5.) Hui Shih spoke of “loving all things equally, ‘ and Kung-sun Lung also wished to extend his argument in order to correct the relations between names and actualities, so as thus to transform the whole world. (Ibid., ch. 1.) Both men thus apparently considered their philosophy as comprising the Too of sageliness within and kingliness without. But it was left to the Taoists fully to apply the discovery made by the School of Names of what lies beyond shapes and features. The Taoists were the opponents of this school, but they were also its true inheritors. This is illustrated by the fact that Hui Shih was a great friend ol Chuang Tzu. CHAPTER 9 THE SECOND PHASE OF TAOISM: LAO TZU ACCORDING to tradition, Lao Tzu (a name which literally means the “Old Master”) was a native of the state of Ch’u in the southern part of the present Honan province, and was an older contemporary of Confucius, whom he is reputed to have instructed in ceremonies. The book bearing his name, the Lao-tzu, and in later times also known as the Too Te Clung (Classic of the Way and Power), has therefore been traditionally regarded as the first philo-sophical work in Chinese history. Modern scholarship, however, has forced us drastically to change this view and to date it to a time considerably after Confucius. Lao Tzu the Man and Lao-tzu the Book Two questions arise in this connection. One is about the date of the man, Lao Tzu (whose family name is said to have been Li, and personal name, Tan), and another about the date of the book itself. There is no necessary connection between the two, for it is quite possible that there actually lived a man known as Lao Tan who was senior to Confucius, but that the book titled the Lao-tzu is a later production. This is the view I take, and it does not necessarily contradict the traditional accounts of Lao Tzu the man, because in these accounts there is no statement that the man, Lao Tzu, actually wrote the book by that name. Hence I am willing to accept the traditional stories about Lao Tzu the man, while at the same time placing the book, Lao-tzu, in a later period. In fact, I now believe the date of the book to be later than I assumed when I wrote my History of Chinese Philosophy. I now believe it was written or composed after Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung, and not before, as I there indicated. This is because the Lao-tzu contains considerable dis-cussion about the Nameless, and in order to do this it would seem that men should first have become conscious of the existence of names themselves. My position does not require me to insist that there is absolutely no con-nection between Lao Tzu the man and Lao-tzu the book, for the book may indeed contain a few sayings of the original Lao Tzu. What I maintain, how-ever, is that the system of thought in the book as a whole cannot be the product of a time either before or contemporary with that of Confucius. In the pages following, however, to avoid pedantry, 1 shall refer to Lao Tzu as having said so and so, instead of stating that the book Lao-tzu says so and so, just as we today still speak of sunrise and sunset, even though we know very well that the sun itself actually neither rises nor sets. Tao, the Unnamable In the last chapter, we have seen that the philosophers of the School of Names, through the study of names, succeeded in discovering that which lies beyond shapes and features. Most people, however, think only in terms of what lies within shapes and features, that is, the actual world. Seeing the actual, they have no difficulty in expressing it, and though they use names for it, they are not conscious that they are names. So when the philosophers of the School of Names started to think about the names them-selves, this thought represented a great advance. To think about names is to think about thinking. It is thought about thought and therefore is thought on a higher level. All things that lie within shapes and features have names, or, at least, possess the possibility of having names. They are namable. But in contrast with what is namable, Lao Tzu speaks about the unnamable. Not everything that lies beyond shapes and features is unnamable. Universals, for instance, lie beyond shapes and features, yet they are not unnamable. But on the other hand, what is unnamable most certainly does lie beyond shapes and features. The Tim or Way of the Taoists is a concept of this sort. In the first chapter of the Lao-tzu we find the statement: “The Too that can be comprised in words is not the eternal Too; the name that can be named is not the abiding name. The Unnamable is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the namable is the mother of all things.” S��SS��^�8^S�� T�S T�^�8^ T0�e T)Y0WKN�Y� g TNirKN�kAnd in chapter thirty-two: The Too is eternal, nameless, the Uncarved Block…Once the block is carved, there are names.” �8^�e T�4g0& & �Y6R g T Or in chapter forty-one: “The Too, lying hid, is nameless.” S����e T In the Taoist system, there is a distinction between yu (being) and wu (non-being), and between yu ming (having name, namable) and wu ming (having-no-name, unnamable). These two distinctions are in reality only one, for yu and wu are actually simply abbreviated terms for yu�ming and wu�ming. Heaven and Earth and all things are namables. Thus Heaven has the name of Heaven, Earth the name Earth, and each kind of thing has the name of that kind. There being Heaven, Earth and all things, it follows that there are the names of Heaven, Earth, and all things. Or as Lao Tzu says: “Once the Block is carved, there are names.” �Y6R g TThe Too, however, is un-namable; at the same time it is that by which all namables come to be. This is why Lao Tzu says: ‘The Unnamable is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the namable is the mother of all things.” �e T)Y0WKN�Y� g TNirKN�k Since the Tao is unnamable, it therefore cannot be comprised in words. But since we wish to speak about it, we are forced to give it some kind of designation. We therefore call it Tao, which is really not a name at all. That is to say, to call the Tao Tao, is not the same as to call a table table. When we call a table table, we mean that it has some attributes by which it can be named. But when we call the Tao Tao, we do not mean that it has any such namable attributes. It is simply a designation, or to use an expression com-mon in Chinese philosophy, Tao is a name which is not a name. In Chapter twenty-one of the Lao tzu it is said: From the past to the present, its [Too’s] name has not ceased to be, and has seen the beginning [of all things].” ��S�S�N�vQ T N�S��N�O+uThe Tao is that by which anything and everything comes to be. Since there are always things, Tao never ceases to be and the name of Too also never ceases to be. It is the beginning of all beginnings, and therefore it has seen the beginning of all things. A name that never ceases to be is an abiding name, and such a name is in reality not a name at all. Therefore it is said: “The name that can be named is not the abiding name.” “The Unnamable is ihe beginning of Heaven and Earth.” T�S T�^�8^ T0 �e T)Y0WKN�Y This proposition is only a formal and not a positive one. That is to say, it fails to give any in-formation about matters of fact. The Taoists thought that since there are things, there must be that by which all these things come to be. This “that” is designated by them as Tao, which, however, is really not a name. The concept of Tao, too, is a formal and not a positive one. Thai is to say, it does not describe anything about what it is through which all things come to be. All we can say is that Tao, since it is that through which all things come to be, is necessarily not a mere thing among these other things. For if it were such a thing, it could not at the same time be that through which all things whatsoever come to be. Every kind of thing has a name, but Tao is not itself a thing. Therefore it is “nameless, the Uncarved Block. �e T�4g Anything that comes to be is a being, and there are many beings. The coming to be of beings implies that first of all there is Being. These words, “first of all,” here do not mean first in point of time, but first in a logical sense. For instance, if we say there was first a certain kind of animal, then man, the word first in this case means first in point of time. But if we say that first there must be animals before there are men, the word “first” in this case means first in a logical sense. The statement about the origin of the species” makes an assertion about matters of fact, and required many years observation and study by Charles Darwin before it could be made. But the second of our sayings makes no assertion about matters of fact. It simply says that the existence of men logically implies the existence of animals. In the same way, the being of all things implies the being of Being. This is the meaning of Lao Tzu’s saying: “All things in the world come into being from Being (Yu); and Being comes into being from Non-being (Wu). (Ch. 40.) )YNNiru�N g � g u�N �e This saying of Lao Tzu does not mean that there was a time when there was only Non being, and that then there came a time when Being came into being from Non-being. It simply means that if we analyze the existence of things, we see there must first be Being before there can be any things. Too is the unnamable, is Non�being, and is that by which all things come to be. Therefore, before the being of Being, there must be Non-being, from which Being comes into being. What is here said belongs to ontology, not to cos-mology. It has nothing to do with time and actuality. For in time arid actuali-ty, there is no Being; there are only beings. There are many beings, but there is only one Being. In the Lao-tzu it is said: From Too there comes one. From one there comes two. From two there comes three. From three there comes all things.” S�uN�Nu�N��Nu N� NuNir (Ch. 42.) The “one” here spoken of refers to Being. To say that “from Too comes one,” is the same as that from Non-being comes Being. As for two and three, there are many interpretations. But this saying, that “from one there comes two. From two there comes three. From three there comes all things, may simply be the same as saying that from Being come all things. Being is one, and two and three arc the beginning of the many. The Invarialile Law of Nature In the final chapter of the Chuang-tzu, “The World,” it is said that the leading ideas of Lao Tzu are those of the T m Yi or Super One, and of Being, Non�being, and the invariable. The Super One is the Too. From the Too comes one, and therefore Too itself is the “Super One.” The “invari-able is a translation of the Chinese word ch ang, which may also be trans-lated as eternal or abiding. Though things are ever changeable and changing, the laws that govern this change of things are not themselves changeable. Hence in the Lao-tzu the word ch’ang is used to show what is always so, or in other words, what can be considered as a rule. For instance, Lao Tzu tells us: “The conquest of the world comes invariably from doing nothing.” �S)YN8^�N�e�N (Ch. 48.) Or again: “The way of Heaven has no favorites, it is invariably on the side of the good man. (Ch. J<).))YS��e�N�8^N�U�N Among the laws that govern the changes of things, the most fundamental is that "when a thing reaches one extreme, it reverts from it." ir�g�_�S These are not the actual words of Lao Tzu, but a common Chinese saying, the idea of which no doubt comes from Lao Tzu. Lao Tzu s actual words are: Reversing is the movement of the Tim �S�S�KN�R" (Ch. 40), and: "To go further and further means to revert again." ��f��f�S (Ch. 15.) The idea is that if anything develops certain ex-treme qualities, those qualities invariably revert to become their opposites. This constitutes a law of nature. Therefore: "It is upon calamity that blessing leans, upon blessing that calamity rests. xy�N�yKN@bP��y�NxyKN@bO(Ch. 58.) Those with little will acquire, those with much will be led astray. (Ch. 2.2.) A hurricane never lasts the whole morning, nor a rainstorm the whole day." (Ch. 23.) "The most yielding things in i0the world master the most unyielding." (Ch. 43.) )� R�_�YR�` (,{�NAS�N�z)� ؘΘ N�~g���� N�~�e (,{�NAS N�z)� )YNKN��g�p���)YNKN�ZW (,{�VAS N�z)� irb_cKN��v�b�vKN�_c (,{�VAS�N�z)0 "Diminish a thing and it will increase. Increase a thing and it will diminish." (Ch. 42-) All these paradoxical theories are no longer paradoxical, if one understands the fundamental law of nature. But to the ordinary people who have no idea of this law, they seem paradoxical indeed. Therefore Lao Tzu says: "The gentleman of the low type, on hearing the Truth, laughs loudly at it. If he had not laughed, it would not suffice to be the Truth." (Ch: 41) N�X�S��'Y{KN� N{ N���N:NS� It may be asked: Granted that a thing, on reaching an extreme, then re-verts, what is meant by the word "extreme '? Is there any absolute limit for the development of anything, going beyond which would mean going to the extreme? In the Lao-tzu no such question is asked and therefore no answer is given. But if there had been such a question, 1 think Lao Tzu would have answered that no absolute limit can be prescribed for all things under all circumstances. So far as human activities are concerned, the limit for the ad-vancement of a man remains relative to his subjective feelings and objective circumstances. Isaac Newton, for example, felt that compared with the total universe, his knowledge of it was no more than the knowledge of the sea possessed by a boy who is playing al the seashore. With such a feeling as this, Newton, despite his already great achievements in physics, was still far from reaching the limits of advancement in his learning. If, however, a stu-dent, having just finished his textbook on physics, thinks that he then knows all there is to know about science, he certainly cannot make further advance-ment in his learning, and will as certainly revert back. Lao Tzu tells us: If people of wealth and exalted position are arrogant, they abandon them-selves to unavoidable ruin." �[5������W�vQ�T (Ch. 9.) Arrogance is the sign that one s ad-vancement has reached its extreme limit. It is the first thing that one should avoid. The limit of advancement for a given activity is also relative to objective circumstances. When a man eats too much, he suffers. In overeating, what is ordinarily good for the body becomes something harmful. One should eat on-ly the right amount of food. But this right amount depends on one's age, health, and the quality of food one eats. These are the laws that govern the changes of things. By Lao Tzu they are called the invariables. He says: "To know the invariables is called enlighten-ment." �w8^�ff (Ch. 16.) Again: "He who knows the invariable is liberal. Being liber-al, he is without prejudice. Being without prejudice, he is comprehensive. Being comprehensive, he is vast. Being vast, he is with the Truth. Being with the Truth, he lasts forever and will not fail throughout his lifetime." (Ibid.) �w8^��[0�[CNlQ0lQCN�s0�sCN)Y0)YCNS�0S�CNEN��l�� N�k0 Human Conduct Lao Tzu warns us: "Not to know the invariable and to act blindly is to go to disaster." N�w8^��YO��Q(Ibid.) One should know the laws of nature and conduct one s activ-ities in accordance with them. This, by Lao Tzu, is called "practicing enlight-enment. The general rule for the man practicing enlightenment is that if he wants to achieve anything, he starts with its opposite, and if he wants to retain anything, he admits in it something of its opposite. If one wants to be strong, one must start with a feeling that one is weak, and if one wants to pre-serve capitalism, one must admit in it some elements of socialism. Therefore Lao Tzu tells us: The sage, putting himself in the background, is always to the fore. Remaining outside, he is always there. Is it not just because he does not strive for any personal end, that all his personal ends are fulfilled? (Ch. 7.) Again: He does not show himself; therefore he is seen everywhere. He does not define himself; therefore he is distinct. He does not assert himself; therefore he succeeds. He does not boast of his work; therefore he endures. He does not contend, and for that very reason no one in the world can contend with him. (Ch. 2.2.) These sayings illustrate the first point of the general rule. #W�NTvQ�����HQ�YvQ�����X[0^��NvQ�e�y���Ee�b vQ�y0 (,{N�z)؏JTɋb�N� N���Eef0 N�/f�Eep_0 N�O�Ee g�R0 N���Ee�0+Y/U N�N�Ee)YN���NKN�N0 In the Lao-tzu we also find: What is most perfect seems to have something missing, yet its use is unimpaired. What is most full seems empty, yet its use is inexhaustible. What is most straight seems like crookedness. The greatest skill seems like clumsiness. The greatest eloquence seems like stuttering." (Ch. 45-) Again: Be twisted and one shall be whole. Be crooked and one shall be straight. Be hollow and one shall be filled. Be tattered and one shall be renewed. Have little and one shall obtain. But have much and one shall be perplexed." 'Yb�:�vQ(u�_ _0'Y�v傲Q�vQ(u Nwz0'Y�v�H 'Y�]��b0'Y�傷�0 (,{�VAS�N�z)�S�� �fRhQ0�gR�v0<��Y g0 (,{�NASN�z) The first act of a sage ruler, then, is to undo all these. Lao Tzu says: Banish wisdom, discard knowledge, and the people will be benefited a hundredfold. Banish human -heartedness, discard righteousness, and the people will be dutiful and compassionate. Banish skill, discard profit, and thieves and robbers will disappear." (Ch.19.) Again: "Do not exalt the wor-thies, and the people will no longer be contentious. Do not value treasures that are hard to get, and there will be no more ibieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, their mind will not be confused. Therefore the sage rules the people by emptying their minds, filling their bellies, weak-ening their wills, and toughening their sinews, ever making the people with-out knowledge and without desire." (Ch. 3.) �~#W_zf�l)R~v P0�~�N_IN�l Y][Ha0�~�]_)R��v<���e g0 (,{AS]N�z)�S�� N$��Ol N�N0 N5����_KN'��Ol N:N�v0 N��S2k�Ol�_ NqN0/f�N#W�NKN�l�Z�vQ�_��[vQy��1_vQ�_�:_vQ���8^Ol�e�w�e2k0(,{ N�z) The sage ruler would undo all the causes of trouble in the world. After that, he would govern with non-action. With non-action, he does nothing, yet everything is accomplished. The Lao-tzu says: "I act not and the people of themselves are transformed. I love quiescence and the people of them-selves go straight. I concern myself with nothing, and the people of themselves are prosperous. I am without desire, and the people of themselves are simple. (Ch. 57-) "Do nothing, and there is nothing that is not done." b�e:N�l�S0b}YY��l�ck0b�e�N�l��[0b�e2k�l�4g0 (,{�NASN�z) �e:N���e N:N 0 This is another of the seemingly paradoxical ideas of the Taoists. In the Lao-tzu we read: Tao in-variably does nothing and yet there is nothing that is not done. S�8^�e:N��e N:N (Ch. 37-) Tao is that by which all things come to be. It is not itself a thing and there-fore it cannot act as do such things. Yet all things come to be. Thus Tao does nothing, yet there is nothing that is not done. It allows each thing to do what it itself can do. According to the Taoists, the ruler of a state should model himself on Tao. He, too, should do nothing and should let the people do what they can do themselves. Here is another meaning of wu�wei (non-action), which later, with certain modifications, become one of the important theories of the Legalists (Fa chia). Children have limited knowledge and few desires. They are not far away from the original Te. Their simplicity and innocence are characteristics that every man should if possible retain. Lao Tzu says: Not to part from the in-variable Te is to return to the state of infancy." 8^�_ N�y� YR_�NtZ?Q (Ch. 18.) Again: "He who holds the Te in all its solidity may be likened to an infant. +T�_KN�S��k�Nd�P[ (Ch. 55-) Since the life of the child is nearer to the ideal life, the sage ruler would like all of his people to be like small children. Lao Tzu says: "The sage treats all as children." (Ch.49.) He "does not make them enlightened, but keeps them ig-norant." (Ch. 65. ) #W�N�vi[KN0 (,{�VAS]N�z) ^��Nfl��NaKN0"Ignorant here is a translation of the Chinese yu, which means ignorance in the sense of simplicity and innocence. The sage not only wants his people to be yu, but wants himself to be so too. Lao Tzu says: Mine is the mind of the very ignorant." ba�NKN�__N�T (Ch. 20.) In Taoism yu is not a vice, but a great virtue. But is the yu of the sage really the same as the yu of the child and the common people? Certainly not. The yu of the sage is the result of a conscious process of cultivation. It is something higher than knowledge, something more, not less. There is a common Chinese saying: Great wisdom is like ignorance.'Yzf�a The yu of the sage is great wisdom, and not the yu of the child or of ordinary people. The latter kind of yu is a gift of nature, while that of the sage is an achievement of the spirit. There is a great difference between the two. But in many cases the Taoists seemed to have confused them. We shall see this point more clearly when we discuss the philosophy of Chuang Tzu. CHAPTER 10 THE THIRD PHASE OF TAOISM: CHUANG TZU ChUANG CHOI), better known as Chuang Tzu (c. 369-c. 2-86), is perhaps the greatest of the early Taoists. We know little of his life save that he was a na-tive of the little state of Meng on the border between the present Shantung and Honan provinces, where he lived a hermit's life, but was nevertheless famous for his ideas and writings. It is said that King Wei of Ch'u, having heard his name, once sent messengers with gifts to invite him to his state, promising to make him chief minister. Chuang Tzu, however, merely laughed and said to them: "...go away, do not defile me....I prefer the enjoyment of my own free will. (Historical Records, ch. 63-) ZiZ�s�^hT$��OO�S^ΏKN����N:N�v0�^hT{�ZiO��f�& & P[�Q�S��ealb0& & b�[8nbalnKN-N��_��e:N g�V�@b���~�� N�N��N�_>T�_ q0 ( 0�P[�^�R O0) Chuang Tzu the Man and Chuang tzu the Book Though Chuang Tzu was a contemporary of Mencius and a friend of Hui Shih, the book titled the Chuang-tzu, as we know it today, was probably compiled by Kuo Hsiang, Chuang Tzu s great commentator of the third cen-tury A.D. We are thus not sure which of the chapters of Chuang-tzu the book were really written by Chuang Tzu himself. It is, in fact, a collection of various Taoist writings, some of which represent Taoism in its first phase of development, some in its second, and some in its third. It is only those chap-ters representing the thought of this third climactic phase that can properly be called Chuang Tzu’s own philosophy, yet even they may not all have been written by Chuang Tzu himself. For though the name of Chuang Tzu can be taken as representative of the last phase of early Taoism, it is proba-ble that his system of thought was brought to full completion only by his fol-lowers. Certain chapters of the Chuang-tzu, for example, contain statements about Kung-sun Lung, who certainly lived later than Chuang Tzu. Way of Achieving Relative Happiness The first chapter of the Chuang-tzu, titled “The Happy Excursion, �e�8n is a simple text, full of amusing stories. Their underlying idea is that there are varying degrees in the achievement of happiness. A free development of our natures may lead us to a relative kind of happiness; absolute happiness is achieved through higher understanding of the nature of things. To carry out the first of these requirements, the free development of our nature, we should have a full and free exercise of our natural ability. That ability is our Te, which comes directly from the Too. Regarding the Too and Te, Chuang Tzu has the same idea as Lao Tzu. For example, he says: At the great beginning there was Non-being. It had neither being nor name and was that from which came the One. When the One came into existence, there was the One but still no form. When things obtained that by which they came into existence, it was called the Te. *YR g�e0�e g�e T�NKN@bw�0 gN�+gb_0ir�_�Nu�KN�_0 ( 0�^P[�)Y0W0 (Ch. 12.) Thus our Te is what makes us what we are. We are happy when this Te or natural ability of ours is fully and freely exercised, that is, when our nature is fully and freely de-veloped. In connection with this idea of free development, Chuang Tzu makes a contrast between what is of nature and what is of man. “What is of nature,” he says, “is internal. What is of man is external. …That oxen and horses should have four feet is what is of nature. That a halter should be put on a horse’s head, or a string through an ox’s nose, is what is of man.” )Y(W�Q��N(WY0& & [rl��V���/f�)Y0=�l����z[r;��/f��N0 ( 0�^P[��y4l0) (Ch. TJ.) Following what is of nature, he maintains, is the source of all happiness and goodness, while following what is of man is the source of all pain and evil. Things are different in their nature and their natural ability is also not the same. What they share in common, however, is that they are all equally happy when they have a full and free exercise of their natural ability. In “The Happy Excursion” a story is told of a very large and a small bird. The abilities of the two are entirely different. The one can fly thousands of miles, while the other can hardly reach from one tree to the next. Yet they are both happy when they each do what they are able and like to do. Thus there is no absolute uniformity in the natures of things, nor is there any need for such uniformity. Another chapter of the Chuang-tzu tells us: The duck s legs are short, but if we try lo lengthen them, the duck will feel pain. The crane’s legs are long, but if we try to shorten them, the crane will feel grief. There-fore we are not to amputate what is by nature long, nor to lengthen what is by nature short. (Ch. 8.) �Q�}��w��~KNR�_0d��}����eKNR�`0>e’`�^�@b�e�’`�w^�@b�~��e@b�S�__N0 Political and Social Philosophy Such, however, is just what artificiality tries to do. The purpose of all laws, morals, institutions, and governments, is to establish uniformity and suppress difference. The motivation of the people who try to enforce this uniformity may be wholly admirable. When they find something that is good for them, they may be anxious to see that others have it also. This good in-tention of theirs, however, only makes the situation more tragic. In the Chuang-tzu there is a story which says: “Of old, when a seabird alighted outside the capital of Lu, the Marquis went out to receive it, gave it wine in the temple, and had the Chiu-shao music played to amuse it, and a bullock slaughtered to feed it. But the bird was dazed and too timid to eat or drink anything. In three days it was dead. This was treating the bird as one would treat oneself, not the bird as a bird….Water is life to fish but is death to man. Being differently constituted, their likes and dislikes must necessarily differ. Therefore the early sages did not make abilities and occupations uni-form.” f��wm�bk�N��ʐ����O�_�މKN�N�^�OY]N��N:NPN�wQ*Ybr�N:N��0�CN)wƉ�_�`� NbeߘN�� Nben�Nog� N�e�{k0dk�N�]{Q{Q�_N�^��NLN{Q{Q�_N0& & |�Y4l�u��NY4l�{k0|_�_�vN_�vQ}Yv`Ee__N0EeHQ#W NNvQ�� NTvQ�N0 (Ch. 18.) When the Marquis treated the bird in a way which he con-sidered the most honorable, he certainly had good intentions. Yet the result was just opposite to what he expected. This is what happens when uniform codes of laws and morals are enforced by government and society upon the individual. This is why Chuang Tzu violently opposes the idea of governing through the formal machinery of government, and maintains instead that the best way of governing is through non�government. He says: I have heard of letting mankind alone, but not of governing mankind. Letting alone springs from the fear that people will pollute their innate nature and set aside their Te. When people do not pollute their innate nature and set aside their Te, then is then! need for the government of mankind? ‘ (Ch. II.) �(W�[)YN� N�l)YN_N0(WKN_N��P`)YNKN�mvQ’`_N0�[KN_N��P`)YNKN�vQ�__N0)YN N�mvQ’`� N�vQ�_� g�l)YN��T� ( 0�^P[�(W�[0) If one fails to leave people alone, and tries instead to rule them with laws and institutions, the process is like putting a halter around a horse s neck or a string through an ox s nose. It is also like lengthening the legs of the duck or shortening those of the crane. What is natural and spontaneous is changed into something artificial, which is called by Chuang Tzu “overcoming what is of nature by what is of man. �N�Nmp)Y ( 0�^P[��y4l0(Ch. 17.) Its result can only lie misery and un-happiness. Thus Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu both advocate government through non-government, but for somewhat different reasons. Lao Tzu emphasizes his general principle that “reversing is the movement of the Too.” The more one governs, he argues, the less one achieves the desired result. And Chuang Tzu emphasizes the distinction between what is of nature and what is of man. The more the former is overcome by the latter, the more there will be misery and unhappiness. Thus far we have only seen Chuang Tzu’s way of achieving relative hap-piness. Such relative happiness is achieved when one simply follows what is natural in oneself. This every man can do. The political and social philoso-phy of Chuang Tzu aimes at achieving precisely such relative happiness for every man. This and nothing more is the most that any political and social philosophy can hope to do. Emotion and Reason Relative happiness is relative because it has to depend upon something. It is true that one is happy when one has a full and free exercise of one s nat-ural ability. But there are many ways in which this exercise is obstructed. For instance, there is death which is the end of all human activities. There are diseases which handicap human activities. There is old age which gives man the same trouble. So it is not without reason that the Buddhists consider these as three of the four human miseries, the fourth, according to them, be-ing life itself. Hence, happiness which depends upon the full and free exer-cise of one’s natural ability is a limited and therefore relative happiness. In the Chuang-tzu there are many discussions about the greatest of all disasters that can befall man, death. Fear of death and anxiety about its coming are among the principal sources of human unhappiness. Such fear and anxiety, however, may be diminished if we have a proper understanding of the nature of things. In the Chuang�tzu there is a story about the death of Lao Tzu. When Lao Tzu died, his friend Chin Shih,�y1Y who had come after the death, criticized the violent lamentations of the other mourners, saying: “This is to violate the principle of nature and to increase the emotion of man, for-getting what we have received from nature. These were called by the an-cients the penalty of violating the principle of nature. When the Master came, it was because he had the occasion to be born. When he went, he sim-ply followed the natural course. Those who are quiet at the proper occasion and follow the natural course, cannot be affected by sorrow or joy. They were considered by the ancients as the men of the gods, who were released from bondage.” (Ch. 3-)/fA�)Y P�`��_vQ@b�S0�S��KNA�)YKNR0�eg�+YP[�e_N0��S�+YP[z�_N0�[�e�Yz���TPN N�N_N0�S��/f^KN�`�0 ( 0{Qu;N0) To the extent that the other mourners felt sorrow, to that extent they suf-fered. Their suffering was the “penalty of violating the principle of nature. The mental torture inflicted upon man by his emotions is sometimes just as severe as any physical punishment. But by the use of understanding, man can reduce his emotions. For example, a man of understanding will not be angry when rain prevents him from going out, but a child often will. The rea-son is that the man possesses greater understanding, with the result that he suffers less disappointment or exasperation than the child who docs get an-gry. As Spinoza has said: “In so far as the mind understands all things are necessary, so far has it greater power over the effects, or suffers less from them. �_upt�0RNir�v�_6q’`0t㉄v��V gY’Y��[1(WY’Y�v��V�Q g�f’Y�v�Rϑ�c6RT�g�� N:N�[�N�S�(Ethics, Pt. 5, Prop. VI.) Such, in the words of the Taoists, is to dis-perse emotion with reason.” A story about Chuang Tzu himself well illustrates this point. It is said that when Chuang Tzu’s wife died, his friend Hui Shih went to condole. To his amazement he found Chuang Tzu sitting on the ground, singing, and on ask-ing him how he could be so unkind to his wife, was told by Chuang Tzu: “When she had just died, I could not help being affected. Soon, however, I examined the matter from the very beginning. At the very beginning, she was not living, having no form, nor even substance. But somehow or other there was then her substance, then her form, and then her life. Now by a further change, she has died. The whole process is like the sequence of the four seasons, spring, summer, autumn, and winter. While she is thus lying in the great mansion of the universe, for me to go about weeping and wailing would be to proclaim myself ignorant of the natural laws. Therefore I stop.” N6q0/fvQ�Y{k_N�b�rUO��e�i6q0�[vQ�Y��,g�eu�^��_�eu_N��,g�eb_0^��_�eb__N��,g�el0BgNN����KN���S� gl�l�S� gb_�b_�S� gu0�N�S�S�KN{k�/f�vN:N%f�y�QY�V�eL�_N0�NNCP6q�[�N�]�[��b�U�U6q����TKN���N:N N�NN}T�>ebk_N0 ( 0�^P[��PN0) (Chuang tzu, ch. 18.) On this passage the great commentator Kuo Hsiang comments: “When ignorant, he felt sorry. When he understood, he was no longer affected. This teaches man to disperse emotion with reason.” *gf��i��]���bk��e@b�N� g�`�0�N�c�t�Nc�/}_N0Emotion can be counteracted with reason and understanding. Such was the view of Spinoza and also of the Taoists. The Taoists maintained that the sage who has a complete understanding of the nature of things, thereby has no emotions. This, however, does not mean that he lacks sensibility. Rather it means that he is not disturbed by the emotions, and enjoys what may be called “the peace of the soul.” As Spinoza says: ‘The ignorant man is not only agitated by external causes in many ways, and never enioys true peace in the soul, but lives also ignorant, as it were, both of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be. On the other hand, the wise man, in so far as he is con-sidered as such, is scarcely moved in his mind, but, being conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys the peace of the soul. �e�w�v�N N�N(WT�eb��S0RY萟S�V�vpbqN��N*g�N�SupB��vwck�Ts^��NǏ@w�[ N^0�[NirT܀�b�g/f_N���g^�_N���vQb/f_N�vQb^�_N���vQ�`/f_N�vQ�O^�_N���bN� N��v�w_N�R�N�V�SvQ(ўu ��f0>T�OckKN�OTNN��ckKN��eN�T�w�v`�ckKN�OTNNb�ckKN��eTNNb�w�v`�ckKN�O_NNbN��ckKN��e_NNbN��w�v`�ckKN�OTNNbN��ckKN��eTNNbN��w�v`�ckKN This passage is reminiscent of the manner of argument followed by the School of Names. But whereas the members of that school argue thus in or-der to contradict the common sense of ordinary people, the Ch’i Wu Lun’s purpose is to contradict the followers of the School of Names. For this school did actually believe that argument could decide what is really right and re-ally wrong. Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, maintains that concepts of right and wrong are built up by each man on the basis of his own finite point of view. All these views are relative. As the Ch’i Wu Lun says: “When there is life, there is death, and when there is death, there is life. When there is possibili-ty, there is impossibility, and when there is impossibility, there is possibility. Because there is right, there is wrong. Because there is wrong, there is right. �eu�e{k0�e{k�eu0�e�S�e N�S��e N�S�e�S0�V/f�V^���V^��V/f Things are ever subject to change and have many aspects. Therefore many views can be held about one and the same thing. Once we say this, we assume that a higher standpoint exists. If we accept this assumption, there is no need to make a decision ourselves about what is right and what is wrong. The argument explains itself. The Higher Point of View To accept this premise is to see things from a higher point of view, or, as the Ch’i Wu Lun calls it, to see things “in the light of Heaven.” “To see things in the light of Heaven” gqKN�N)Ymeans to see things from the point of view of that which transcends the finite, which is the Too. It is said in the Ch’i Wu Lun: “The ‘this’ is also ‘that.’ The ‘that’ is also ‘this.’ The ‘that’ has a system of right and wrong. The this also has a system of right and wrong. Is there really a distinction between ‘that’ and this ? Or is there really no distinction be tween that and this ? That the that and the this cease to be opposites is the very essence of Too. /f�N|__N�|_�N/f_N0|_�NN/f^��dk�NN/f^�0�gN g|_/fNN�T��gN�e|_/fNN�T�|_/f���_vQvP��KNS��g0�g�Y�_vQ�s-N��N�^�ewz0/f�NN�ewz�^��NN�ewz_N0Ee�f�����Nf Only the essence, an axis as it were, is the center of the circle responding to the endless changes. The right is an endless change. The wrong is also an endless change. Therefore it is said that there is nothing better than to use the light. ‘ In other words, the that and the this, in their mutual opposition of right and wrong, are like an endlessly revolving circle. But the man who sees things from the point of view of the Tao stands, as it were, at the center of the circle. He understands all that is going on in the movements of the circle, but does not himself take part in these movements. This is not owing to his inactivity or resignation, but because he has transcended the finite and sees things from a higher point of view. In the Chuang-tzu, the finite point of view is compared with the view of the well�frog. The frog in the well can see only a little sky, and so thinks that the sky is only so big. From the point of view of the Tao, everything is just what it is. It is said in the Ch i Wu Lun: The possible is possible. The impossible is impossi-ble. The Tao makes things and they are what they are. What are they? They are what they are. What are they not? They are not what they are not. Every-thing is something and is good for something. There is nothing which is not something or is not good for something. Thus it is that there are roof-slats and pillars, ugliness and beauty, the peculiar and the extraordinary. All these by means of the Tan are united and become one. ‘ �SNN�S0 N�SNN N�S0S�L�KN�b�ir�KN�6q0v`NN6q�6q�N6q0v`NN N6q� N6q�N N6q0ir�V g@b6q�ir�V g@b�S0�eir N6q0�eir N�S0Ee:N/f>N��Nyi��SN��e�b`�2�*`�S��:NNAlthough all things difier, they are alike in that they all constitute something and are good for something. They all equally come from the Tao. Therefore from the viewpoint of the Tao, things, though different, yet are united and become one. The Ch i Wu Lun says again: vQR_N�b_N0vQb_N��k_N0�Qir�eb�e�k� Y�:NNTo make a distinction is to make some construction. But construction is the same as destruction. For things as a whole there is neither construction nor destruction, but they turn to unity and become one. For example, when a table is made out of wood, from the viewpoint of that table, this is an act of construction. But from the viewpoint of the wood or the tree, it is one of destruction. Such construction or de-struction are so, however, only from a finite point of view. From the view-point of the Tao, there is neither construction nor destruction. These distinc-tions are all relative. The distinction between the “me” and the “non-me” is also relative. From the viewpoint of the Tao, the “me” and the “non-me” are also united and become one. The Ch i Wu Lun says: “There is nothing larger in the world than the point of a hair, yet Mount T’ai is small. There is nothing old-er than a dead child, yet Peng Tsu La legendary Chinese Methuselah J had an untimely death. Heaven and Earth and I came into existence together, and all things with me are one.” )YN��’Y�N�y�kKN+g���lq:N ���[NN�kP[��m_Vy:N-Y0)Y0WNbv^u��NirNb:NNHere we again have Hui Shih’s dictum: “Love all things equally, Heaven and Earth are one body. �l1rNir�)Y0WNSO_N Knowledge of the Higher Level This passage in the Ch i Wu Lun, however, is immediately followed by another statement: Since all things arc one, what room is there for speech? But since I have already spoken of the one, is this not already speech? One plus speech make two. Two plus one make three. Going on from this, even the most skillful reckoner will not be able to reach the end, and how much less able to do so are ordinary people! If proceeding from nothing to some-thing we can reach three, how much further shall we reach, if we proceed from something to something! Let us not proceed. Let us stop here. �e�]:NN�w�N�_ g�NN��e�]�KNN�w�N�_�e�NN�NN�:N�N��NNN:N N��dk�N�_��]�S N�_���QvQ�QNN�Ee��e� g�N�N N0��Q� g� gNN��e� q��V/f�]It is in this statement that the Ch i Wu Lun goes a step further than Hui Shih, and begins to discuss a higher kind of knowledge. This higher knowledge is ‘knowledge which is not knowledge. What is really one can neither be discussed nor even conceived. For as soon as it is thought of and discussed, it becomes something that exists ex-ternally to the person who is doing the thinking and speaking. So since its all-embracing unity is thus lost, it is actually not the real one at all. Hui Shih said: “The greatest has nothing beyond itself and is called the Great One.” �’Y�eY��KN’YN By these words he described the Great One very well indeed, yet he remained unaware of the fact that since the Great One has nothing beyond itself, it is impossible either to think or speak of it. For anything that can be thought or spoken of has something beyond itself, namely, the thought and the speaking. The Taoists, on the contrary, realized that the “one” is un-thinkable and inexpressible. Thereby, they had a true understanding of the one and advanced a step further than did the School of Names. In the Ch’i Wu Lun it is also said: “Referring to the right and the wrong, the being so and not being so : if the right is really right, we need not dispute about how it is different from the wrong; if the being so is really being so, we need not dispute about how it is different from ‘not being so. …Let us forget life. Let us forget the distinction between right and wrong. Let us take our joy in the realm of the infinite and remain there.’ /f N/f�6q N6q0/f傜g/f_N�R/fKN_NN N/f_N�N�e��06q傜g6q_N�R6qKN_NN N6q_N�N�e��0& & �_t^�_IN�/c�N�e�z�Ee�[��e�z0The realm of the infinite is the realm wherein lives the man who has attained to the Tao. Such a man not only has knowledge of the one, but also has actually experienced it. This experience is the experience of living in the realm of the infinite. He has forgotten all the distinctions of things, even those in-volved in his own life. In his experience there remains only the undifferen-tiable one, in the midst of which he lives. Described in poetical language, such a man is he who chariots on the normality of the universe, rides on the transformations of the six elements, and thus makes excursion into the infinite. He is really the independent man, so his happiness is absolute. Here we see how Chuang Tzu reached a final resolution of the original problem of the early Taoists. That problem is how to preserve life and avoid harm and danger. But, to the real sage, it ceases to be a problem. As is said in the Chuang�tzu: The universe is the unity of all things. If we attain this unity and identify ourselves with it, then the members of our body are but so much dust and dirt, while life and death, end and beginning, are but as the succession of day and night, which cannot disturb our inner peace. How much less shall we be troubled by worldly gain and loss, good-luck and bad-luck! “+Y)YN_N��NirKN@bN_N0�_vQ@bN�T q�R�V/e~vSO�:N�W��{ku�~�Y�:Ne#W�N8n�NirKN@b N�_A���vX[ It is in this sense that the sage never ceas-es to be. Methodology of Mysticism In order to be one with the Great One, the sage has to transcend and for-get the distinctions between things. The way to do this is to discard knowl-edge, and is the method used by the Taoists for achieving sageliness with-in. The task of knowledge in the ordinary sense is to make distinctions; to know a thing is to know the difference between it and other things. There-fore to discard knowledge means to forget these distinctions. Once all dis-tinctions are forgotten, there remains only the indifferentiable one, which is the great whole. By achieving this condition, the sage may be said to have knowledge of another and higher level, which is called by the Taoists knowledge which is not knowledge. In the Chuang-tzu there are many passages about the method of forgetting distinctions. In the sixth chapter, for example, a report is given of an imagi-nary conversation between Confucius and his favorite disciple, Yen Hui. The story reads: “Yen Hui said: ‘I have made some progress.’ ‘What do you mean? asked Confucius. 1 have forgotten human -heartedness and righ-teousness,’ replied Yen Hui. ‘Very well, but that is not enough,’ said Con-fucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said: ‘I have made some progress. What do you mean? asked Confucius. I have forgotten rituals and music, replied Yen Hui. Very well, but that is not enough,’ said Confucius. Another day Yen Hui again saw Confucius and said: ‘I have made some progress. What do you mean? asked Confucius. I sit in for-getfulness,’ replied Yen Hui. “At this Confucius changed countenance and asked: ‘What do you mean by sitting in forgetfulness? To which Yen Hui replied: My limbs are nerveless and my intelligence is dimmed. I have abandoned my body and discarded my knowledge. Thus I become one with the Infinite. This is what I mean by sitting in forgetfulness. Then Confucius said: If you have become one with the Infinite, you have no personal likes and dislikes. If you have become one with the Great Evolution [of the universe], you are one who merely follow its changes. If you really have achieved this, I should like to follow your steps. ���V�f� �V�v�w0 �N<�f� UO�_N� �f� �V�_�NIN�w0 �f� �S�w0�r*g_N0 �[�e Y�0�f� �V�v�w0 �f� UO�_N� �f� �V�_N�[��N���ba��N��Q>e��N{|�S��N{|�N0 The first part of this passage deals with the purpose and function of dialectic; the second part with its methodology. In another part of the same chapter, it is said that there are seven methods of dialectic: A particular judgment indicates what is not all so. A hypothetical judgment indicates what is at present not so. Imitation consists in taking a model. What is imitated is what is taken as a model. If the cause is in agreement with the imitation, it is correct. If it is not in agreement with the imitation, it is not correct. This is the method of imitation. The method of comparison consists in using one thing to explain another. The method of parallel consists in comparing two series of propositions consistently throughout. The method of analogy says: You are so. Why should I alone not be so? The method of extension consists in attributing the same to what is not known as to what is known. When the other is said to be the same (as this), how can I say that it is different?” (Ch. 45.) b_N�� N=_N0GP���N N6q_N0He��:NKN�l_N0@bHe��@b�N:NKN�l_N0Ee-NHe�R/f_N� N-NHe�R^�_N�dkHe_N0��_N��>N�Nir��NfKN_N0oO_N���k����OL�_N0�c_N���f�P[6q�b���r N�S�N6q_N��c_N���NvQ@b N�SKNT�NvQ@b�S��NKN_N0 /f�r� _N��T_N� >T�� _N��__N The method of imitation in this passage is the same as that of “using statements to set forth causes” of the preceding quotation. And the method of extension is the same as the “taking and giving according to classes” of the preceding passage. These are the two most important of the methods, and correspond roughly to the deductive and inductive methods of Western logic. Before giving further explanation of these two methods, something may be said regarding what in the “Mohist Canons” is called a cause. A cause is defined as “that with which something becomes,” and is also classified into two kinds, the major and minor.’YEe Ee (Ch. 4�) “A minor cause is one with which something may not necessarily be so, but without which it will never be so. “A major cause is one with which something will necessarily be so, and without which it will never be so.” ‘YEe� gKN�_6q��eKN�_ N6q (Ch. 42..) It is evident that what the “Mohist Canons” call a minor cause is what in modern logic would be called a necessary cause, while what the “Mohist Canons” call a major cause is what modern logic would describe as a necessary and sufficient cause. In modern logic there is the distinction of yet another kind of cause, the sufficient cause, which is one with which something will necessarily be so, but without which it may or may not be so. gKN�_6q��eKNb6qb N6q This distinction the Mohists failed to make. In modern logical reasoning, if we want to know whether a general proposition is true or not, we verify it with facts or experiment. If, for example, we want to make sure that certain bacteria are the cause of a certain disease, the way to verify the matter is to take as a formula the general proposition that the bacteria A are the cause of the disease B, and then make an experiment to see whether the supposed cause really produces the expected result or not. If it does, it really is the cause; if not, it is not. This is deductive reasoning and is also what the “Mohist Canons” call the method of imitation. For to take a general proposition as a formula is to take it as a model, and to make an experiment with it is to make an imitation of it. That the supposed cause produces the expected result, means that the cause is in agreement with the imitation. And that it does not, means that the cause is not in agreement with the imitation.” Ee-NHe N-NHe It is in this way that we can distinguish a true from a false cause, and determine whether a cause is a major or minor one. As regards the other form of reasoning through extension, it may be illustrated through the dictum that all men are mortal. We are able to make this dictum, because we know that all men of the past were mortal, and that men of today and of the future are the same in kind as those of the past. Hence we draw the general conclusion that all men are mortal. In this inductive reasoning, we use “the method of extension.’ That men of the past were mortal is what is known. And that men of today and of the future are and will be mortal is what is not known. To say that all men are mortal, therefore, is ‘ to attribute the same to what is not known as to what is known. We can do this because “the other is said to be the same [as this].”We are “taking and giving according to class. Clarification of All-embracing Love Versed in the method of dialectic, the later Mohists did much in clarifying and defending the philosophical position of their school. Following the tradition of Mo Tzu s utilitarianistic philosophy, the later Mohists maintain that all human activities aim at obtaining benefit and avoiding harm. Thus in the Major Illustrations we are told: When one cuts a finger in order to preserve a hand, this is to choose the greater benefit and the lesser harm. To choose the lesser harm is not to choose harm, but to choose benefit….If on meeting a robber one loses a finger so as to save one’s life, this is benefit. The meeting with the robber is harm. Choice of the greater benefit is not a thing done under compulsion. Choice of the lesser harm is a thing done under compulsion. The former means choosing from what has not yet been obtained. The latter means discarding from what one has already been burdened with.” �ec�NX[U��)RKN-N�S’Y��[KN-N�S_N0�[KN-N�S�^��S�[_N��S)R_N0& & G��v�N��ec�NMQ��0MQ���)R_N0vQG��v�N��[_N0& & )RKN-N�S’Y�^� N�_�]_N0�[KN-N�S� N�_�]_N0�N@b*g g��S q�/f)RKN-N�S’Y_N0�N@b�e g�_ q�/f�[KN-N�S_N(Ch. 44-) Thus for all human activities the rule is: “Of the benefits, choose the greatest; of the harms, choose the slightest.” (Ibid.) Both Mo Tzu and the later Mohists identified the good with the beneficial. Beneficialness is the essence of the good. But what is the essence of beneficialness? Mo Tzu did not raise this question, but the later Mohists did and gave an answer. In the first ‘Canon, it is said: “The beneficial is that with the obtaining of which one is pleased. The harmful is that with the obtaining of which one is displeased. )R�@b�_��U_N0 �[�@b�_�v`_N (Ch. 40.) Thus the later Mohists provided a hedonistic justification for the utilitarianistic philosophy of the Mohist school. This position reminds us of the “principle of utility” of Jeremy Bentham. In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham says: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do….The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law.” (P. I.) Thus Bentham reduces good and bad to a question of pleasure and pain. According to him the aim of morality is “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” (Ibid.) )Y6q O�N{|:N�N�yg NZCg@b�~�l0dk�NZCg�sS/f�_PNN��u0�Sdk�NZCg�c�Q�N�^ZP�NHN��Q�[�NZP�NHN0 (,{Nu�) �R)R�Tf[sSb���N{| g�Ndk�NZCgKN�N�[���NKN:N�Tf[�v�W@x0dk�Tf[KN�v�v�(W�Nt’`0�l�_�~cx^�y0 (,{N0�Nu�)ُ7h����l�b�Uv`R_�~:N�_PN0��u�v�0gq�N�v��l�S��_�v�v�v1/f g’YYpe�vg’Yx^�y 0 This is also what the later Mohists do. Having defined “the beneficial,” they go on to define the virtues in the light of this concept. Thus in the first Canon we find: Righteousness consists in doing the beneficial. Loyalty consists in benefiting one’s ruler.” “Filial piety consists in benefiting one’s parents. Meritorious accomplishment consists in benefiting the people. �_��N:N)R�:_T_N0 ][�)R�N_N0 �R�)Rl_N0 (Ch. 4�.) “Benefiting the people means “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” Regarding the theory of all embracing love, the later Mohists maintain that its major attribute is its all-embracing character. In the “Minor Illustrations we read: In loving men one needs to love all men before one can regard oneself as loving men. In not loving men one does not need not to love any man [before one can regard oneself as not loving men]. Not to have all-embracing love is not to love men. When riding horses, one need not ride all horses in order to regard oneself as riding a horse. For if one rides only a few horses, one is still riding horses. But when not riding horses, one must ride no horse at all in order to regard oneself as not riding horses. This is the difference between all-inclusiveness [in the case of loving men] and the absence of all-inclusiveness [in the case of riding horses]. “(Ch. 44.) 1r�N��_hT1r�N��T:N1r�N0 N1r�N� N�_hT N1r�N0 NhT1r��V:N N1r�N�w0XNl�� N�_hTXNl��6qT:NXNl�_N0 gXN�Nl���V:NXNl��w0.�� NXNl���_hT NXNl���T:N NXNl�0dkNhT�N NhT�_N0 Every man, as a matter of fact, has someone whom he loves. Every man, for example, loves his own children. Hence the mere fact that a man loves someone does not mean that he loves men in general. But on the negative side, the fact that he does wrong to someone, even his own children, does mean that he does not love men. Such is the reasoning of the Mohists. Defense of All-embracing Love Against this view of the later Mohists, there were at that time two main objections. The first was that the number of men in the world is infinite; how, then, is it possible for one to love them all? This objection was referred to under the title: Infinity is incompatible with all�embracing love. And the second objection was that if failure to love a single man means failure to love men in general, there should then be no such punishment as killing a robber.” This objection was known under the title: To kill a robber is to kill a man.” The later Mohists used their dialectic to try to refute these objections. In the second Canon there is the statement: Infinity is not incompatible with all-embracingness. The reason is given under ‘full or not.'” (Ch. 40.) The second Exposition of the Canons develops this statement as follows: “Infinity: (Objection:) ‘If the South has a limit, it can be included in to. [There was a common belief in ancient China that the South had no limit] If it has no limit, it cannot be included in to. It is impossible to know whether it has a limit or not and hence it is impossible to know whether it can all be included or not. It is impossible to know whether people fill this [space] or not, and hence it is impossible to know whether they can be included in to or not. This being so, it is perverse to hold that all people can be included in our love. (Answer:) If people do not fill what is unlimited, then [the number of] people has a limit, and there is no difficulty in including anything that is limited [in number]. But if people do fill what is unlimited, then what is [supposed to be] unlimited is limited, and then there is no difficulty in including what is limited. ” (Ch. 43-)�e(�S�[�)� WS�e gwz�R�S=(-N�V�S�NN,��N�v�OWS�e�ewz)��ewz�R N�S= gwz��ewz�*g�S�w�R�S=� N�S=�*g�S�w0�NKN�vKN&T�*g�S�w���_�NKN�S= N�S=��N*g�S�w0��_�NKN�S=1r_N��`� (T{�) �N� N�v�ewz�R�N gwz_N0= gwz��e��0�v�ewz�R�ewz�=_N0= gwz��e��.To kill a robber is to kill a man is the other major objection to the Mohists, because killing a man is not consistent with loving all men equally and universally. To this objection the Minor Illustrations answers as follows: “A white horse is a horse. To ride a white horse is to ride a horse. A black horse is a horse. To ride a black horse is to ride a horse. Huo [name of a person ] is a man. To love Huo is to love a man. Tsang [ name of a person ] is a man. To love Tsang is to love a man. This is to affirm what is right. “But Huo’s parents are men. Yet when Huo serves his parents, he is not serving men. His younger brother is a handsome man. Yet when he loves his younger brother, he is not loving handsome men. A cart is wood, but to ride a cart is not to ride wood. A boat is wood, but to ride a boat is not to ride wood. A robber is a man, but that there are many robbers does not mean that there are many men; and that there are no robbers does not mean that there are no men. “How is this explained? To hate the existence of many robbers is not to hate the existence of many men. To wish that there were no robbers is not to wish that there were no men. The world generally agrees on this. And this being the ease, although a robber�man is a man, yet to love robbers is not to love men, and not to love robbers is not to love men. Likewise to kill a robber-man is not to kill a man. There is no difficulty in this proposition.” (Ch. 45-) }vl��l�_N0XN}vl��XNl�_N0��l��l�_N0XN��l��XNl�_N0����N_N01r���1r�N_N0���N_N01r��1r�N_N0dkCN/f�6q�_N0 ��KN�N��N_N0���NvQ�N�^��N�N_N0vQ_���N_N01r_�^�1r��N_N0f��(g_N0XNf��^�XN(g_N09��(g_N0XN9��^�XN(g_N0�v��N_N0Y�v�^�Y�N_N0�e�v�^��e�N_N0 ���NfKN�v`Y�v�^�v`Y�N_N02k�e�v�^�2k�e�N_N0N�vNqQ/fKN0�/f�R}��v��N_N�1r�v�^�1r�N_N� N1r�v�^� N1r�N_N@g�v�^�@g�N_N��e���w0 With such dialectic as this the later Mohists refuted the objection that the killing of a robber is inconsistent with their principle of all-embracing love. Criticism of Other Schools Using their dialectic, the later Mohists not only refute the objections of other schools against them, but also make criticisms of their own against these schools. For example, the “Mohist Canons” contain a number of objections against the arguments of the School of Names. Hui Shih, it will be remembered, had argued for the “unity of similarity and difference.” TT_ In his ten paradoxes he passed from the premise that all things are similar lo each other,” to the conclusion: “Love all things equally. Heaven and Earth are one body.” l1rNir�)Y0WNSO_NThis, for the later Mohists, is a fallacy arising from the ambiguity of the Chinese word tung. Tung may be variously used to mean identity, “agreement, or “similarity. In the first Canon there is a statement which reads: “Tung: There is that of identity, that of part-and-whole relationship, that of co�existence, and that of generic relation. (Ch. 4?-) And the Exposition” explains further: “T ung: That there are two names for one actuality is identity. Inclusion in one whole is part�and�whole relationship. Both being in the same room is co-existence. Having some points of similarity is generic relation. � T�͑0SO0T0{|0 0�~� N0�ʑ�� T��N TN�[�͑T_N� NY�N|Q�SOT_N��OY�N�[�TT_N� g�NT�{|T_N0 0(Ch. 42-)The same Canon and Exposition also have a discussion on “difference,” which is just the reverse of t’ung. The Mohist Canons fail actually to mention Hui Shih by name. As a matter of fact, no name is ever mentioned in these chapters. But from this analysis of the word t’ ung, Hui Shih’ s fallacy becomes dear. That all things are similar to each other means that they have generic relationship, that they are of the same class, the class of “things.” But that Heaven and Earth are one body means that they have a part�and�whole relationship. The truth of the one proposition as applied to a particular situation cannot be inferred from the truth of the other, even though the same word, t ung, is used in both cases. As regards Kung-sun Lung s argument for “the separation of hardness and whiteness, the later Mohists thought only in terms of concrete hard and white stones as they actually exist in the physical universe. Hence they maintained that the qualities of hardness and whiteness both simultaneously inhere in the stone. As a result, they are not mutually exclusive, but “must pervade each other.” (Chaps. 40, 42.) The later Mohists also criticized the Taoists. In the second Canon we read: “Learning is useful. The reason is given by those who oppose it.” f[KN�v_N��(W��(Ch. 41-) The second “Exposition’ comments on this: “Learning: By maintaining that people do not know that learning is useless, one is thereby informing them of this fact. This informing that learning is useless, is itself a teaching. Thus by holding that learning is useless, one teaches. This is perverse.” (Ch. 43.) f[_N��N:N N�wf[KN�e�v_N0>eJTKN_N0/fO�wf[KN�e�v_N�/fYe_N0�Nf[:N�e�v_N�Ye��`� This is a criticism of a statement in the Lao-tzu: Banish learning and there will be no grieving.” �~f[�e�_(Ch. 10.) According to the later Mohists, learning and teaching are related terms. If learning is to be banished, so is teaching. For once there is teaching, there is also learning, and if teaching is useful, learning cannot be useless. The very teaching that learning is useless proves in itself that it is useful. In the second “Canon” we read: “To say that in argument there is no winner is necessarily incorrect. The reason is given under ‘argument’.” The second “Exposition comments on this: “In speaking, what people say either agrees or disagrees. There is agreement when one person says something is a puppy, and another says it is a dog. There is disagreement when one says it is an ox, and another says it is a horse. [That is to say, when there is disagreement, there is argument When neither of them wins, there is no argument. Argument is that in which one person says the thing is so, and another says it is not so. The one who is right will win.” (Ch. 43.) 0�~N0�{�� � ���e܀ ��_ NS_��(W��0 0�~�N0�{�ʑ�� ��@b�^�T_N�R__N0TRb�KN�r�vQb�KN�r_N0_Rb�KN[r�vQb�KNl�_N0�O�e܀�/f N��_N0��_N��b�KN/f�b�KN^��S_�܀_N0 In the second Canon we also read: To hold that all speech is perverse is perverse. The reason is given under speech.'”�N�:N=�`��`0�(WvQ� (Ch. 41.) The second “Exposition comments on this: [To hold that all speech ] is perverse, is not permissible. If the speech of this man who holds this doctrine is permissible, then at least his speech is not perverse, and there is some speech that is permissible. If the speech of this man is not permissible, then it is wrong to take it as being correct. The second “Canon” also says: “That knowing it and not knowing it are the same, is perverse. The reason is given under no means. �w��wKN&TKN/fT_N��`0�(W�e�N_N(Ch. 4L) And the second “Exposition” comments: “When there is knowledge, there is discussion about it. Unless there is knowledge, there is no means [of discussion].” (Ch. 43.) �w0��KN�^��w�e�N_N Yet again the second “Canon states: “To condemn criticism is perverse. The reason is given under ‘not to condemn.’^����`��(W_^� (Ch. 41.) On which the second “Exposition” comments: “To condemn criticism is to condemn one’s own condemnation. If one does not condemn it, there is nothing to be condemned. When one cannot condemn it, this means not to condemn criticism. (Ch. 43-)^���^��]KN�_N0 N^���^��S�_N0 N�S^�_N�/f N^��_N These are all criticisms against Chuang Tzu. Chuang Tzu maintained that nothing can be decided in argument. Even if someone wins, he said, the winner is not necessarily right or the loser necessarily wrong. But according to the later Mohists, Chuang Tzu, by expressing this very doctrine, showed himself in disagreement with others and was himself arguing. If he won the argument, did not this very fact prove him to be wrong? Chuang Tzu also said: “Great argument does not require words.” ‘Y�� N�And again: “Speech that argues falls short of its aim. ���� N�S(Chuang Tzu, oh. 2..) Hence all speech is perverse. Furthermore, he held that everything is right in its own way and in its own opinion, and one should not criticize the other. (Ibid.) But according to the later Mohists, what Chuang Tzu said itself consists of speech and itself constitutes a criticism against others. So if all speech is perverse, is not this saying of Chuang Tzu also perverse? And if all criticism against others is to be condemned, then Chuang Tzu’s criticism should be condemned first of all. Chuang Tzu also talked much about the importance of having no knowledge. But such discussion is itself a form of knowledge. When there is no knowledge, there can be no discussion about it. In criticizing the Taoists, the later Mohists pointed out certain logical paradoxes that have also appeared in Western philosophy. It is only with the development of a new logic in recent times that these paradoxes have been solved. Thus in contemporary logic, the criticisms made by the later Mohists are no longer valid. Yet it is interesting to note that the later Mohists were so logically minded. More than any other school of ancient China, they attempted to create a pure system of epistemology and logic. CHAPTER 12 THE YIN-YANG SCHOOL AND EARLY CHINESE COSMOGONY In the second chapter of this book I said that the Yin-Yang School had its origin in the occultists. These occultists were anciently known as the fang shih, that is, practitioner of occult arts. In the “Treatise on Literature” (ch. 30) in the History of the Former Han Dynasty, which is based on the Seven Summaries by Liu Hsin, these occult arts are grouped into six classes. The Six Classes of Occult Arts The first is astrology. “Astrology, says this chapter in the Han History; “serves to arrange in order the twenty-eight constellations, and note the progressions of the five planets and of the sun and the moon, so as to record thereby the manifestations of fortune and misfortune.” )Y�e���^�NASkQ�[0ek�Nf�eg��N�~ T�QKNa�0 The second deals with almanacs. “Almanacs,” says the same treatise, serve to arrange the four seasons in proper order, to adjust the times of the equinoxes and solstices, and to note the concordance of the periods of the sun, moon, and five planets, so as thereby to examine into the actualities of cold and heat, life and death….Through this art, the miseries of calamities and the happiness of prosperity all appear manifest.” �S1����^�V�eKNMO�ckR�KN���O�eg�NfKN����N��[�f@guKN�[0& & �Q�SKN�`� T��KN�U�vQ/g�v�Q q0 The third is connected with the five Elements. “This art,” says the “Treatise on Literature,” “arises from the revolutions of the Five Powers [Five Elements], and if it is extended to its farthest limits, there is nothing to which it will not reach. vQ�l�Nw��N�_�~�Y��cvQ�gR�e N� The fourth is divination by means of the stalks of the milfoil plant and that done with the tortoise shell or shoulder bones of the ox. These were the two main method* of divination in ancient China. In the latter method, the diviner bored a hole in a tortoise shell or a flat piece of bone, and then applied heat to it by a metal rod in such a way as to cause cracks to radiate from the hole. These cracks were interpreted by the diviner according to their configuration as an answer to the question asked. In the former method, the diviner manipulated the stalks of the milfoil in such a way as to produce certain numerical combinations which could be interpreted by means of the Book of Changes. Such interpretation was the primary purpose of the original corpus of this work. The fifth group is that of miscellaneous divinations and the sixth is the system of forms. The latter included physiognomy together with what in later times has been known as feng-shui, literally, “wind and water.” Feng-shui is based on the concept that man is the product of the universe. Hence his house or burial place must be so arranged as to be in harmony with the natural forces, i.e., with “wind and water. In the days when feudalism was in its prime during the early centuries of the Chou dynasty, every aristocratic house had attached to it hereditary experts in these various occult arts, who had to be consuited when any act of importance was contemplated. But with the gradual disintegration of feudal-ism, many of these experts lost their hereditary positions and scattered throughout the country, where they continued to practice their arts among the people. They then came to be known as the fang shih or practitioners of occult arts. Occultism or magic is itself, of course, based on superstition, but it has often been the origin of science. The occult arts share with science the de-sire to interpret nature in a positive manner, and to acquire the services of nature through its conquest by man. Occultism becomes science when it gives up its belief in supernatural forces, and tries to interpret the universe solely in terms of forces that are natural. The concepts of what these natural forces are may in themselves initially look rather simple and crude, yet in them we find the beginnings of science. Such has been the contribution of the Yin -Yang school to Chinese thought. This school represents a scientific tendency in the sense that it tried to give a positive interpretation to natural events in terms solely of natural forces. By the word positive I mean that which has to do with matters of fact. In ancient China there were two lines of thought that thus tried to interpret the structure and origin of the universe. One is found in the writings of the Yin-Yang school, while the other is found in some of the “Appendices” added by anonymous Confucianists to the original text of the Book of Changes. These two lines of thought seem to have developed independently. In the “Grand Norm” and “Monthly Commands, 0*m�0�T 0g�N0which we will examine be-low, there is stress on the Five Elements but no mention of the Yin and Yang; in the Appendices of the Book of Changes, on the contrary, much is said about the Yin and Yang, but nothing about the Five Elements. Later, however, these two lines of thought became intermingled. This was already the case by the time of Ssu�ma T an (died IIO B.C.), so that in the Historical Records he lumps them together as the Yin-Yang school. The Five Elements as Described in the Grand Norm The term Wu Hsing is usually translated as the Five Elements. We should not think of them as static, however, but rather as five dynamic and interacting forces. The Chinese word hsing means to act or to do, so that the term Wu Hsing, literally translated, would mean the Five Activities, or Five Agents. They are also known as the Wu Te, which means Five Powers. The term Wu Hsing appears in a text traditionally said to antedate the twentieth century B.C. (See the Book of History; Part 111, Book II, eh. I, 3.) The authenticity of this text cannot be proved, however, and even if it were proved, we cannot be sure whether the term Wu Hsing means the same thing in it as it does in other texts whose date is better fixed. The first really authentic account of the Wu Hsing, therefore, is to be found in another section of the Book of History (Part V, Book 4), known as the Hung Fan or “Great Plan” or “Grand Norm.” Traditionally, the “Grand Norm” is said to be the record of a speech delivered to King Wu of the Chou dynasty by the Viscount of Chi, a prince of the Shang dynasty which King Wu conquered at the end of the twelfth century B.C. In this speech, the Viscount of Chi�{P[in turn attributes his ideas to Yu, traditional founder of the Hsia Dynasty who is said to have lived in the twenty-second century B.C. These traditions are mentioned as examples of the way the writer of this treatise tried to give importance to the Wu Hsing theory. As to the actual date of the “Grand Norm,” modern scholarship inclines to place it within the fourth or third centuries B.C. In the “Grand Norm” we are given a list of “Nine Categories.” “First [among the categories],” we read, “is that of the Wu Hsing. The first [of these] is named Water; the second, Fire; the third, Wood; the fourth, Metal; the fifth, Soil. [The nature of] Water is to moisten and descend; of Fire, to flame and ascend; of Wood, to be crooked and straighten; of Metal, to yield and to be modified; of Soil, to provide for sowing and reaping. ‘ Next comes the category of the Five Functions. “Second,” we read, “is that of the Five Functions. The first [of these] is personal appearance; the second, speech; the third, vision; the fourth, hearing; the fifth, thought. Personal appearance should be decorous; speech should follow order; vision should be clear; hearing, distinct; thought, profound. Decorum produces solemnity; following order, regularity; clearness, intelligence; distinctness, deliberation; profundity, wisdom. Skipping now to the eighth of the Nine Categories, we come to what the “Grand Norm” calls the various indications: “The eighth is that of various indications. These are rain, sunshine, heat, cold, wind, and seasonableness. When these five come fully and in their regular order, The various plants will be rich and luxuriant. If there is extreme excess in any of them, disaster follows. The following are the favorable indications: the solemnity of the sovereign will be followed by seasonable rain; his regularity, by seasonable sunshine; his intelligence, by seasonable heat; his deliberation, by season-able cold; his wisdom, by seasonable wind. The following are the unfavorable indications: the madness of the sovereign will be followed by steady rain; his insolence, by steady sunshine; his idleness, by steady heat; his haste, by steady cold; his ignorance, by steady wind. ]Ntu � N0�NL��N�f4l��N�fkp� N�f(g��V�fё��N�fW04l�f�mN�kp�f�p N�(g�f�f�v�ё�f�Ni���X0revQr�R��vQ�NR(g0 �SdlKN�e�)YHQ�ёRu�N4l0dl�f�ёl܀0ёl܀�EevQr�}v�vQ�NRё0 �S�e�sKN�e�)YHQ�kp�d�LNT�9NfNƖ�NhT>y0�e�s�f�kpl܀0kpl܀�EevQr�d��vQ�NRkp0 �Nkp��_4l0)YNHQ�4ll܀04ll܀�EevQr�ў�vQ�NR4l04ll�� N�w�peY��_�NW0 The Yin Yang school maintained that the Five Elements produce one another and also overcome one another in a fixed sequence. It also maintained that the sequence of the four seasons accords with this process of the mutual production of the Elements. Thus Wood, which dominates spring, produces Fire, which dominates summer. Fire in its turn produces Soil, which dominates the “center ; Soil again produces Metal, which dominates autumn; Metal produces Water, which dominates winter; and Water again produces Wood, which dominates spring. According to the above quotation, the succession of dynasties likewise accords with the natural succession of the Elements. Thus Earth, under whose Power the Yellow Emperor ruled, was overcome by the Wood of the Hsia dynasty. The Wood of this dynasty was overcome by the Metal of the Shang dynasty, Metal was overcome by the Fire of the Chou dynasty, and Fire would in its turn be overcome by the Water of whatever dynasty was to follow the Chou. The Water of this dynasty would then again be overcome by the Soil of the dynasty following, thus completing the cycle. As described in the Lii-shih Ch’un-ch’iu, this is but a theory, but soon afterward it had its effect in practical politics. Thus in the year 221 B.C., the First Emperor of the Chin dynasty, known as Ch in Shih�Huang�Ti (246� 210 B.C.), conquered all the rival feudal states and thus created a unified Chinese empire under the Ch’in. As the successor to the Chou dynasty, he actually believed that “the force of Water is in ascendancy,” and so, according to Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Historical Records, “assumed black as his color” and “took Water as the pattern for affairs.” “The name of the Yellow River,” says the Historical Records, “was changed to that of Power Water, because it was supposed to mark the beginning of the Power of Water. With harshness and violence, and an extreme severity, everything was decided by the law. For by punishing and oppressing, by having neither human� heartedness nor kindness, but only conforming to strict justice, there would come an accord with [the transformations of] the Five Powers.” (Ch. 6.) �c�~�Y�N�_KN O��N:NhT�_kp�_0�y�NhT�_��N@b N܀��e�N4l�_KN�Y �vQr�ў�vQ�NR4l�Ğ�l9e T �_4l 0 �N:N4l�_KN�Y0R�k>b�m��N�v�Q�N�l�;RJR�e�Ni`�TIN�6qTT�N�_KNpe Because of its very harshness, the Chin dynasty did not last long, and was soon succeeded by that of Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 22O). The Han Emperors also believed that they had become Emperors “by virtue of’ one of the Five Powers, but there was considerable dispute as to which of the Powers it was. This was because some people maintained that the Han was the successor of the Chin, and therefore ruled through Soil, whereas others maintained that the Chin had been too harsh and short to be counted as a legitimate dynasty, so that the Han dynasty was actually the successor of the Chou. Support for both sides was found from many omens which were subject to varying interpretations. Finally, in 104 B.C., the Emperor Wu decided and formally announced that Soil was the Power for the Han. Even afterward, however, there were still differences of opinion. Following the Han dynasty, people no longer paid very much attention to this question. Yet as late as 1911, when the last dynasty was brought to an end by the Chinese Republic, the official title of the Emperor was still “Emperor through the Mandate of Heaven and in accordance with the Movements [of the Five Powers].” The Yin and Yang Principles As Described in the “Appendices” of the Book of Changes The theory of the Five Elements interpreted the structure of the universe, but did not explain the origin of the world. This was provided by the theory of the Yin and Yang. The word yang originally meant sunshine, or what pertains to sunshine and light; that of yin meant the absence of sunshine, i.e., shadow or darkness. In later development, the Yang and Yin came to be regarded as two cosmic principles or forces, respectively representing masculinity, activity, heat, brightness, dryness, hardness, etc., for the Yang, and femininity, passivity, cold, darkness, wetness, softness, etc., for the Yin. Through the interaction of these two primary principles, all phenomena of the universe are produced. This concept has remained dominant in Chinese cosmological speculation down to recent times. An early reference to it appears already in the Kuo Yu or Discussions of the States 0�V�0(which was itself compiled, however, probably only in the fourth or third century B.C.) This historical work records that when an earthquake occurred in the year 780B.C., a savant of the time explained: “When the Yang is concealed and cannot come forth, and when the Yin is repressed and cannot issue forth, then there are earth-quakes.” (Chou YU, I, 10.) 3�O� N��Q�4��� N���edkW[�ocr)��N/f g0W� Later, the theory of the Yin and Yang came to be connected primarily with the Book of Changes. The original corpus of this book consists of what are known as the eight trigrams, each made up of combinations of three divided or undivided lines, as follows: EE, E��, ZE, EJE, ErE, rE, El, E E. By combining any two of these trigrams with one another into diagrams of six lines each, ^ j l,|j, etc., a total of sixty-four combinations is obtained which are known as the sixty�four hexagrams. The original text of the Book of Changes consists of these hexagrams, and of descriptions of their supposed symbolic meaning. According to tradition, the eight trigrams were invented by Fu Hsi, China s first legendary ruler, antedating even the Yellow Emperor. According to some scholars, Fu Hsi himself combined the eight trigrams so as to obtain the sixty-four hexagrams; according to others, this was done by King Wen of the twelfth century B.C. The textual comments on the hexagrams as a whole and on their hsiao (the individual lines in each hexagram) were, according to some scholars, written by King Wen; according to others, the comments on the hexagrams were written by King Wen, while those on the hsiao were by the Duke of Chou, the illustrious son of King Wen. Whether right or wrong, these attributions attest the importance which the Chinese attached to the eight trigrams and sixty�four hexagrams. Modern scholarship has advanced the theory that the trigrams and hexagrams were invented early in the Chou dynasty as imitations of the cracks formed on a piece of tortoise shell or bone through the method of divination that was practiced under the Shang dynasty (1766?-nil’! B.C.), the dynasty that preceded the Chou. This method has already been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. It consisted of applying heat to a shell or bone, and then, according to the cracks that resulted, determining the answer to the subject of divination. Such cracks, however, might assume an indefinite number of varying configurations, and so it was difficult to interpret them according to any fixed formula. Hence during the early part of the Chou dynasty this kind of divination seems to have been supplemented by another method, in which the stalks of a certain plant, known as the milfoil, were shuffled together so as to get varying combinations yielding odd and even numbers. These combinations were limited in number and so could be interpreted according to fixed formulas. It is now believed that the undivided and divided (i.e., odd and even) lines of the trigrams and hexagrams were graphic representations of these combinations. Thus the diviners, by shuffling the stalks of the milfoil, could obtain a given line or set of lines, and then, by reading the comments on it contained in the Book of Changes, could give an answer to the question on which divination was made. This, then, was the probable origin of the Book of Changes, and explains its title, which refers to the changing combinations of lines. Later, however, many supplementary interpretations were added to the Book of Changes, some moral, some metaphysical, and some cosmological. These were not composed until the latter part of the Chou dynasty, or even the earlier portion of the following Han dynasty, and are contained in a series of appendices known as the Ten Wings. In this chapter we shall discuss only the cosmological interpretations, leaving the remainder for chapter fifteen. Besides the concept of Yin and Yang, another important idea in the “Appendices” is that of number. Since divination was usually regarded by the ancients as a method for revealing the mystery of the universe, and since divination through the use of stalks of the milfoil plant was based on the combination of varying numbers, it is not surprising that the anonymous writers of the “Appendices” tended to believe that the mystery of the universe is to be found in numbers. According to them, therefore, the numbers of the Yang are always odd, and those of the Yin are always even. Thus in “Appendix III” we read: “The number for Heaven [i.e., Yang] is one; that for Earth [i.e. Yin] is two; that for Heaven is three; that for Earth is four; that for Heaven is five; that for Earth is six; that for Heaven is seven; that for Earth is eight; that for Heaven is nine; that for Earth is ten. The numbers for Heaven and the numbers for Earth correspond with and complement one another. The numbers of Heaven [put together] are twenty-five; the numbers of Earth [put together] are thirty; the numbers of both Heaven and Earth [put together] are fifty five. It is by these numbers that the evolutions and mystery of the universe are performed. )YN0W�N�)Y N0W�V�)Y�N0WmQ�)YN0WkQ�)Y]N0WAS0)Ype�N�0Wpe�N��NMO�v�_�T gT0)Ype�NAS g�N�0Wpe NAS��Q)Y0WKNpe�NAS g�N0dk@b�Nb�SS�L�<��^y_N0 ( 0�|�� O0 N) Later the Yin-Yang school tried to connect the Five Elements with the Yin and Yang by means of numbers. Thus it maintained that one, the number for Heaven, produces Water, and six, the number for Earth, completes it. Two, the number for Earth, produces Fire, and seven, the number for Heaven, completes it. Three, the number for Heaven, produces Wood, and eight, the number for Earth, completes it. Four, the number for Earth, produces Metal, and nine, the number for Heaven, completes it. Five, the number for Heaven, produces Soil, and ten, the number for Earth, completes it. Thus one, two, three, four and five are the numbers that produce the Five Elements; six, seven, eight, nine and ten are the numbers that complete them.* This is the theory, therefore, that was used to explain the statement just quoted above: "The numbers for Heaven and the numbers for Earth correspond with and complement one another." It is remarkably similar to the theory of the Pythagoreans in ancient Greece, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, according to which the four elements of Greek philosophy, namely Fire, Water, Earth and Air, are derived, though indirectly, from numbers.* This, however, is in China a comparatively late theory, and in Appendices themselves there is no mention of the Five Elements. In these Appendices each of the eight trigrams is regarded as symbolizing certain things in the universe. Thus we read in 'Appendix V : "(The trigram) Ch' ien EEE is Heaven, round, and is the father....(The trigram) K un EE is Earth and is the mother. ...(The trigram) Chen is thunder....(The trigram) Sun = is wood and wind....(The trigram) K an � is water...and is the moon....(The trigram) Li EZ is fire and the sun... (The trigram) Ken El is mountain....(The trigram) Tui EE: is marsh. In the trigrams, the undivided lines symbolize the Yang principle, and the divided lines the Yin principle. The trigrams Ch ien and K un, being made up entirely of undivided and divided lines respectively, are the symbols par excellence of the Yang and Yin, while the remaining six trigrams are supposedly produced through the intercourse of these primary two. Thus Ch ien and K'un are father and mother, while the other trigrams are usually spoken of in the Appendices as their sons and daughters. Thus the first line (from the bottom) of Ch ieh � , combined with the second and third lines of K'un EE , results in Chen Ei , which is called the eldest son. The first line of K'un, similarly combined with Ch'ien, resulls in Sun EE: , which is called the eldest daughter. The second line of Ch ich, combined with the first and third lines of K un, results in K an EE , which is called the second son. The second line of K' un, similarly combined with Ch' ien, results in Li E-E , which is called the second daughter. The third line of Ch ien, combined with the first and second lines of K un, results in Ken z~z , which is called the youngest son. And the third line of K'un, similarly combined with Ch ien, results in Tui E , which is called the youngest daughter. This process of combination or intercourse between Ch ien and K un, which results in the production of the remaining six trigrams, is a graphic symbolization of the process of intercourse between the Yin and the Yang, whereby all things in the world are produced. That the world of things is produced through such intercourse of the Yin and Yang, is similar to the fact that living beings are produced through the intercourse of the male and female. It will be remembered that the Yang is the male principle, and the Yin, the female principle. In "Appendix III" of the Book of Changes we read: "There is an intemingling of the genial influences of heaven and earth, and the transformation of all things proceeds abundantly. There is a communication of seed between male and female, and all things are produced." Heaven and earth are the physical representations of the Yin and Yang, while Ch ien and K un are their symbolic representations. The Yang is the principle that "gives beginning to things; the Yin is that which completes them. Thus the process of the production of things by the Yang and Yin is completely analogous to that of the production of living beings by the male and female. In the religion of the primitive Chinese, it was possible to conceive of a father god and mother goddess who actually gave birth to the world of things. In the Yin-Yang philosophy, however, such anthropomorphic concepts were replaced by, or interpreted in terms of, the Yin and Yang principles, which, though analogous to the female and male of living beings, were nevertheless conceived of as completely impersonal natural forces. CHAPTER 13 THE REALISTIC WING OF CONFUCIANISM: HSUN TZU @�P[ THE three greatest figures of the School of Literati in the Chou dynasty were Confucius (551-479), Mencius (371?-289? ) and Hsiin Tzu. The latter's dates are not definitely known, but probably lay within the years 298 and 238 B.C. Hsiin Tzu's personal name is K'uang, but he was also known under the alternative name of Hsun Ch'ing. He was a native of the state of Chao in the southern part of the present Hopei and Shansi provinces. The Shih Chi or Historical Records says in its biography of him (ch. 74) that when he was fifty he went to the state of Chi, where he was probably the last great thinker of the academy of Chi-hsia,7zN the great center of learning of that time. The book hearting his name contains thirty two chapters, many of them detailed and logically developed essays which probably come directly from his pen. Among the literati, Hsun Tzu's thought is the antithesis of that of Mencius. Some people say that Mencius represents the left wing of the school, while Hsiin Tzu represents its right wing. This saying, while suggestive, is too much of a simplified generalization. Mencius was left in that he emphasized individual freedom, but he was right in that he valued super�moral values and therefore was nearer to religion. Hsiin Tzu was right in that he emphasized social control, but left in that he expounded naturalism and therefore was in direct opposition to any religious ideas. Position of Man Hsun Tzu is best known because of his theory that human nature is originally evil. This is directly opposed to that of Mencius according to which human nature is originally good. Superficially, it may seem that Hsiin Tzu had a very low opinion of man, yet the truth is quite the contrary. Hsiin Tzu' s philosophy may be called a philosophy of culture. His general thesis is that everything that is good and valuable is the product of human effort. Value comes from culture and culture is the achievement of man. It is in this that man has the same importance in the universe as Heaven and Earth. As Hsiin Tzu says: Heaven has its seasons, Earth has its resources, man has his culture. This is what is meant [when it is said that man] is able to form a trinity [with Heaven and Earth]." (Hsiln-tzu, ch. 17.) )Y gvQ�e00W gvQ"���N gvQ�l�+Y/f�KN��S0 ( 0@�P[�)Y��0) Mencius said that by developing one s mind to the utmost, one knows one's nature, and by knowing one's nature, one knows Heaven. =vQ�_���wvQ'`_N��wvQ'`0R�w)Y�w0 ( 0_[P[�=�_ N0) (Mencius, Vila, I.) Thus, according to Mencius, a sage, in order to become a sage, must "know Heaven." But Hsiin Tzu maintains, on the contrary: "It is only the sage who does not seek to know Heaven." (Hsun-lzu, ch. 17.) /U#W�N:N NBl�w)Y 0( 0)Y��0) According to Hsiin Tzu, the three powers of the universe, Heaven, Earth and man, each has its own particular vocation: "The stars make their rounds; the sun and moon alternately shine; the four seasons succeed one another; the Yin and Yang go through their great mutations; wind and rain are widely distributed; all things acquire their harmony and have their lives. Rf���e��eg�gq��V�e�N�_�4�3�'YS�Θ�ZS�e�NirT�_vQ�T�Nu (Ibid.) Such is the vocation of Heaven and Earth. But the vocation of man is to utilize what is offered by Heaven and Earth and thus create his own culture. Hsiin Tzu asks: Is it not much better to heap up wealth and use it advantageously than to exalt Heaven and think about it? 'Y)Y�`KN�p[Niru�6RKN�(Ibid.) And then he continues: If we neglect what man can do and think about Heaven, we fail to understand the nature of things. (Ibid.) For in so doing, according to Hsiin Tzu, man forgets his own vocation; by daring to "think" about Heaven, he arrogates the vocation of Heaven. Ee�(�c)�N�`)Y�R1YNirKN�`0 This is "to give up that wherewith man can form a trinity with Heaven and Earth, and yet still desire such a trinity. This is a great illusion. (Ibid.) �vQ@b�N�S��?avQ@b�S�R�`�w Theory of Human Nature Human nature, too, should be cultured, for, from Hsiin Tzu s view, the very fact that it is uncultured means that it cannot be good. Hsiin Tzu's thesis is that the nature of man is evil; his goodness is acquired training. �NKN'`�v`�vQ�U��*O_N0 ( 0@�P[�'`v`0) (Hsiln-tzu, ch. 2.3.) According to him, "nature is the unwrought material of the original; what are acquired are the accomplishments and refinements brought about by culture. Without nature there would be nothing upon which to add the acquired. Without the acquired, nature could not become beautiful of itself." (Ibid.) '`��,g�YPg4g_N�*O���et���v_N0�e'`R*OKN�e@b�R��e*OR'` N�ꁎ0 ( 0@�P[�e{kKN:NSђ_NяNЂ NпS—_ЌQ Y_NягЃKN@bеNфЃН‘vQTяP[KN@bфЃН‘vQІNяЋN/f=гw0 'N
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